R v Misra and Srivastava [2004] EWCA Crim 2375; [2005] 1 Cr App R 21 (p 328)
Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), 8 October 2004 — gross negligence manslaughter and legal certainty.
What the appeals concerned
Two doctors challenged their convictions for gross negligence manslaughter. They argued that asking a jury whether negligence was sufficiently serious to be criminal made the offence circular and uncertain. The Court of Appeal rejected that argument: the jury was applying an established legal standard to the facts, rather than inventing an offence.
Facts
Sean Phillips underwent surgery to repair his patella tendon at Southampton General Hospital in June 2000. His wound became infected with staphylococcus aureus. The infection was not treated appropriately and he died from toxic shock syndrome four days after the operation.
Law Teacher writing support
Writing a law essay?
We choose a writer who is an expert in your area of law and qualified to at least the academic level you select. Most of our writers hold a master’s degree or PhD, have teaching experience, or both.
Send us your question and, if you wish, any marking criteria. We’ll write an essay to your instructions.
Dr Amit Misra and Dr Rajeev Srivastava were senior house officers involved in his postoperative care. His persistently raised temperature and pulse, together with low blood pressure, indicated serious illness. Neither doctor obtained and acted on available blood-test results or sought the necessary help from senior colleagues. The prosecution alleged elementary failures to recognise and respond to severe infection.
The case did not depend on failure to identify the precise, rare syndrome. Nor did every omission itself cause the death: the court expressly noted that failing to take blood cultures did not contribute to it because the results would have taken too long. That omission was nevertheless relevant evidence of the attention given to the patient’s condition.
Both doctors accepted that they had made mistakes, but said they had acted in good faith and had not realised how ill their patient was. The jury convicted them. Each received an 18-month prison sentence suspended for two years.
Why the offence was sufficiently certain
The principal challenge relied on Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which requires criminal offences to be sufficiently clear and prohibits retrospective punishment. The court distinguished uncertainty about the ingredients of an offence from uncertainty about how a jury would assess a particular case. The latter is an ordinary feature of trial by jury.
Following R v Adomako, the prosecution had to establish a negligent breach of a duty of care which caused death, exposed the deceased to a risk of death, and occurred in circumstances sufficiently reprehensible to amount to gross negligence. Ordinary negligence attracting civil liability was not enough.
The jury did not first find gross negligence and then make a separate, unrestricted choice about whether to call it criminal. It decided whether the conduct reached the gross-negligence standard. If that and the other ingredients were proved, criminal liability followed. References to criminal conduct in the directions emphasised how far the prosecution had to go beyond proving an ordinary mistake.
The court therefore held the offence compatible with Article 7. Its reasoning required sufficient certainty, rather than a guarantee that every jury would reach the same conclusion on disputed facts.
Risk of death and the doctors’ state of mind
The relevant risk was to life. A risk merely of injury, even serious injury, or harm to health did not suffice. The court approved the approach requiring a serious and obvious risk of death.
The doctors also relied on R v G, arguing that gross negligence manslaughter should require recklessness. The court rejected that submission. R v G concerned the Criminal Damage Act 1971 and had not displaced Adomako. Gross negligence supplied the necessary culpability.
This did not make the defendant’s state of mind irrelevant. Where evidence of it was available, it could be important when assessing gross negligence. The jury had to consider all relevant circumstances in which the breach occurred.
The other grounds of challenge
The Article 6 fair-trial argument also failed. The absence of reasons from the jury did not leave the basis of these convictions unintelligible: the indictment and the judge’s directions identified the allegations and the questions the jury had answered.
The court refused leave to appeal on the claim that there had been no case to answer on causation. The clinical and expert evidence justified leaving that issue to the jury. The prosecution still had to make the jury sure that each doctor’s relevant failures substantially caused the death; uncertainty about whether the patient would have survived appropriate treatment had to be resolved in the defendants’ favour. The court also rejected the argument that the verdicts were perverse.
A separate application sought to introduce new statistical evidence about survival rates. The court refused it. The defence had deliberately chosen not to pursue comparable evidence at trial, and the new report added little to the limitations already explored before the jury. It did not address the clinical assessments on which the prosecution’s causation case substantially rested.
Outcome
The appeals were dismissed and the convictions remained in place. The decision confirmed the distinction between civil negligence and the much higher degree of fault required for gross negligence manslaughter, while leaving the assessment of that degree of fault to a properly directed jury.
Judgment: R v Misra and another [2004] EWCA Crim 2375.