Mr Sanambar had lawfully spent most of his childhood in the United Kingdom. The Supreme Court considered how that history affected the proportionality of deportation for serious offences committed while he was under 18. In particular, did the Strasbourg requirement for very serious reasons impose an extra test?
Mr Sanambar came to the United Kingdom from Iran as a child and was granted indefinite leave to remain. He relied on the private and family life he had established here.
The offending and the deportation decision
As a teenager he committed a series of serious offences, including armed robberies, for which he received a custodial sentence. The Home Secretary later decided to deport him.
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Because he was under 18 when he offended, automatic deportation did not apply. The Home Secretary instead relied on the public-good deportation power. Mr Sanambar challenged the decision under article 8.
He succeeded before the First-tier Tribunal. That decision was set aside because the tribunal had applied the 2012 Immigration Rules rather than the criteria introduced in 2014. On a rehearing, with agreed findings about his background preserved, the Upper Tribunal dismissed his appeal. The Court of Appeal agreed. The Supreme Court appeal raised two questions: how article 8 applies to the deportation of a settled migrant who entered as a child and offended as a child, and how to approach “very significant obstacles to integration” in the receiving state.
The statutory test
Section 117C of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, and the matching 2014 Rules, applied throughout the appeals. They provide that deporting a foreign criminal is in the public interest, and that the more serious the offence, the greater that interest. Where the sentence is under four years, deportation is still required unless an exception applies. The exception relied on required lawful residence for most of his life, social and cultural integration in the United Kingdom, and very significant obstacles to integration in the country of return. If it did not apply, deportation was required unless there were very compelling circumstances over and above the matters in the exceptions. Sir Declan Morgan, with whom Lord Reed, Lord Hodge, Lord Sales and Lord Stephens agreed, noted that the Rules are not themselves law, but express the Secretary of State’s policy and are intended to reflect the article 8 case law.
No separate “very serious reasons” test
Article 8 required the tribunal to weigh the prevention of crime against the interference with private and family life. Relevant considerations included the nature and seriousness of the offences, the length of lawful residence, the time since the offences and conduct during that time, and ties to both countries. Strasbourg placed particular weight on childhood residence and on the offender’s age.
The appellant argued that this summary was a further condition. After the four factors, and after particular weight had been given to childhood, juvenile offending and a duty to facilitate reintegration, the state still had to show “very serious reasons”, meaning very serious offending. The first two steps were not disputed. The Supreme Court rejected the third. Maslov applied the four criteria and did not add a later test. Later decisions involving the United Kingdom likewise used an ordinary balance. The words “In short” show that the passage summarises what has gone before. As the Court of Appeal held in Akpinar, the weight of the criteria depends on the circumstances. Children are treated differently from adults, but there is no single extra hurdle based only on the level of offending. Hesham Ali supports the same conventional balancing exercise. The interference must still be supported by relevant and sufficient reasons, and a careful domestic assessment will not normally be remade by the European Court.
Why deportation was upheld
The Upper Tribunal had examined this case carefully under the 2002 Act and the 2014 Rules. The robberies were pre-planned, nocturnal and committed with a knife against vulnerable young people likely to be carrying items of value, against a background of earlier offending. Although all the offending was between the ages of 14 and 17, and this was his first custodial sentence, the offences were plainly very serious and violent, unlike the juvenile delinquency considered in Maslov.
The tribunal considered evidence about rehabilitation alongside its assessment of the remaining risk. It also had to evaluate the appellant’s ties and his prospects of integration in Iran.
The tribunal accepted that he had been lawfully resident for most of his life and was socially and culturally integrated here. The remaining issue was integration in Iran. That demanding test arises only where significant offending has already raised a serious public-interest concern. In Kamara v Home Office, Sales LJ described integration as a broad judgment: not merely the ability to find work or survive, but whether the person will be enough of an insider to understand and take part in life there, have a reasonable opportunity to be accepted, manage day to day, and within a reasonable time build relationships giving substance to private or family life.
The tribunal recognised the obstacles to integration but found they did not satisfy the statutory threshold. The Supreme Court held that there was evidence for that conclusion and that the tribunal had explained the weight given to the history of residence and the risk of further serious harm.
Verdict: The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal. The tribunal had given sufficient reasons for finding deportation proportionate on the evidence before it. The Court observed that circumstances could change and that any material change would need to be raised through the appropriate procedure.
Source: Sanambar v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] UKSC 30
