Grant v Edwards [1986] Ch. 638
Common Intention – Beneficial Interest – Constructive Trust – Equity – Common Intention – Title Deeds – Conveyance
Facts
The complainant, Mrs Grant, was going to co-habit with Mr Grant. The defendant purchased a house for them to live together in December 1969, with the property conveyed in the joint name of Mr Grant and his brother. The complainant was married to someone else at this time, so the defendant said he would not put her name on the title deeds, as it may affect her divorce from her husband. The defendant paid the deposit and mortgages for the home, while the complainant paid for housekeeping and the children.
Issues
This appeal concerned whether Mrs Grant had a beneficial interest in the property, even though the defendant had not put her name on the conveyance and had paid the mortgage instalments.
Decision/Outcome
It was held that the complainant was entitled to 50 per cent of any proceedings of sale from the house, as she had a beneficial interest under constructive trust. In order to form a constructive trust, there must be a common intention that a person has a beneficial interest; although there were no express words in the title deeds, the excuse made by the defendant about prejudicing the matrimonial proceeds was seen as demonstrating this agreement to share the property. In addition, although the defendant paid the mortgage, Mrs Grant made financial contributions to the upkeep of the home and this would not have been done if she did not think she had an interest in the property. Thus, there is common intention for a constructive trust and the complainant has a beneficial interest in the property.
Updated 21 March 2026
This case summary accurately reflects the decision in Grant v Edwards [1986] Ch 638 and the legal principles it established regarding common intention constructive trusts. The core reasoning — that a fabricated excuse for excluding a claimant from the legal title can itself evidence a common intention to share beneficially, and that substantial indirect financial contributions can constitute the requisite detrimental reliance — remains good law.
However, readers should be aware that the law in this area has developed significantly since 1986. The House of Lords in Lloyds Bank plc v Rosset [1991] 1 AC 107 appeared to narrow the basis on which a common intention could be inferred from conduct alone, suggesting that only direct contributions to the purchase price or mortgage payments would ordinarily suffice. More recently, the Supreme Court in Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 and Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53 developed the law further in the context of cohabiting couples, particularly regarding quantification of shares and the concept of ambulatory intention. These cases are now the leading authorities on constructive trusts and beneficial interests in the family home context, and Grant v Edwards should be read alongside them. The article’s description of the outcome as entitling Mrs Grant to “50 per cent of any proceedings of sale” contains a minor inaccuracy in terminology — the correct word is “proceeds” not “proceedings” — but this does not affect the legal substance.
