Jaggard v Sawyer [1995] 1 W.LR. 269
LAND LAW – BREACH OF RESTRICTIVE COVENANT – REMEDY
Facts
The defendant was subject to a restrictive covenant requiring them to leave a private road clear for use. They breached this covenant by building a house and beginning to build access to that house partially on the road. The claimant sought an injunction for the cessation of the construction work and to bar the occupiers of the new house from using the road. The judge at first instance granted damages in lieu of an injunction.
Issue
The case of Shelfer v City of London Electric Lightingheld that damages in lieu of an injunction should be granted if four conditions are satisfied: the damage to the claimant is small, is capable of monetary valuation, can be compensated by a small money-payment, and it would be oppressive to impose an injunction on the defendant. This is sometimes referred to as the ‘working rule’.
The issue in this case was whether the working rule was satisfied and the meaning of ‘oppressive’.
Held
The Court of Appeal upheld the grant of damages in lieu of an injunction.
The Court stressed that injunctions should be the normal remedy in a restrictive covenant case unless the four conditions are made out. They noted that the evaluation of whether an injunction would be oppressive to the defendant should not slip into a ‘balance of convenience’ style test: it is a higher threshold. Relevant factors to consider when evaluating the oppressiveness of an injunction include whether the claimant could have sought an injunction at an earlier, more convenient stage and whether the defendant acted with blatant and calculated disregard for the claimant’s rights.
In this case, all four conditions of the working rule were deemed to have been met.
Updated 21 March 2026
This case summary is broadly accurate as a statement of the law in Jaggard v Sawyer [1995] 1 WLR 269. However, readers should be aware of a significant subsequent development: the Supreme Court in Coventry v Lawrence [2014] UKSC 13 revisited the Shelfer ‘working rule’ and the approach to damages in lieu of an injunction. Lord Neuberger (with whom the majority agreed) expressed the view that the Shelfer criteria had been applied too mechanically and that courts should exercise a broader discretion when deciding whether to award damages instead of an injunction. The Supreme Court indicated that the fact that an injunction would be oppressive to the defendant, or that damages would be an adequate remedy, are relevant considerations, but the Shelfer test should not be treated as a rigid checklist. This does not overrule Jaggard v Sawyer itself, which remains good law on its facts, but the wider legal framework for the discretion to award damages in lieu of an injunction has been substantially reconsidered. Students relying on Jaggard v Sawyer and Shelfer should read Coventry v Lawrence alongside these cases for a complete and current picture of the law.
