R v Miller [1983] 2 AC 161

R v Miller [1983] 2 AC 161; [1983] 1 All ER 978

House of Lords, 17 March 1983 — arson and responsibility for failing to counteract a danger created by one’s own conduct.

Facts

James Miller had been staying in a house in Sparkbrook for a couple of weeks. After an evening drinking, he returned, lay on a mattress and lit a cigarette. He fell asleep and awoke to find the mattress on fire.

Instead of trying to extinguish the fire or calling for help, Miller moved into another room and went back to sleep. The fire spread and damaged the house. In his statement to the police he said that he had nothing with which to put it out, so he had left it.

A jury at Leicester Crown Court convicted him of arson under sections 1(1) and 1(3) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971. He was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment. The Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal but certified a question of law for the House of Lords.

Issue

Could a person commit arson by accidentally starting a fire and then failing to take steps to extinguish it or prevent damage, while possessing the intention or recklessness required by the statute?

The prosecution did not rely on Miller having been reckless when he lit the cigarette and fell asleep. It relied on his conduct and state of mind after he awoke and discovered the fire. The question was whether this failure to act could form part of the conduct constituting arson.

Decision

The House of Lords unanimously dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction. Lord Diplock gave the principal speech, with which the other four members agreed. A failure to take available measures against a danger created by one’s own act could give rise to criminal liability where the necessary state of mind accompanied that failure.

Why the accidental beginning did not prevent liability

Lord Diplock treated arson as an offence requiring a result: damage or destruction of another’s property. The defendant’s conduct and state of mind had to be considered over the period in which the fire caused that damage.

The relevant conduct could include both the original act and a later failure to prevent or reduce the danger. It was not necessary for the intention or recklessness to exist at the instant the fire began. Once Miller became aware of the situation his own act had created, his subsequent response was capable of satisfying the offence.

Nor was the responsibility limited to putting the fire out personally. A person who could not deal with it himself could take steps to obtain help, including calling the fire brigade. The measures in question had to lie within the person’s power.

The duty and continuing-act explanations

The trial recorder had explained the case through a duty to act after discovering the fire. The Court of Appeal had instead treated Miller’s behaviour as a continuous course of conduct, within which the required mental element arose.

Lord Diplock considered that both approaches produced the same result on these facts. For directing juries, he preferred the duty explanation because it was easier to understand, although he favoured the word responsibility to distinguish criminal liability from a civil obligation owed to another person.

He applied the approach to recklessness stated in R v Caldwell, adapted to Miller’s delayed awareness of the events. The relevant failure was taking no available step to prevent or reduce the risk after discovering what his own conduct had set in motion, either without considering the obvious risk or after recognising it and deciding not to act.

Scope of the principle

Miller had created the danger; he was not merely a bystander who happened to encounter someone else’s fire. Lord Diplock expressly distinguished passive bystanders. The decision therefore concerned responsibility arising from the defendant’s own conduct, combined with the mental element required for the particular offence.

Judgment: R v Miller, House of Lords.