R v Hudson and Taylor [1971] 2 QB 202
Criminal law- Threat to witness – Perjury
Facts
Hudson and Taylor were two girls who were charged with perjury having given false evidence by failing to identify an individual in the courtroom, during the course of a trial. They had self-confessed that the evidence they had given was false and used the defence of duress on the basis that they had been frightened by threat of injury to them if they had identified the individual. They argued that they had seen an individual in the courtroom who was known for violent behaviour. The jury was directed that duress could not provide a defence in the circumstances and on this basis, they were convicted.
Issues
When giving direction to the jury, the recorder directed that as the offence of perjury had taken place in the courtroom, there was no threat of violence in this instance and therefore the defence could not be implemented. The issue at hand was whether the danger was ‘present’ for the purposes of employing duress as a defence.
Decision/Outcome
Hudson and Taylor’s appeals were allowed and their convictions were quashed. An essential part of the defence of duress was that the threat should be enough to neutralise the will of the accused at the time the crime was committed. On this basis, the jury should have been able to decide to what extent that the impact of the perceived threat had on the circumstances. It was held that just because the threats, in this case, could not be implemented at the relevant moment, it did not mean that the threat was any less ‘present’ to neutralise the girls’ will.
Updated 20 March 2026
This case summary accurately reflects the decision in R v Hudson and Taylor [1971] 2 QB 202. However, readers should be aware that the approach to the defence of duress has developed significantly since 1971, and the authority of Hudson and Taylor has been substantially qualified by later decisions.
In particular, the House of Lords in R v Hasan [2005] UKHL 22 (also reported as R v Z) significantly tightened the requirements for the defence of duress. The Court held that the threat relied upon must be one of death or serious injury, must be directed against the defendant or a member of their immediate family or someone for whom the defendant reasonably regards themselves as responsible, and — critically — must be sufficiently immediate and imminent. The House of Lords expressly disapproved of the broad approach taken in Hudson and Taylor to the imminence requirement, holding that it had been stated too favourably to defendants. Lord Bingham confirmed that the defence is not available where the defendant had a reasonably available safe avenue of escape. This represents a material departure from the more permissive reasoning in Hudson and Taylor on the question of whether a threat needs to be immediately operative.
Students relying on this case should therefore treat it in its modern context: whilst it remains a well-known illustration of the defence of duress and its elements, its reasoning on imminence must be read subject to the stricter approach confirmed in Hasan.
