Webb v Paternosters Case (1619) 78 E.R. 165
LAND LAW – LICENSES – ENFORCEABILITY
Facts
The defendant’s predecessor-in-title granted the claimant a license to leave haystacks on his land.
Issues
Personal rights are generally not enforceable against third-parties, in contrast to proprietary rights, which can be enforced against successors-in-title provided certain requirements are met. The nature of these requirements will depend on the form of the proprietary interest.
A license is a form of personal, non-proprietary interest. The issue in this case was whether the claimant’s license to leave the hay on the land could be enforced against the defendant, who, as successor-in-title, was not a party to the original agreement.
Decision/Outcome
The licence, combined with the actual occupation of the land (the claimant’s possession of the land being represented by his leaving the stack of hay on it) was binding on both the land-owner and their successors-in-title.
To reconcile it with the principle that licenses are non-proprietary, this case has later been interpreted as supporting the principle that if a license ‘shadows’ a proprietary interest such as an easement or an equitable freehold, it can be enforced in the same manner as the relevant proprietary interest. This means that if the proprietary interest can be enforced against the defendant, so can the license.
As such, the court in this case appeared to decide that the claimant had acquired an equitable property right in the land by being granted a right to occupy and possess the land (Wallis v Harrison). This property right was bound to the land and so enforceable against successors-in-title. The license mirrored this property right and so could be enforced against the defendant.
In the absence of a property right to which the license attaches, however, a license remains entirely unenforceable (National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth).
Updated 21 March 2026
This article discusses the seventeenth-century case of Webb v Paternoster (1619) and the general principles it is said to illustrate regarding licences and proprietary interests in land law. The core historical account and the traditional doctrinal framework described — that licences are personal rather than proprietary and are generally unenforceable against third parties — remain accurate statements of established English land law.
The interpretive gloss applied to this case (that a licence may be enforceable where it ‘shadows’ a proprietary interest such as an easement or equitable freehold) and the reference to National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth [1965] AC 1175 as authority for the unenforceability of bare licences against successors-in-title continue to reflect orthodox land law doctrine. No subsequent statutory change or appellate decision has displaced these principles.
Students should note that the broader law on licences — particularly contractual licences and licences coupled with an interest — has continued to be refined through case law and academic commentary. The article provides a sound introductory account of this older authority but should be read alongside more recent treatments of licence enforceability in standard land law texts.
