Attorney-General’s Reference (No 6 of 1980) [1981]
Crime – Assault – Consent – Fighting in a public place other than in the course of sport
Facts:
The respondent and the complainant had an argument. They agreed to engage in a fist fight to settle the matter in a public street. The complainant was injured during the fight and the respondent was charged with assault under s 20 of the Offences Against a Person Act 1861.
Issue:
The question put to the Attorney-General to consider under s 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1972, was whether two people having a physical fight by way of consent, other than in sport, but in a public place, could use consent as a defence if the charge of assault arises. The Attorney-General found that consent was a valid defence, but not where the action involved unlawful activity that was contrary to the interests of the public.
Held:
Assault was defined as an act where a person intentionally or recklessly causes harm through unlawful violence. The Attorney-General opined that violence in a public place, other than in sport, amounted to a breach of the peace and was unlawful. To “unlawfully” wound a person is also a requirement to for an assault charge under s 20 of the Act. Further, violence when in anger was intended and likely to cause bodily injury, and is unlawful regardless of whether consent was given. The only defences found to be available were those permitted by law, i.e. sport, medical procedure, self-defence or the prevention of a crime.
Updated 19 March 2026
This case summary remains broadly accurate. Attorney-General’s Reference (No 6 of 1980) [1981] QB 715 continues to be good law and is the leading authority for the proposition that consent is not a valid defence to assault causing actual bodily harm or worse where the activity is contrary to the public interest. The principle has been affirmed and developed in subsequent cases, most notably R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212 (House of Lords), which confirmed and extended the AG’s Reference reasoning, holding that consent cannot be a defence to the infliction of actual bodily harm for the purposes of sexual gratification. The exceptions to the general rule (sport, surgery, tattooing, and similar recognised categories) also continue to be recognised, as reflected in cases such as R v Wilson [1996] 2 Cr App R 241. There have been no subsequent statutory changes that displace the principles described. One minor point worth noting: the article describes these as the views of the Attorney-General, but the ruling was given by the Court of Appeal (Lord Lane CJ), which is the correct source of the legal principles stated. Section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1972, under which the reference was made, has since been replaced by section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (which governs Attorney-General’s references on points of law), though this does not affect the substance of the decision. Overall, the legal principles summarised in this article remain current.
