Legal Case Summary
R v Conway (Francis Gerald) [1989] Q.B. 290
Criminal law – Reckless driving – Duress
Facts
Conway was arrested for driving recklessly in contradiction of the Road Traffic Act 1972, section 2. Conway had driven away from plain-clothed police officers in a reckless manner. Conway’s defence was that he acted under duress and that due to the circumstances he feared for his and his passenger’s life. His passenger was the victim of a shotgun attack under similar circumstances several weeks prior to this and sustained serious injuries from this. Conway was convicted of reckless driving, sentenced to six months imprisonment and was banned from driving for eighteen months. He appealed his conviction.
Issues
Conway had accepted that his driving could be considered reckless in the circumstances but argued that he had driven in the same manner that a reasonable man would have done in the same situation. The legal issue, in this case, was whether the defence submitted by Conway should have been put to the jury or not. The court also raised the question whether the circumstances led to a defence of necessity or duress.
Decision / Outcome
Conway’s appeal against conviction was allowed. Firstly, it was held by the court that it was immaterial whether the defence in this instance was termed as duress or necessity but that if the defendant was acting in order to avoid a threat of serious harm or death, the judge was required to direct the jury to consider this in accordance with their verdict. The trial judge did not do so in the first instance and therefore the conviction had to be quashed.
Updated 20 March 2026
This case summary remains broadly accurate as a description of R v Conway [1989] QB 290 and its role in establishing that duress of circumstances (necessity) is available as a defence to reckless driving where the defendant acts to avoid a threat of death or serious injury. The court’s holding that the label of ‘duress’ or ‘necessity’ is immaterial, and that the judge was required to leave the defence to the jury, is correctly stated.
One point readers should note is that the offence of reckless driving under section 2 of the Road Traffic Act 1972 was abolished and replaced by dangerous driving under section 2 of the Road Traffic Act 1988. The 1988 Act adopted an objective test of dangerous driving rather than the subjective Caldwell-style recklessness standard that applied at the time of Conway. This does not affect the correctness of the case summary as a statement of what was decided, but students should be aware that the specific offence no longer exists in that form. The principles established in Conway regarding duress of circumstances remain good law and have been affirmed in subsequent cases including R v Martin [1989] 1 All ER 652 and R v Pommell [1995] 2 Cr App R 607.
