Otuo v Morley and another [2016] EWHC 46 (QB)
Religious membership; intention to create legal relations; permission to add a contractual claim.
The High Court refused Mr Otuo permission to add a breach of contract claim concerning his expulsion from the Jehovah’s Witnesses. He had not established an arguable contract with the organisation he sued or an actionable breach of an identified obligation. The court did not decide that religious membership could never involve enforceable obligations.
Facts and application
Mr Otuo had been expelled in 2012. He sued Jonathan Morley and the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society of Britain for slander over words allegedly spoken at a July 2013 meeting concerning his reinstatement. In those proceedings, he sought permission to add a contractual claim about the process leading to his expulsion.
Law Teacher writing support
Writing a law essay?
We choose a writer who is an expert in your area of law and qualified to at least the academic level you select. Most of our writers hold a master’s degree or PhD, have teaching experience, or both.
Send us your question and, if you wish, any marking criteria. We’ll write an essay to your instructions.
His proposed claim relied on an oral agreement allegedly made in Ghana in June 1992. He said that two elders had accepted his application for international membership, acting as authorised representatives of the Society. He also relied on religious publications as evidence of membership rules and obligations.
The Society disputed that there was any contract. It pointed out that it had only been incorporated in 1999. Its articles also restricted membership to elders who had been invited to join; Mr Otuo did not satisfy either condition.
Issues
Sir David Eady had to decide whether the proposed amendment disclosed a properly arguable contractual claim against an existing defendant. This required more than identifying religious rules: Mr Otuo needed to explain how a contract with the Society had arisen, what enforceable obligation it imposed, and how that obligation had been broken.
The defendants also argued that he should have raised the contractual claim in his earlier proceedings about the 2012 expulsion, relying on the principle in Henderson v Henderson against improperly bringing related matters in successive proceedings.
Decision and reasoning
The judge considered the amendment on its merits rather than rejecting it for not having been included in the earlier action. That action had been struck out on limitation grounds, with an appeal still pending; no substantive issues had been resolved. The contractual limitation period had not expired, and the policy of finality did not justify refusing to examine the application.
The proposed contract claim nevertheless failed. The alleged 1992 agreement could not have been made with a company that did not exist until 1999. Mr Otuo had not explained any later agreement with that company or shown how he could be its member despite its articles. If he intended to allege a contract with some other organisation, he needed to identify it and formulate that claim. The judge was also unpersuaded that he had identified an arguable breach of a particular contractual rule or obligation.
Further written submissions and extracts from religious publications did not cure these defects. They did not support the alleged contractual relationship with the Society. The suggestion that the Society had acted through another organisation before its own incorporation did not overcome the problem that it had not then existed.
Why the religious context was not decisive
The judge rejected the broader proposition that a religious setting necessarily excludes an intention to create legal relations. The answer depends on the circumstances. Where an organisation assumes powers to discipline or expel members, mutual obligations concerning fair procedures may sometimes be inferred, just as with other clubs or associations.
He distinguished the existence of enforceable obligations from the remedies a court could appropriately grant. A limited declaration might be possible even where forcing a religious body to readmit someone, or awarding compensation, would be difficult.
Permission to amend was therefore refused because of the deficiencies in this proposed claim. This was a decision on the contractual amendment, not a final determination of the slander action or a finding that the expulsion was lawful.
Judgment: Otuo v Morley and another [2016] EWHC 46 (QB), 15 January 2016.
