R v Saik [2006] UKHL 18
Court: House of Lords. Judgment: 3 May 2006. Reported: [2007] 1 AC 18; [2006] 2 WLR 993; [2006] 4 All ER 866.
The House of Lords set aside a money-laundering conspiracy conviction because Saik’s accepted guilty plea admitted suspicion, but not the knowledge or intention required for conspiracy.
Facts
Abdulrahman Saik operated a bureau de change near Marble Arch in London. The prosecution alleged that he exchanged cash representing the proceeds of drug trafficking or other criminal conduct into foreign currency.
He was charged with conspiracy under section 1(1) of the Criminal Law Act 1977 to convert criminal proceeds. The relevant substantive money-laundering offence was contained in section 93C(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.
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Saik pleaded guilty on a written basis which stated that he suspected the money was criminal proceeds, but did not know this. He said his suspicions began when the volume of transactions increased in December 2001. The prosecution accepted that basis. The Court of Appeal upheld his conviction, although it reduced his seven-year sentence to five and a half years.
Issues
Could suspicion sufficient for the substantive laundering offence also support a conviction for conspiracy? A second question concerned whether the substantive offence required actual suspicion, as well as reasonable grounds for it, consistently with its requirement of a purpose to assist another person to avoid prosecution or confiscation.
Decision and reasoning
By four to one, the House allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction.
Section 1(1) concerned an agreement to pursue conduct which, if carried out as intended, would necessarily involve an offence. Conspiracy was complete on the making of the agreement; the planned offence need not actually be carried out.
Section 1(2) imposed a further requirement concerning facts or circumstances necessary for the substantive offence. The defendant and at least one other party had to intend or know that the relevant fact or circumstance would exist when the agreed conduct took place. A lesser state of mind sufficient for the completed offence did not automatically suffice for conspiracy.
The criminal origin of the property was such a fact. Lord Nicholls distinguished an agreement concerning identified criminal proceeds from one concerning property not yet identified. For identified property, the required knowledge concerned its actual criminal origin. For unidentified property, an intention that it would be criminal proceeds could satisfy the requirement. It was therefore too narrow to describe actual knowledge as the only possible basis of liability.
Saik’s admitted suspicion did not meet the required standard. The majority rejected the argument that willingness to exchange the money even if it was criminal proceeds necessarily amounted to the relevant intention. Nor could knowledge simply be inferred from his purpose when the prosecution had accepted a plea expressly limited to suspicion.
The substantive offence and the dissent
The House agreed that, where the substantive offence was based on suspicion rather than knowledge, Saik had to suspect the criminal origin himself and have reasonable grounds for that suspicion. An entirely objective basis for suspicion was insufficient. That was compatible with the offence’s separate requirement concerning his purpose.
Baroness Hale disagreed on conspiracy. She considered that an intention to carry out the agreement even if the money was criminal proceeds could be sufficient conditional intention. The majority did not accept that reading of Saik’s qualified plea.
The result turned on the requirements of the conspiracy charge and the accepted basis of plea. It did not establish that suspicion could never support liability for the substantive laundering offence.