This essay concerns England and Wales. It examines the law and the Courts and Tribunals Bill as at 4 November 2026, using the version brought from the Commons on 14 October 2026. The reforms discussed remain proposals.
Introduction
The controversy surrounding the Courts and Tribunals Bill concerns the distribution of power within criminal justice as much as the management of court business. Jury trial places the determination of guilt in the hands of citizens, while reserving questions of law and the conduct of proceedings to a professional judge. A reform which reduces access to that arrangement changes the relationship between the individual and the institutions through which the state prosecutes and punishes. Its justification therefore requires attention to constitutional principle, the quality of adjudication and the practical conditions under which procedural rights can be exercised.
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The government’s October 2026 withdrawal of its proposed judge-only Crown Court Bench Division was a significant concession. The provision was removed at Commons report stage on 13 October. Nevertheless, the Bill retains the removal of defendants’ election for Crown Court trial in either-way cases, a judge-only procedure for certain complex or lengthy cases, powers to enlarge magistrates’ sentencing jurisdiction, and restrictions on appeals from magistrates’ courts. Following Lords second reading on 27 October, the Bill awaits further scrutiny.1 These measures deserve assessment as a connected restructuring of criminal procedure.
This essay argues that the retained package would materially narrow access to jury trial and weaken the combination of procedural choices and corrective mechanisms presently available to defendants. The case for timely justice is compelling: prolonged proceedings can themselves defeat the purposes of a fair hearing. However, a reduction in Crown Court demand establishes only part of the justification for reform. Parliament must also examine where the work will go, which safeguards will replace those removed, and whether the proposed restrictions are proportionate to benefits supported by reliable evidence. A narrowly drawn exception may be defensible where a particular trial presents exceptional difficulties. The broader redistribution of adjudicative power requires a more demanding justification than administrative capacity alone can supply.
The legal and constitutional character of jury trial
The legal starting point is a differentiated system. Summary offences are ordinarily tried in magistrates’ courts, indictable-only offences proceed to the Crown Court, and either-way offences occupy an intermediate category. For an adult defendant whose case is suitable for summary trial, section 20 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 presently preserves a choice between consenting to that procedure and being tried on indictment.2 The right at issue is consequently a concrete statutory entitlement within an established allocation scheme. Describing jury trial as historically important conveys its significance; identifying the particular entitlement clarifies what the Bill would remove.
Its constitutional value is illustrated by R v Wang. The House of Lords held that a judge could never direct a jury to convict, even where the evidence appeared to permit only that conclusion. The decision preserves an institutional separation between judicial direction and the jury’s ultimate determination of guilt.3 That separation matters independently of any claim that juries invariably make better factual decisions. It distributes responsibility for conviction between legal expertise and lay judgment, reducing the concentration of adjudicative authority in a single professional decision-maker. Wang governs the conduct of a jury trial; its reasoning provides constitutional grounds for valuing that mode of trial, rather than an entrenched prohibition on legislative change.
The European Convention on Human Rights supplies a different baseline. In Twomey, Cameron and Guthrie v United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights confirmed that Article 6 permits different forms of tribunal, including trial by an independent judge alone. The Court examined the fairness of the proceedings and the safeguards surrounding the decision to dispense with a jury.4 Convention compatibility therefore leaves substantial room for domestic constitutional choice. A procedure may satisfy the Convention’s requirements while offering fewer protections than Parliament has previously considered appropriate. The important question is whether the reasons for surrendering those additional protections are sufficient.
Three concepts should accordingly remain distinct: an enforceable entitlement under existing legislation, a constitutional practice whose alteration demands persuasive reasons, and the minimum guarantees of a fair hearing under Article 6. Conflating them produces opposite errors. Treating every reduction in jury trial as necessarily unlawful overstates the Convention. Treating the absence of a Convention entitlement as a complete answer overlooks the value of the domestic arrangements being displaced.
Delay as a problem of fairness
The pressure motivating reform is substantial. The Ministry of Justice recorded 80,829 open Crown Court cases at the end of June 2026, including 23,706 which had been open for at least a year. For defendants receiving a jury trial following a not-guilty plea, the median interval from receipt at the Crown Court to the first main hearing was 49.7 weeks.5 Open caseload includes recent cases progressing normally, so it should be distinguished from a backlog consisting exclusively of delayed proceedings. The age profile and waiting-time figures nevertheless demonstrate serious congestion.
The resulting harm extends across the criminal process. Complainants and witnesses may live for prolonged periods with uncertainty, while defendants experience unresolved allegations, restrictions on their liberty and disruption to employment and family life. Evidence can become harder to obtain and recollection less dependable. These consequences make timely adjudication an element of justice itself. In Attorney General’s Reference (No 2 of 2001), the House of Lords recognised the distinct Article 6 entitlement to determination within a reasonable time. It also explained that delay does not automatically require proceedings to be stayed: the appropriate response depends on the circumstances, including the continuing possibility of a fair trial.6
The strongest government argument is therefore about the effective delivery of justice under real constraints. Judicial time, experienced advocates and functioning courtrooms are scarce resources. Additional funding can support their expansion, but training and recruitment take time. The original impact assessment treats saved sitting days primarily as capacity which can be used for other cases, rather than immediate reductions in expenditure.7 That is a more substantial justification than a simple preference for cheaper trials.
Its limits follow from the same reasoning. A proposed restriction should be capable of producing the claimed improvement, should be assessed against less intrusive alternatives, and should preserve a defensible relationship between procedural protection and the consequences of conviction. These are standards for constitutional evaluation, rather than an assertion that Article 6 contains a freestanding proportionality test governing every change of tribunal. The relevant comparison is between workable systems of fair adjudication, each with its own costs, risks and institutional strengths.
Removing election: from individual entitlement to institutional allocation
Clause 1 would remove the defendant’s right to elect trial on indictment for either-way offences. Magistrates would continue to assess suitability for summary trial and parties could make representations, but the ultimate choice of venue would belong to the courts. The government expressly acknowledges that its approach goes beyond Leveson’s recommendation to begin with offences carrying a statutory maximum of two years or less.8 The extension across the either-way category is an independent policy choice requiring its own justification.
There is an intelligible allocation argument. Defendants’ preferences affect a publicly funded system shared with other defendants, complainants and witnesses. Courts already decide many procedural questions, and they may be well placed to assess complexity and seriousness. The existing allocation guideline directs attention to sentencing powers and the circumstances of the case.9 A carefully reasoned allocation decision can therefore pursue a legitimate aim: matching cases to a suitable forum while preserving Crown Court capacity for proceedings which require it.
Nevertheless, suitability and consent perform different functions. Suitability asks whether the lower court can properly hear a case. Consent allows the person exposed to conviction to prefer the independent participation of a jury even where that assessment favours summary trial. Replacing consent with representations changes the substance of the protection. The defendant becomes an applicant seeking to persuade an institution about the forum in which that institution will exercise power, rather than the holder of an entitlement to choose a different form of adjudication.
Expected sentence length is also an incomplete measure of what is at stake. A conviction carrying a modest immediate penalty may have serious consequences for professional registration, livelihood or reputation. These consequences vary between defendants charged with the same offence. They do not establish an unlimited entitlement to the most resource-intensive procedure, but they demonstrate why a jurisdictional boundary based predominantly on anticipated custody requires careful justification. Fairness encompasses the legitimacy of the decision-making process as well as the scale of the eventual sentence.
The change could also increase the significance of charging and allocation practices. Prosecutors determine charges subject to their legal duties, and courts determine venue within the resulting framework. Where defendant election disappears, variation at those stages may have a greater influence on access to a jury. Published allocation reasons, consistent guidance and scrutiny of outcomes would therefore become more important. This is an institutional risk arising from the proposed distribution of discretion, rather than an allegation that prosecutors or magistrates routinely misuse their powers.
Magistrates’ sentencing powers and the importance of first-instance safeguards
The current general maximum for a single either-way offence in the magistrates’ court is twelve months’ imprisonment. Clause 5 would enable regulations to select limits of six, twelve, eighteen or twenty-four months. Any increase beyond twelve months would require a subsequent exercise of the power, rather than following automatically from enactment. The regulations would use the negative resolution procedure.10
This provision reinforces the effect of removing election. Enlarged sentencing powers allow magistrates to retain cases which might otherwise exceed their jurisdiction. Consequently, the practical boundary of jury trial can move through changes to sentencing capacity as well as through express changes to trial procedure. A power framed as sentence administration thus has consequences for the identity of the tribunal determining guilt.
Leveson recommended making the twelve-month maximum permanent and repealing the ministerial power to vary it. The government rejected that recommendation in favour of greater flexibility.8 The distinction is constitutionally important. A negative instrument can remain effective without an affirmative parliamentary vote unless successfully challenged through the relevant procedure. Parliament should decide whether changes with substantial consequences for jury access merit the stronger scrutiny ordinarily associated with primary legislation or, at least, affirmative approval.
Summary justice itself includes different institutional forms. Cases may be heard by a bench of lay magistrates supported by a legal adviser, or by a District Judge sitting alone. The proposed transfer of work therefore differs from a universal replacement of citizens by professional judges.11 Lay magistrates offer a continuing form of public participation, although their selection, training and repeated service distinguish them from a jury assembled for a particular trial. Analysis should recognise that contribution while asking whether the safeguards supporting summary adjudication remain appropriate as its responsibilities grow.
Representation is central. In Benham v United Kingdom, the Strasbourg Court held that the seriousness of threatened imprisonment and the complexity of proceedings made publicly funded legal representation necessary for an applicant lacking sufficient means.12 The principle is particularly relevant when a supposedly less formal forum acquires greater powers over liberty. Longer available sentences strengthen the case for dependable access to legal advice, adequate preparation time and appropriately resourced legal advisers. The designation of proceedings as summary cannot answer those practical requirements.
Appeal reform and the cumulative reduction of protection
The existing appeal structure supplies a substantial safeguard. Under section 108 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, a defendant who pleaded not guilty may appeal against conviction or sentence; a guilty plea ordinarily confines the appeal to sentence. An appeal to the Crown Court proceeds by rehearing under section 79(3) of the Senior Courts Act 1981. It is already heard without a jury, normally by a judge sitting with magistrates.13 Restricting this route therefore concerns access to a second factual adjudication, rather than removal of a jury from the appeal itself.
In Cuciurean v Crown Prosecution Service, the High Court explained the breadth of that rehearing jurisdiction: the Crown Court determines the case afresh, the prosecution retains the burden of proof, and further evidence may be introduced.14 Its value extends beyond identifying errors of legal principle in the magistrates’ reasoning. A fresh assessment may correct an adverse factual conclusion even where the original proceedings were regularly conducted.
Clause 6 and Schedule 2 would replace automatic access with permission, granted where a ground for allowing the appeal is reasonably arguable. Conviction appeals would turn on whether the conviction was unsafe. The court would retain powers to receive further evidence, and the new scheme would protect appellants against an increased sentence on appeal.15 These provisions preserve meaningful avenues of correction. Describing the proposal as limiting appeals exclusively to points of law would misstate its operation.
Even so, review for safety and an automatic rehearing represent different allocations of responsibility. R v Pendleton distinguishes an appellate court’s assessment of a conviction’s safety from deciding guilt as a first-instance tribunal. Although the case concerned a jury conviction, its treatment of the appellate function helps explain why review and original adjudication are complementary protections.16 A defendant required to identify an arguable appellate ground faces a different task from a defendant entitled to require the prosecution to establish its case afresh.
The Convention permits such distinctions. Delcourt v Belgium establishes that Article 6 does not itself require states to create appellate courts, while requiring appropriate fair-hearing guarantees where they exist.17 Permission requirements can therefore be legitimate. Their practical operation becomes crucial: a safeguard available in principle may be difficult to exercise without reasons, transcripts and legal assistance. The government’s ECHR memorandum confirms that permission would ordinarily be determined on the papers, with an oral hearing available at the court’s discretion and judicial review available following refusal.18 Judicial review serves a distinct supervisory function and should be evaluated on that basis.
The Justice Committee reported success rates of 41 per cent for conviction appeals and 46 per cent for sentence appeals, and questioned the evidence for widespread abuse of the existing route.19 Those figures concern a selected group of appealed decisions. They neither establish an equivalent error rate across all magistrates’ cases nor prove that every successful appeal corrects a negligent decision. They do, however, show the practical significance of appellate intervention and justify caution about treating a second hearing as avoidable duplication.
The government has committed to operational audio recording across magistrates’ courts before commencing the appeal changes. It considers existing requirements for reasons adequate and has declined to require more detailed written reasons for this purpose.20 Recording is an important improvement, but it preserves what occurred; intelligible reasons explain why the court reached its decision. Both matter to the preparation of a focused permission application. Their usefulness also depends on affordable and prompt access to the record.
The cumulative issue is decisive. Removal of election places more defendants within summary jurisdiction. Increased sentencing powers enlarge the consequences of decisions made there. Permission-based appeals then reduce access to a fresh determination. Each measure may possess an arguable justification in isolation, yet their interaction concentrates more responsibility at first instance while narrowing an existing corrective safeguard. An assessment confined to the number of Crown Court days saved by each provision would miss that structural change.
Complex and lengthy cases: the scope of the retained juryless procedure
Current clause 3 would introduce a distinct judge-only procedure in the Crown Court. Eligibility requires at least one listed offence, the absence of an excluded offence, and an ordered preparatory hearing. Complexity, length, or both may justify the direction, subject to safeguards preserving jury trial where the public interest or other reasons favour it. The list extends beyond conventional fraud to offences including money laundering and bribery. Homicide and indictable-only sexual offences are excluded.21 This is a discretionary mechanism, rather than an automatic rule that every listed offence will be tried without a jury.
The distinction between complexity and length matters. An extended trial may burden jurors even where the central issues are comprehensible. Conversely, a shorter case may contain technically demanding evidence. The Bill allows either consideration to support departure from jury trial. That breadth makes careful judicial explanation essential: a decision should identify the actual difficulty, its effect on the proceedings, and the alternatives considered.
There are serious arguments for a tailored exception. Sustained service can impose considerable burdens on jurors’ work, finances and caring responsibilities. Technical cases may benefit from specialist judicial experience. A reasoned judgment can also explain how disputed evidence was assessed. Yet these advantages require comparison with a properly supported jury trial, including focused indictments, accessible expert evidence and effective case management. Complexity frequently reflects the presentation and organisation of a prosecution as well as the underlying transactions.
Leveson’s discussion of the collapsed Jubilee Line trial illustrates the need for causal precision. His report records several contributors to its extraordinary duration, including the indictment, disjointed proceedings and a defendant’s illness. It also records jurors’ subsequent accounts that they understood and recalled the evidence.22 Self-reported understanding cannot establish the accuracy of a verdict which was never reached. Equally, the collapse of a lengthy trial supplies an incomplete basis for attributing failure to the intellectual limitations of jurors.
Two features of the drafting warrant particular attention. First, one listed count can bring a mixed indictment within the procedure, subject to the statutory exclusions. The potential effect therefore extends to accompanying charges. Secondly, the explanatory notes expressly recognise that ministers could add offences unrelated to fraud or financial crime to the schedule through an affirmative statutory instrument.23 Parliamentary approval remains a safeguard, but this is a power capable of shifting the jury boundary beyond the immediate economic-crime rationale. A principled scheme would specify the characteristics which justify inclusion and require a fresh evidential case for expansion.
The Bill also excludes appeals against making or refusing the judge-only order and against decisions concerning its revocation. Ordinary conviction and sentence appeals remain available, and the trial judge must give reasons for the verdict.24 The distinction is consequential: a later challenge to a conviction cannot provide the experience of a jury trial which has already been denied. An expedited, permission-based appeal against an exceptional allocation order would offer a more direct safeguard while allowing courts to control tactical delay.
Exceptional necessity and the history of juryless trial
Earlier legislation cautions against treating the present proposals as the inevitable next stage of a continuous process. Section 43 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 provided for certain serious or complex fraud trials without a jury. It remained uncommenced and was repealed for England and Wales by section 113 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012.25 Together with the October 2026 withdrawal, that history demonstrates that the boundary of jury trial remains the subject of political and constitutional choice.
The operative jury-tampering exception supplies a more instructive comparator. In R v Twomey, the Court of Appeal held that the conditions for dispensing with a jury under section 44 of the 2003 Act had to be established to the criminal standard. The inquiry concerned a real and present danger of tampering and the sufficiency of reasonable protective measures.26 The justification was connected to preserving the integrity of the particular trial.
That reasoning supports a disciplined approach to exceptional departures, although it offers no simple prohibition on considering resources. Twomey recognised the practicality, expense and consequences of protective arrangements. The important difference lies in the connection between the problem and the proposed solution. Where intimidation would compromise adjudication, a judge-only trial can preserve the possibility of a lawful verdict. Where the principal concern is aggregate demand, the justification must establish why changing the tribunal is preferable to measures addressing preparation, listing, representation or capacity. The Strasbourg decision in Twomey assessed a safeguarded procedure in its specific context; it supplies no general endorsement of efficiency-based reductions in jury access.
Lay judgment, reasoned decisions and public confidence
A persuasive defence of juries should acknowledge their limitations. In R v Abdroikof and the conjoined appeals of Green and Williamson, the House of Lords examined whether the presence of jurors connected with policing or prosecution created an appearance of bias. The outcomes turned on the particular circumstances, with two appeals allowed and Abdroikof’s dismissed.27 Collective lay decision-making therefore operates through safeguards against improper relationships and allegiances. Its legitimacy depends on the conditions under which jurors serve.
Reason-giving also presents a genuine comparative advantage for professional adjudication. In Taxquet v Belgium, the Grand Chamber held that the accused and the public must be able to understand the basis of a conviction. Jury systems may achieve this through the overall framework of directions, questions and appellate safeguards, even where the jury delivers an unreasoned general verdict.28 A judge’s reasoned verdict can make factual conclusions and legal reasoning available for scrutiny. That benefit deserves weight alongside the jury’s distinct contribution to participation and the distribution of power.
Neither feature establishes categorical institutional superiority. A reasoned decision can disclose error but may also give coherent expression to an erroneous assessment. Collective deliberation can expose assumptions held by an individual decision-maker but may reproduce shared prejudice. Fairness is better evaluated through the design and performance of each process than through confidence in the professional or lay identity of its participants alone.
Empirical work suggests constructive improvements within the jury system. Cheryl Thomas’s 2013 study reported that jurors who received written legal directions found them helpful, while most of those without such directions would have welcomed them. The study involved 239 jurors in twenty trials in Greater London.29 Its findings concern participants’ reported experience, rather than proof of comparative accuracy or universal comprehension of complex fraud. Their narrower implication is valuable: difficulties in jury participation can generate an agenda for better support and explanation.
Public confidence also has a distributive dimension. Reform may affect defendants differently according to race, economic resources and access to representation. A person who distrusts an institution may attach particular importance to lay participation or a fresh hearing. Those concerns deserve investigation through evidence rather than assumptions about the moral superiority of either tribunal. The central constitutional interest is a process whose authority can be justified to those subject to it, including groups whose experience of criminal justice gives them reason to demand close scrutiny.
What does the efficiency evidence establish?
The government’s revised October modelling estimates that the amended package would reduce Crown Court demand by 24,500 sitting days in 2028/29. It retains an earlier demand forecast for comparability, pending an update. Under the accelerated implementation scenario, investment and structural reform are projected to leave an open caseload of approximately 93,000 in March 2030, falling to approximately 83,000 when further efficiency improvements are included.30 These are conditional forecasts of reduced pressure relative to a counterfactual, rather than observed gains or a demonstration that the backlog will disappear.
The original disaggregated model is instructive about the proposed sources of capacity. It attributed reductions of 16,000 sitting days to removing election, 8,000 to eighteen-month magistrates’ sentencing powers, and 200 to judge-only fraud and financial-crime trials in 2028/29.31 Those figures belong to the pre-withdrawal model and include measures whose interactions prevent simple addition. Used cautiously, they show that reallocating cases was expected to do much more of the work than accelerating specialist fraud proceedings. Each restriction should therefore be justified in relation to its own anticipated contribution.
The receiving courts already face pressure. Magistrates’ courts had 380,230 open cases at the end of June 2026, including 89,727 trial cases; the trial caseload had risen by 22 per cent over the year.5 The Justice Committee questioned the deliverability of the required expansion, particularly the availability of magistrates and legal advisers. The government subsequently reported increased recruitment and maintained its expansion target.32 The appropriate conclusion is conditional: redistribution may improve the system if supported by sufficient resources, while inadequate receiving capacity risks relocating delay.
Operational reforms provide an essential comparator. The government’s October response to Leveson includes measures concerning case progression, listing and preparation.33 These address sources of wasted time which exist whatever tribunal ultimately hears the evidence. A useful evaluation would distinguish time saved through better administration from time saved through reduced procedural opportunities. It would also track additional appeals, retrials, sentencing consequences and delay in magistrates’ courts. A fall in the Crown Court’s caseload is only one measure of system-wide improvement.
There is a further methodological difficulty. Aggregate conviction or acquittal rates cannot reliably establish which tribunal is fairer without accounting for differences in charges, evidence, plea decisions and case allocation. Likewise, a successful appeal may reflect fresh evidence, and an unsuccessful appeal may still have raised a reasonable issue. Efficiency evaluation should therefore combine quantitative measures with scrutiny of reasons, access to advice and the experiences of defendants and witnesses. Constitutional judgment necessarily addresses values which cannot be reduced to a sitting-day total.
Conditions for a defensible reform
The Bill contains an important new safeguard in clause 20. An independent review must consider whether the relevant reforms create or exacerbate differences in treatment or outcomes associated with race and socioeconomic status. Reviewers must be appointed within six months of the earliest relevant commencement, with an interim report within two years and a final report after two but within five years. Reports must be published and laid before Parliament.34 This recognises that the consequences of structural reform require empirical examination.
Review, however, differs from conditional authorisation. The clause supplies neither automatic expiry nor a statutory requirement to reverse a measure shown to produce serious adverse effects. By the time a final report appears, the new allocation of cases may be embedded in staffing, budgets and institutional expectations. A stronger scheme would connect evaluation to renewed parliamentary approval, with published criteria addressing timeliness, accuracy, participation, equality and access to effective appeal.
Several safeguards follow from the analysis. Any specialist judge-only jurisdiction should have clearly bounded eligibility, a requirement to explain why supported jury trial would be inadequate, and an expedited route to challenge the allocation decision. Expansion beyond the stated economic-crime rationale should receive fresh substantive parliamentary scrutiny. Changes to summary jurisdiction should be preceded by verified capacity, legal-aid and recording arrangements. If automatic rehearing is restricted, the replacement should provide accessible reasons, timely transcripts and sufficient legal assistance to make the permission test a meaningful filter for merits.
Sequencing matters as much as drafting. Introducing wider summary jurisdiction and restricting its appellate safeguard simultaneously makes it harder to identify which change produces an adverse outcome. Staged implementation with published baseline data would permit more reliable evaluation. It would also give Parliament an opportunity to assess whether improved preparation and capacity achieve sufficient gains before accepting further reductions in defendant choice. The objective should be a sustainable system in which timely adjudication and procedural protection develop together.
Conclusion
The right to jury trial is a legally structured protection with a distinctive constitutional function. The Courts and Tribunals Bill would narrow its availability through the removal of election and the enlargement of summary jurisdiction, while creating a further route to judge-only trial and restricting automatic appellate rehearing. The October withdrawal limits that programme but leaves its cumulative significance intact.
The strongest justification for reform is the harm caused by delay. A system which preserves procedural rights on paper while requiring years of waiting fails defendants, witnesses and complainants alike. Yet the seriousness of that failure strengthens the need for an effective remedy supported by evidence. It cannot establish the necessity of every proposed restriction. Parliament should insist on a demonstrated connection between each change and the problem it addresses, effective replacement safeguards, and a credible means of reconsidering measures whose consequences prove unacceptable.
The present proposals therefore amount to a substantial contraction of procedural protection, although its ultimate extent remains open to legislative choice. A defensible settlement would preserve jury access where its constitutional value is greatest, confine exceptions to clearly justified circumstances, and strengthen the institutions receiving additional responsibility. Efficiency earns its place within criminal justice by improving the delivery of fair adjudication. It becomes an inadequate governing principle when the reduction of workload is treated as sufficient reason to reduce the rights through which the exercise of state power is tested.
References
- Courts and Tribunals Bill, HL Bill 57 (2026–27), as brought from the Commons on 14 October 2026, cls 1–6; UK Parliament, Bill stages; Claire Brader, ‘Courts and Tribunals Bill: HL Bill 57 of 2026–27’ (House of Lords Library, 22 October 2026), discussion of the Commons amendments. Clause references throughout this essay refer to the October text; the withdrawn Bench Division appeared in clause 3 of earlier versions.
- Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, s 20, especially ss 20(2)(b) and 20(9), read with s 19.
- R v Wang [2005] UKHL 9, [8] and [16]–[18].
- Twomey, Cameron and Guthrie v United Kingdom (dec), Apps 67318/09 and 22226/12 (ECtHR, 28 May 2013), [30]–[36]. This was an admissibility decision concerning the particular proceedings and their safeguards.
- Ministry of Justice, Criminal court statistics quarterly: April to June 2026 (24 September 2026), Crown Court and magistrates’ courts sections. The 49.7-week measure runs from Crown Court receipt to first main hearing for the specified category; it is not the duration from offence to final disposal.
- Attorney General’s Reference (No 2 of 2001) [2003] UKHL 68, especially [24]–[25].
- Ministry of Justice, Courts and Tribunals Bill (Structural Criminal Court Reform): impact assessment, IA MoJ035/2025 (24 February 2026), especially pp 23–24 on opportunity costs. This assessment concerns the original package; its aggregate estimates should be distinguished from the October revision.
- Ministry of Justice, Government response to the Independent Review of the Criminal Courts (12 October 2026), responses to recommendations 14–16; Courts and Tribunals Bill, cl 1.
- Sentencing Council, ‘Allocation and committal for sentence’, allocation guidance.
- Sentencing Act 2020, s 224 and sch 23 para 14A; Courts and Tribunals Bill, cl 5; explanatory notes, HL Bill 57–EN, paras 111–119; Ministry of Justice, response to Leveson, recommendation 15.
- Ministry of Justice, explanatory notes to the Courts and Tribunals Bill, HL Bill 57–EN (14 October 2026), para 16.
- Benham v United Kingdom, App 19380/92 (ECtHR, 10 June 1996), [60]–[64].
- Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, s 108; Senior Courts Act 1981, s 79(3), and s 74; see also the Bill’s explanatory notes, paras 24–25, describing the current rehearing procedure.
- Cuciurean v Crown Prosecution Service [2024] EWHC 848 (Admin), [28]–[29].
- Courts and Tribunals Bill, cl 6 and sch 2, especially proposed Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 ss 108A, 108B, 108R and 108T; explanatory notes, paras 39–45, 253–259 and 317–318.
- R v Pendleton [2001] UKHL 66, [17]–[20]. The observations about the possible impact of fresh evidence on a jury assist the statutory safety inquiry; they do not replace it.
- Delcourt v Belgium, App 2689/65 (ECtHR, 17 January 1970), [25]–[26].
- Ministry of Justice, Courts and Tribunals Bill: European Convention on Human Rights memorandum (published 16 October 2026), paras 28–36, especially para 30. This memorandum sets out the government’s assessment of compatibility.
- House of Commons Justice Committee, Courts and Tribunals Bill, First Report of Session 2026–27, HC 192 (10 June 2026), especially paras 52, 62 and 71–72. The report predates withdrawal of the Bench Division; the appeal proposals discussed here remain relevant.
- Ministry of Justice, government response to the Justice Committee’s report on the Courts and Tribunals Bill (letter dated 5 October 2026, published 8 October 2026), responses JSC5, JSC7 and JSC8, pp 4–7.
- Courts and Tribunals Bill, cl 3, proposed Criminal Justice Act 2003 ss 42A–42B, and sch 1; explanatory notes, paras 64–69. The statutory test is complexity or length, or both.
- Sir Brian Leveson, Independent Review of the Criminal Courts, Part I (9 July 2025), ch 9, paras 70–73 and Case Study G, printed pp 305–308. The underlying Jubilee Line research is discussed here through the material reproduced and assessed in the official review.
- Ministry of Justice, explanatory notes, HL Bill 57–EN, paras 64–68, especially para 66; Courts and Tribunals Bill, sch 1, proposed Criminal Justice Act 2003 sch 3ZA, para 20, and cl 3(4), amending s 330(5)(a).
- Courts and Tribunals Bill, cl 3, proposed Criminal Justice Act 2003 ss 42A(5), 42C(10) and 42D(4); explanatory notes, paras 137–139.
- Criminal Justice Act 2003, former s 43, including its commencement and repeal annotations; Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, s 113.
- R v Twomey [2009] EWCA Crim 1035, [10], [16]–[19]; Criminal Justice Act 2003, s 44. BAILII’s judgment heading uses the anonymised title T and others.
- R v Abdroikof; R v Green; R v Williamson [2007] UKHL 37, [6]–[7], [14]–[16] and [22]–[27].
- Taxquet v Belgium [GC], App 926/05 (ECtHR, 16 November 2010), [83]–[84] and [90]–[92].
- Cheryl Thomas, ‘Avoiding the perfect storm of juror contempt’ [2013] Criminal Law Review 483, especially 497–498. Full text accessed through UCL’s institutional repository; the survey’s self-reporting limitations are discussed at 486.
- Ministry of Justice, October 2026: appendix to Criminal Court Reform Impacts Factsheet, especially Annex A and its assumptions. These are revised package forecasts following withdrawal of the Bench Division.
- Ministry of Justice, Criminal court reform: impacts factsheet (February 2026, updated March 2026), p 8, table of estimated sitting-day impacts. Individual estimates are cited as historical components of the original model, rather than recalculated estimates of the amended package.
- Justice Committee, Courts and Tribunals Bill, HC 192 (2026–27), discussion of magistrates’ courts capacity; Ministry of Justice, government response (published 8 October 2026), responses concerning recruitment and magistrates’ courts capacity.
- Ministry of Justice, Government response to the Independent Review of the Criminal Courts (12 October 2026), responses to recommendations 91–92 and 109–110.
- Courts and Tribunals Bill, cl 20; explanatory notes, paras 529–530. The commencement trigger disregards provisions commencing only powers to make regulations or rules.