Every second in this world, people are promising to do or not to do certain things, for example, having a date, or accepting a promotion. These promises expressing the willingness of both parties are basically deemed as agreements. Nevertheless, it becomes much more complicated when an agreement is upgraded to the level of a contract bound by law. Obviously, no one will be sued for calling off an appointment for amusement, unless the arrangements as such are illegal ab initio. Whereas the agreement goes to the heart of contract (Gibson & Fraser, 2009: 268), the creation of an apparent simple contract requires 2 more elements, intention and consideration. Further, for validity, the parties related to the contract must have legal capacity and genuine consent, meanwhile the legitimate purpose and form are necessary. Concisely, any breach of a valid contract, not simple arrangements, will cause legal sanctions.
As mentioned, an arrangement lays the foundation of a contract. An agreement emerges as a result of an unequivocal delivered offer and acceptance, while it can also appear in the form of the acts and conduct of the parties. In Harrison v Nickerson [1873] LR 8 QB 286, Harris saw an advertisement for an auction in a newspaper and traveled to the sale, ended up with being informed of the withdrawal of the item in his favor. Ultimately, the auctioneer was not to blame since the advertisement was simply an invitation to treat not an offer, and Harris did not prove the agreement existed with any file or relevant conduct. Therefore, it is not legally enforceable until the requirements of ‘arrangement’, further ‘contract’, are met. However, the Quasi-contract, like the third party car insurance, is an exception which is compulsorily implemented by law, irrespective of whether there is agreement between the parties involved. In brief, a contract is nonexistent without an agreement admitted by all the parties in most cases.
Notwithstanding a contract is based on an agreement, legally binding contracts comprise more specific and rigorous criteria, amongst which the most essential term is the intention to establish juristic relations. Intention can be express or implied. Mackinnon pointed out that ‘Whether an agreement was intended by the parties to have legal effect is determined at law according to objective criteria and not the subject intention of the parties at the time the agreement was reached'(2005). In other words, wording and conduct of the parties during the consultation are crucial. Express intention albeit rare, referring to any direct statement about the intention to contract within the contract itself, provides definite evidences about the question. The negative terms known as exemption clauses, such as ‘binding in honor only’, and ‘subject to contract’, are mostly presented in commercial agreements. For instance, in Rose and Frank Company v JR Crompton and Bros Ltd [1925] AC 445, the American firm suffered due to the ‘honors clauses’ in the arrangement which excluded the jurisdiction of the court, when the British firm suddenly terminated the relations. However, for the majority of agreements, the intention of the parties is vague, which attracts most difficulties because the court must primarily determine if the arrangement was intended to be legally bound during the trial. For the purpose of helping making objective decisions, the agreements are divided into two categories, commercial or non-commercial. After classification, reputable presumptions of fact are applied to resolve the issue. In the case of business agreements, the inference strongly indicates that the parties intended to create jural nexus. Referring to the case of Edwards v Skyways Ltd [1964] 1 WLR 349, the pilot successfully got the ex gratia payment back, as the court declared that the agreement between the pilot and the airline company was ‘commercial in nature’ and there was ‘a meeting of minds – an intention’; with no prove to rebut. However, by demonstrating the exemption clauses clearly, the presumption about commercial agreements can be refuted. On the other hand, the law presumed that the social, family or voluntary agreements were prima facie unenforceable. Although the assumption is helpful, each case must be treated on the merits, signifying that plaintiffs can controvert the deduction by showing ample evidences. To be specific, in Cohen v Cohen (1929) 42 CLR 91; [1929] HCA 15, where there was actually a domestic arrangement, the wife failed to get the rest dress allowance, because the facts illustrated that the promise was made before separation, albeit at the point of engagement. In comparison, the wife confirmed that her husband had an affair and they were separated at the time the agreement was reached, and succeed in maintaining the lawful rights in Merritt v Merritt [1970] 2 ALL ER 760. In addition, if the consequences for the plaintiff are that serious when the defendant breaks the promise, the court may announce that the intention to be bound existed. Hence, the courts consider about the nature of the agreements, the parties’ relations, and the seriousness of the consequences, or any other relevant circumstances, in dealing with non-commercial agreements in practice. In conclusion, it is the element of ‘intention’ which chiefly distinguishes legally binding contracts from other types of arrangements (Gibson & Fraser, 2009: 250).
Apart from the intention issue, other elements can also differentiate onerous contracts from gratuitous agreements. First, valuable consideration is one requirement for an agreement to become a contract, except formal contracts which get validity from the form alone. People can accept gifts freely, while the electricity bills must be paid. Secondly, if the parties have no legal capacity, such as infants, agreements can not be enforceable. Furthermore, agreements still exist if the parties are threatened to reach the agreement, or even the purposes are illegal, like the drug trade, but contracts with legal obligations can not.
To sum up, a legally binding contract arises from a simple agreement, adding 6 legal restrictions. Those 6 elements—intention to create onerous relations, valuable consideration, legal capacity of parties, genuine consent, lawful objects and complete form required, distinguish contracts with binding nature from daily agreements.
References
Book
Contract law cases Harrison v Nickerson [1873] LR 8 QB 286
Website
http://www.horseforce.com.au/documents/ContractversusAgreement.pdf
Updated 15 March 2026
This article sets out foundational principles of English contract law and remains broadly accurate as a general introduction to the elements required for a legally binding simple contract. The core requirements discussed — agreement (offer and acceptance), intention to create legal relations, consideration, capacity, genuine consent, and legality — continue to reflect established common law principles.
The cases cited, including Harrison v Nickerson [1873], Rose and Frank Company v JR Crompton and Bros Ltd [1925], Edwards v Skyways Ltd [1964], and Merritt v Merritt [1970], remain good law and are still regularly cited in English contract law. Cohen v Cohen (1929) is an Australian High Court decision and should be read accordingly — it is used here for illustrative purposes only and is not binding English authority.
Readers should note several limitations. The article does not address more recent developments in the law of contract formation, including the growing body of case law on electronic contracts and offer and acceptance in online contexts. The treatment of consideration is brief and omits important nuances, including the rule that past consideration is not good consideration and ongoing debate following cases such as Williams v Roffey Bros & Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd [1991] 1 QB 1, which significantly developed the doctrine of practical benefit in the context of consideration for variation of contracts. The article also does not address the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, which is now well established and modifies the strict common law doctrine of privity. The description of quasi-contract is simplified and may cause confusion; the modern preferred term is unjust enrichment or restitution. The article’s reference to compulsory third-party car insurance as a quasi-contract example is not legally precise. Finally, the article appears to draw on Australian and Scottish sources alongside English law without always distinguishing between jurisdictions, which students should bear in mind.
Overall, the article is a useful introductory overview but should not be relied upon for detailed or up-to-date analysis of any of the individual elements it describes.
