Co-Ownership Disputes Lecture
INTRODUCTION
This chapter is a focused discussion of the areas of dispute within co-ownership. This chapter will reprise some of the discussions that you have already looked over in the chapters titled ‘Joint Tenancies and Tenancies in Common’ and ‘Severance’.
This chapter will look at some of the main sources of dispute within co-ownership. The first is the idea of the right of survivorship. Joint tenants - and their successors - will each have a financial and personal interest in whether or not a deceased joint tenant has been survived by the other joint tenant(s) or whether the deceased joint tenant’s interest passes on to their named successors. The questions are whether the beneficial interest was held jointly in the first place and, if so, whether the joint tenancy still subsisted at death. The second source of dispute is between tenants in common regarding their right of possession.
Given the overlap between this chapter and the foregoing chapters on Tenancies and Severance, it is recommended that you refer to those chapters to fill any gaps in your knowledge on the topics discussed below.
RIGHT OF SURVIVORSHIP
The right of survivorship, as indicated in the chapter on ‘Joint Tenancies and Tenancies in Common’, concerns the idea of being wholly entitled to the property held under a joint tenancy with another (now deceased) joint tenant. A right of survivorship is advantageous to the surviving joint tenant(s) because the survivor or survivors continue to hold the entire interest that was held jointly. Indeed, in joint tenancies there is no concept of shares, because the joint tenants together hold the whole.
The right of survivorship is at the heart of most (if not all) problem questions around disputes in co-ownership. Its importance is due to its allocation of rights over the land. Depending on whether land is subject to a joint tenancy, or is held in common from the outset or following severance, the beneficial interest will either remain with the surviving joint tenant(s) or the deceased’s share will pass through their estate under their will or on intestacy. Who obtains the interest depends on whether the right of survivorship is engaged or not upon the death of the given tenant. Therefore, the other joint tenant(s) and named successors each have a stake in finding out whether a joint tenancy exists or not.
Advantages of survivorship
There can be an imbalance because the person(s) with the right of survivorship will take the entire estate, whether co-owned or now solely owned, regardless of how much they contributed towards the purchase price of the property. They may have contributed no funds whatsoever to the purchase or maintenance of the property, and yet be still regarded as owning the property - most likely their most valuable asset - entirely.
The main question is whether a given person is a beneficial survivor of the deceased joint tenant. The question is unlikely to be whether a given person is the survivor of the legal estate, because that carries duties and responsibilities rather than benefits. The legal owner has responsibilities relating to the management of the land, whereas the beneficial joint tenant would be entitled to the use and enjoyment of the land as well as the ultimate value of the land. So if the land is sold, the proceeds be received by them as a beneficial joint tenant. A legal owner may be the first to receive those proceeds, but they would only be holding the proceeds on trust for the beneficial (co-)owner.
If a beneficial joint tenancy subsists at death, survivorship operates automatically. A death certificate usually suffices to remove a deceased joint proprietor’s name from the register. It does not establish how the beneficial interest was held. If the order of deaths cannot be established, the younger is presumed to have survived the elder for purposes affecting title to property, subject to any order of the court (Law of Property Act 1925, s.184). Survivorship can therefore streamline the means by which a surviving partner in a family household can take legal and beneficial control of the land once their partner has died.
The dispute: joint tenant survivor v. beneficiary of the will
It is an inherent and inescapable quality of joint tenancies that the right of survivorship overrides the wishes of any joint tenant expressed in a will where the two conflict.. That is to say, if a joint tenant wants to pass on their share in property simply by expressing that intention in a will, such an act is insufficient to prevent the surviving joint tenant(s) continuing to hold the interest that was held jointly. On a claim for family provision, the court may treat the deceased’s severable share as part of the net estate to the extent it considers just (Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, s.9).
What this means is that if a person named as a beneficiary in a will wants to ensure that they actually get their share, they have to show the following:
- The testator (the person who wrote the will) had a beneficial interest in the property,
- The testator left that interest to the beneficiary under the will, whether specifically or as part of the residue, and
- The beneficial joint tenancy had been severed as to the testator’s interest before their death, or
- The alleged joint tenancy was actually a tenancy in common at the relevant time.
Intention to be a legal owner
That being said, it is possible that the legal estate is desirable because a given person wants to be able to exercise the powers accorded to the person with the legal estate, and intends to do so without being a beneficiary and therefore reliant on the trustee fulfilling the beneficiary’s wishes. A joint tenancy of the legal estate cannot be severed; only a joint tenancy of the beneficial estate may be severed into tenancies in common (Law of Property Act 1925, s.36(2)), and therefore the idea of severance (and all the issues surrounding the above discussion on that topic) does not apply to the legal estate. It is in any event straightforward to render a person as a joint tenant of the legal estate only (i.e. not a joint tenant of the beneficial estate) by a valid appointment and vesting of the title under the Trustee Act 1925, sections 36, 40 and 41(1) and s.19(2) of the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act (TOLATA) 1996. Section 19 permits all the adult beneficiaries with capacity who together are absolutely entitled to direct an appointment in writing where no one is nominated by the trust instrument to appoint trustees and the section has not been excluded. The joint legal owners can transfer the legal estate together, including to one or more of themselves. One of them cannot alone transfer a separate legal share to a stranger (Law of Property Act 1925, ss.36(2), 72).
Examination Consideration: It is important to remember this distinction between the legal estate and the beneficial estate, particularly for severance. Beneficial estates can be severed; legal estates cannot. Beneficial estates carry the benefits and rights of enjoyment of the estate, whilst the legal estate pertains to the fiduciary and administrative responsibilities that come with control of the land. So when you are looking to answer a problem question about a dispute of co-ownership, it is most likely to do with who gets the beneficial estate, not the legal estate. That said, it is possible a person would like to be a co-owner of the legal estate. See in the Hands-On Examples for an example ofsuch a person.
SEVERANCE AND SURVIVORSHIP
As we have seen in the chapter on Severance, there are a number of ways by which a party can sever their joint tenancy into a tenancy in common as to their own beneficial interest. If there are more than two joint tenants, the others may remain joint tenants of the balance.
For disputes, there are several relevant questions pertaining to the various methods, and so this subsection will do the following: it will enumerate briefly the different methods of severance, and with each method this subsection will set out the priorities of the opposing parties and what they would need to be successful in their claim/defence should the matter be litigated. Finally, it is emphasised here that all discussions here of severance are in the context of survivorship, meaning “what would need to happen for the right of survivorship to be brought to an end?”
- Severance by written notice: This method is unilateral, meaning the joint tenant looking to sever acts alone and does not need the consent of the other joint tenant(s) to the process (Harris v Goddard [1983] 1 WLR 1203, CA). What is required is sufficient notice and immediacy of effect: written notice of the first joint tenant’s decision to sever must be served on all the other joint tenants (Harris v Goddard [1983]), and the notice must express an intention to sever with immediate effect (Harris v Goddard [1983]).
A testator looking to sever and therefore pass on their beneficial interest would want to ensure that they have provided the appropriate degree of notice before their death. Likewise, a person hoping to benefit from the will and testament of the deceased joint tenant would want to provide evidence that such notice was served on the remaining joint tenant(s), for example by delivery to their last-known UK home or place of business under s.196(3) (though not necessarily read by those joint tenants: see Kinch v Bullard [1998] 4 All ER 650). Correctly addressed registered or recorded delivery post is deemed served in the ordinary course of delivery if it is not returned undelivered (s.196(4)).
Conversely, if a surviving joint tenant wants to frustrate such a means of severance, their only hope is that notice was not provided, either at all or to all the joint tenants, and/or that the notice was said to take effect in the future rather than immediately (Harris v Goddard [1983]).
Case in focus: Harris v Goddard [1983]
Mr and Mrs Harris married in 1972. Mr Harris was both legal and beneficial joint tenant with his wife of the property they bought several years later. The marriage later broke down. When filing for divorce, Mrs Harris included in the prayer for her petition “that such order may be made by way of transfer of property and/or settlement of property and/or variation of settlement in respect of the former matrimonial home… and otherwise as may be just.” The petition was served on Mr Harris. Several days before the date fixed for the hearing, he was in a car accident and fell into a coma. He later died from his injuries. His executors sought a declaration that the prayer amounted to a valid severance of the joint tenancy. Mrs Harris denied that the prayer had this effect. The Court of Appeal held that the prayer was invalid authority for severance, because it failed to bring about the desired result (i.e. severance) immediately, despite s.36(2) of the Law of Property Act 1925 requiring that immediacy, and also for failing to evince an intention to sever; the Court of Appeal found that the prayer did no more than invite the court to consider it at some future time.
Key Points:
- The wife sought a divorce and invited the court to make a property order.
- The prayer in the petition was not a valid instrument of severance, because it did not evince the required intention, given that it would not take place immediately.
- Service of the petition did not sever the beneficial joint tenancy because of what the petition asked the court to do.
- Severance by a joint tenant acting on their own share: Like the above, this is where the person looking to sever the joint tenancy acts without the consent of the other joint tenant(s). Indeed, they can even choose to not disclose the alienation to the other joint tenants (Mortgage Corporation Ltd v Shaire [2001] Ch 743, ChD). As with severance by means of serving a notice, a joint tenant must operate on their own share in a manner which is final and irrevocable. In other words, the act itself must operate on their beneficial interest.
A joint tenant may transfer their beneficial interest to the intended recipient during life. A disposition of an existing equitable interest must be in writing signed by the person disposing of it or an agent authorised in writing. This requirement does not affect the creation or operation of a constructive trust (Law of Property Act 1925, s.53(1)(c) and s.53(2)).
A will operates on death. Referring in it to a “share” or “shares” in a property does not sever a beneficial joint tenancy during life.
For example, A and B are joint tenants of Blackacre. A wants to pass on their interest to C, their intended beneficiary. C is not a joint tenant. A expresses in their will an intention to pass on their interest in Blackacre to C. If A speaks of this interest as simply an “interest”, that would not be enough, and so A’s interest will go wholly to B. The result is the same if A talks of their “share” in the will. If A first serves an effective notice of severance on B during life, A’s share can pass under the will to C.
Another route open to joint tenants is that they can mortgage or charge their “share” to a third party, thus severing their interest from that of the other joint tenant(s) (First National Securities Ltd v Hegerty [1985] QB 850, CA). The beneficiary normally takes the share subject to the charge. Inheriting the share does not itself make the beneficiary personally liable for the loan (Administration of Estates Act 1925, s.35).
As with the method of severance by notice, a joint tenant relying on survivorship cannot veto an effective disposition by the other joint tenant. They may dispute whether the alleged disposition actually took effect during the deceased’s lifetime.
A will alone remains insufficient, however clearly it describes the intended gift. A mere unilateral intention is also distinguished from an effective disposition in Corin v Patton (1990) 169 CLR 540 (HC of Australia). The decision is persuasive in England and Wales. The English statutory notice procedure is in s.36(2) of the Law of Property Act 1925.
- Severance by mutual agreement: This method, unlike the ones mentioned above, requires that all joint tenants are not only aware of the initiating joint tenant’s intention to sever the tenancy, but also consent to it. As we have seen, unanimous consent of all the joint tenants is required in order for the severance to be valid and effective (Williams v Hensman 70 E.R. 862).
This kind of severance is heavily evidence-based, particularly where the agreement in issue (i.e. the agreement between the joint tenants to sever their interests) has no written record. If the agreement is not written down, it may be proved by what the parties said or inferred from their acts. As a result, such evidence may be more arguable and therefore less certain to ensure that a court accepts the parties had indeed all agreed to a severance of the joint tenancy.
The irrevocable nature of this means of severance is underscored by the need for finality in the discussion itself: if the parties only reach an agreement in principle to sever the joint tenancy, without agreeing to treat their interests as separate there and then, there is no severance by mutual agreement. A concluded agreement to sever needs no later act to give it effect (Gore and Snell v Carpenter (1990) 60 P & CR 456, ChD).
This type of severance can therefore pose an evidential challenge for a joint tenant or beneficiary hoping to rely on severance. If there is no written evidence, either of the agreement or of any operations on shares undertaken subsequent to the agreement, the court may infer there was merely an agreement in principle, which as we have seen is not enough to create severance. The parties’ dealings following the alleged agreement, including any distribution of sale proceeds in separate shares, may help to establish what they agreed (Crooke v de Vandes (1805) 11 Ves 330).
Conversely, the challenge for a joint tenant hoping to rely on survivorship is that they cannot avoid the consequences if they sign a written document attesting to the severance; they cannot resile from their commitment to the severance. Equally, even if written evidence of the initial agreement is lacking, the acts of the parties may show that they mutually agreed to sever. The joint tenant hoping to rely on survivorship would therefore be in a stronger position if they were not present at the agreement to sever. Alternatively, they might argue that inaction on their part regarding severance - for example, they do not create a will of their own regarding their “share” - is evidence that they did not agree to the severance.
- Severance by mutual conduct: This type of severance relates to ‘any course of dealing sufficient to intimate that the interests of all were mutually treated as constituting a tenancy in common’ (Williams v Hensman 70 E.R. 862 per Page Wood V-C). What must be proved differs between severance by mutual conduct and severance by mutual agreement. In the case of the latter, there must be evidence of an agreement, which can be express or inferred. In the case of the former (i.e. mutual conduct) it is enough that the parties dealt with their interests on the shared footing that they held separate shares. They need not have understood the legal consequences for survivorship (Burgess v Rawnsley [1975] Ch. 429, CA).
This type of severance relies on evidence that the parties mutually treated their interests as separate (Davis v Smith [2011] EWCA Civ 1603). You should remind yourself of the kinds of mutual conduct that will not stand in as sufficient evidence of mutual conduct of severance, such as the physical conversion of premises that are jointly-held into partitioned units that are each separate from one another and self-contained (Greenfield v Greenfield (1979) 38 P & CR 570, ChD).
The difference is in what must be proved. As with negligence and fraud in a civil claim, the standard of proof is the balance of probabilities. Proving fraud without explicit evidence of the intentions of the tortfeasor can be difficult, whilst proving negligence relating to the same alleged tortious acts/omissions is comparatively easier.
Case in focus: Davis v Smith [2011] EWCA Civ 1603
Smith was married to the mother of Davis. Smith and Davis’s mother had together purchased a property as joint tenants. The mother had previously occupied the property as a council tenant. The relationship broke down irretrievably, following which Smith moved out of the property and a divorce petition was served. Both Smith and the mother agreed that the property should be sold and that their endowment policy would be surrendered. Discussions between their respective solicitors initially concerned Smith’s request for all the proceeds from the policy and that the mother would get the “lion’s share” of the sale of the property. They agreed that Mr Smith would receive £9,500 of the policy proceeds, with a balancing payment to Mrs Smith on sale of the house. An offer was made on the property, in the course of which solicitors acting for Smith asked the mother to agree division of the proceeds of sale. Shortly thereafter, a will was executed for the mother appointing Davis as executor to the estate. The mother died several days before she could attend her solicitors’ office for serving a notice of severance. Neither party had served a notice by the time of her death.
The court upheld the trial judge’s finding that the joint tenancy was severed on the basis that the parties showed a common intention to sever by indicating they would divide the proceeds of sale equally, subject to balancing payments in light of the bargain over the endowment policy. An agreement to sell alone would have been consistent with holding the proceeds jointly. The correspondence and the balancing payment showed that the parties were treating their interests as separate.
Key Points:
- The relevant parties agreed to split the proceeds of sale of the property.
- The bargain over the split of the proceeds of sale was also subject to another bargain relating to the endowment policy i.e. that each party would receive a “share” of the proceeds.
- Both parties had been advised to give notice of severance, but neither had done so.
- The parties’ agreement about division of the proceeds, and the way they dealt with the policy, mattered. Filing for divorce alone would not have severed the joint tenancy.
Examination Consideration: These four kinds of severance - the serving of notice, operating upon one’s own share, mutual agreement, and mutual conduct - are all potential methods that could feature in an exam question on a dispute over co-ownership and survivorship. Remember the likely positions of the parties and what they would need to show in order to be successful in defeating the claim/defence/counterclaim of the other party/parties.
- Severance by other methods: As you will recall from the chapter on severance, there are several other ways in which severance may be effected. These are summarised in brief as they are less likely to be featured in a dispute over severance. First, there is severance by reason of an involuntary alienation, meaning where the parties’ interests have severed due to an operation of law. A common example is where one of the tenants is declared bankrupt (Re Pavlou (A Bankrupt) [1993] 1 WLR 1046). Second, there is severance following an unlawful killing by (one of) the joint tenants: public policy is keen to discourage the possibility of a person profiting by the killing of another person, and here that would mean that a joint tenant who unlawfully kills another, or procures their death, is precluded from benefiting by survivorship even if obtaining the property was not the motive (Re K, decd [1985] Ch 85, ChD). Third, if one joint tenant looks to “merge” their interest in the co-owned land with an interest in a greater estate in the same land, then that may result in severance because the unity of interest has been overtaken by the merger.
In bankruptcy the bankrupt’s beneficial interest vests in the trustee in bankruptcy (Insolvency Act 1986, ss.291A and 306). In the case of unlawful killing, the court can modify the effect of forfeiture where justice requires, except where the offender stands convicted of murder (Forfeiture Act 1982, ss.2 and 5).
For a successor to the bankrupt or other co-owner, the question is what beneficial interest, if any, remained in the co-owner’s estate at death.
Examination Consideration: As you might expect, these forms of severance are less likely to feature in an exam. Nevertheless, it is possible that they could arise, so it may assist you to revise them in preparation for an exam, particularly where there has been involuntary alienation of one’s share.
TENANCIES WITHOUT THE FOUR UNITIES
The prior section dealt with severance of a joint tenancy. In that scenario, it is accepted that the parties were in a joint tenancy at some point up until an alleged severance. But what if the validity of the joint tenancy itself is called into question? In that case, the issue becomes whether the tenancy was a joint tenancy or a tenancy in common at a given time.
To answer the question of whether a joint tenancy is valid we must deal with issues over the four unities. We address the four unities because they are the requirements of a joint tenancy. Their absence does not automatically establish a tenancy in common. The parties may have no estate in the land at all (AG Securities v Vaughan [1990] 1 A.C. 417, reversing the Court of Appeal majority including Fox LJ). The four occupiers in that case had individual licences. Where there is beneficial co-ownership, the parties can expressly take distinct shares as tenants in common even if all four unities are present.
We will therefore look at ways in which parties may be in a dispute over the alleged validity of a joint tenancy based on the unities of interest, title, and time. We will not deal with the unity of possession, because tenancies in common must have that unity.
Given what we have said already, we can sum up the outcomes hoped for by the parties in this manner: successors (and tenants who want to pass on their interest to persons other than the alleged joint tenants) may seek to show that a unity other than possession was missing, or that the parties held separate beneficial shares by agreement. The persons claiming to be joint tenants, on the other hand, want to prove that those four unities are present.
- Interest: Each tenant must have exactly the same kind of interest, of the same extent and duration. How you discern whether the parties have a common type of interest is by looking at distinguishing characteristics between the tenants. For example, are they said to all be freeholders, or are some said to be leaseholders?
A successor would want to show that the parties did not have the same kind of interest, and would do so by pointing to any distinguishing characteristics in the legal status of the rights amongst the tenants. Conversely, the persons claiming to be joint tenants would rely on evidence that their interests were all equal at the relevant times.
- Title: Every tenant must derive their title from the same document or act. If the tenants obtained their interest in the property via different means (and therefore possibly at different times; see paragraph on ‘Time’ immediately below) then there may be separate interests. But separate documents can be interdependent parts of the same transaction (Antoniades v Villiers [1990] 1 AC 417).
For either party, establishing that title was obtained either in unison or separately should be straightforward. As with interest, it is beneficial to the other joint tenant(s) if the deceased joint tenant had taken ownership via the same means as the remaining joint tenant(s). Conversely, any successors of the deceased joint tenant would want to show that the joint tenants’ interests are derived from separate sources. An example of a separate source would be where the tenants obtained their interests via separate grants over the land.
- Time: As with title above, the interests must generally vest at the same time. And in repeating what was said at the preceding paragraph, it is in the interests of the remaining joint tenant(s) that the deceased joint tenant had taken ownership at the same time as the remaining joint tenant(s), whilst hopeful successors of the deceased tenant would hope for evidence that the interests were obtained at separate times. It is the time when the interests vest that matters. Two independent grants made moments apart do not satisfy unity of time merely because they are close together. Conversely, documents signed separately can take effect together as one transaction.
Examination Consideration: As you will have seen, each party will hope for opposing outcomes. In a dispute over the validity of a joint tenancy’s four unities, it is likely to be in the interest of other joint tenants that all four unities are present (unless of course they too want to take a “share” rather than the property wholly). Conversely, named successors would want the tenancy to be a tenancy in common in order to take their deceased benefactor’s share. When answering a problem question, therefore, it is likely to be the case that you will need to distinguish between the contrasting positions, and also make clear who would be successful.
DISPUTES BETWEEN TENANTS IN COMMON
Thus far the discussion has focused on disputes between co-owning joint tenants and named successors. However, questions may also focus on disputes between tenants in common. A trustee or a person with an interest under the trust can apply for an order about the exercise of the trustees’ powers, including a sale, or for a declaration of the beneficial shares (TOLATA 1996, s.14). Under s.15 the court considers the intentions of those who created the trust, its purposes, the welfare of any minor who occupies or might reasonably be expected to occupy the land as a home, and the interests of any secured creditor of a beneficiary. The court also considers the circumstances and wishes of the beneficiaries specified in s.15(2) or (3), according to the application. Different rules apply to a trustee in bankruptcy’s application under s.335A of the Insolvency Act 1986. Here are some of the common disputes:
- Physical demarcation: As with joint tenancies, tenants in common are unified in rights of possession over the land. One of the acts that such a unity prohibits is the demarcation or separation of land by one tenant in common where that demarcation is intended to exclude the other tenants in common from using that land (Bull v Bull [1955] 1 QB 234, CA). A beneficiary with an interest in possession has a right to occupy if the trust purposes include making the land available for their occupation or the trustees hold it so as to be available (TOLATA 1996, s.12(1)). Where two or more beneficiaries are entitled to occupy, the trustees may reasonably restrict or exclude one or more, but not all, under s.13. A person already in occupation cannot be displaced under that power without their consent or the court’s approval. A dispute can be referred to the court under s.14. One can imagine a problem question therefore in which a tenant in common tries to demarcate land, and then considers asking the court, especially if that tenant in common intends to argue that the property is unsuitable or unavailable for occupation by other tenants in common (TOLATA 1996, s.12(2)).
- Payment of rent: Given the right of possession that exists between tenants in common, it is also the case that a tenant in common cannot demand rent merely because another tenant in common occupies the property (Henderson v Eason (1851) 17 QB 701). Trustees may impose reasonable conditions on occupation, including payment of outgoings. If a beneficiary’s entitlement to occupy is excluded or restricted, the trustees may require an occupying beneficiary to compensate the beneficiary whose right is curtailed (TOLATA 1996, ss.13(1), (3), (5) and (6)(a)). The court can order compensation in a dispute under ss.14 and 15 (Murphy v Gooch [2007] EWCA Civ 603).
- Paying for improvements and maintenance: If a tenant in common offers to pay for maintenance or repairs to the co-owned property, they cannot require the other tenant(s) in common to immediately contribute a share of the cost. On sale, the paying tenant can seek an allowance for repairs or improvements which enhanced the value of the property. The other co-owner’s contribution is normally their proportion of the lesser of the reasonable expenditure and the increase in value (Leigh v Dickeson (1884) 15 QBD 60, CA; Re Pavlou (A Bankrupt) [1993]).
Law Teacher writing support
Writing a law essay?
We choose a writer who is an expert in your area of law and qualified to at least the academic level you select. Most of our writers hold a master’s degree or PhD, have teaching experience, or both.
Send us your question and, if you wish, any marking criteria. We’ll write an essay to your instructions.
Cite This Module
To export a reference to this article please select a referencing style below: