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Parental contact and children’s welfare: should the Children Act 1989 presumption be abolished?

Info: 7,751 words (32 pages) Essay
Published: 04 Nov 2026

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A child’s relationship with a parent can provide affection, continuity, practical care and a sense of identity. It can also become a means through which abuse continues after separation. Family courts must distinguish between these possibilities while working with disputed evidence, incomplete information and the consequences of delay. The proposed repeal of the statutory presumption of parental involvement raises a fundamental question about that task: should the law begin with a general proposition about the benefits of parental relationships, or require their value to be assessed within the circumstances of each child?

Clause 16 of the Courts and Tribunals Bill, in the version brought from the House of Commons on 14 October 2026, proposes removing sections 1(2A), 1(2B), 1(6) and 1(7) of the Children Act 1989, together with the provision which introduced them. The proposal remains legislation under consideration. Its substantive commencement would depend on regulations, so the existing presumption continues to apply.[1] An assessment of reform must therefore distinguish the present legal framework, the evidence concerning its operation and the likely consequences of changing it.

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This essay argues that repeal is justified as a clarification of child-centred adjudication. The existing presumption is carefully qualified, and the evidence provides limited support for attributing unsafe decisions to the statutory provision alone. Nevertheless, a generalised expectation of beneficial involvement can shape the interpretation of evidence and the negotiations surrounding litigation. Its removal would bring the statutory starting point into closer alignment with individual welfare assessment. The strength of that argument depends on acknowledging the continuing importance of safe parental relationships and the possibility of unjustified exclusion.

The appropriate objective is a system capable of recognising both forms of harm: exposing children to abusive involvement and allowing worthwhile relationships to deteriorate through avoidable institutional failure. Repeal should form part of an integrated response involving reliable fact-finding, meaningful participation, properly resourced safeguarding and reasoned decisions about the particular arrangements proposed. Its success should be measured through children’s experiences and outcomes, rather than the proportion of cases producing contact orders.

The existing presumption and its relationship with welfare

Section 1(1) of the Children Act makes the child’s welfare paramount when the court determines questions about upbringing. In contested section 8 proceedings, the statutory checklist directs attention to matters including the child’s wishes and feelings, needs, the effects of change, relevant characteristics, harm and parental capabilities. Section 1 also recognises the prejudice associated with delay and requires an order to be better for the child than making none. These provisions supply an individualised framework for deciding child arrangements.[2]

The involvement presumption was introduced by section 11 of the Children and Families Act 2014 and commenced on 22 October 2014, subject to transitional protection for existing proceedings.[3] In contested section 8 proceedings and the parental-responsibility proceedings specified in section 1(7), section 1(2A) requires the court to presume, unless the contrary is shown, that each qualifying parent’s involvement furthers welfare. Section 1(2B) defines involvement to include direct or indirect involvement and excludes any prescribed allocation of time. Consequently, the provision creates neither a shared-care formula nor an entitlement to face-to-face contact.[2]

Two safeguards require separate attention. First, section 1(6) governs whether the presumption applies to the parent. The parent must be capable of involvement without placing the child at risk of harm. The legislation initially treats that condition as satisfied unless some evidence suggests a risk whatever form involvement takes. Second, even where some safe involvement is possible, the presumption can be rebutted because involvement would fail to further this child’s welfare. The 2014 explanatory notes expressly distinguish these stages and preserve welfare paramountcy.[4]

This distinction has practical significance. Evidence that unsupervised meetings would be dangerous may leave open the possibility of safe supervised or indirect involvement. Conversely, a court need not establish that every imaginable form of involvement is dangerous before deciding that involvement would be inconsistent with welfare. The broader welfare assessment remains operative after the preliminary safety question. Conflating these stages can make the statutory protection appear either much weaker or much stronger than Parliament enacted.

The presumption nevertheless supplies a starting point with a particular direction. An assessment which begins by expecting some benefit can organise the inquiry around finding an acceptable form of involvement. A fully individualised inquiry can instead begin by identifying the child’s needs and considering which relationships and arrangements serve them. Both approaches may reach the same decision. Their practical difference becomes important where evidence is uncertain, several interests compete, or a seemingly modest arrangement carries consequences extending beyond the contact session itself.

The welfare principle already accommodates the distinctive significance of parenthood. In Re B (A Child) [2009] UKSC 5, a dispute between a father and grandmother, the Supreme Court rejected reasoning which effectively elevated biological parenthood into a competing entitlement. Parenthood mattered through its contribution to the child’s welfare. The Court also recognised that the cases reaching adjudication may depart from ordinary expectations about family relationships.[5] Although that decision concerned residence and preceded the statutory amendment, its reasoning demonstrates how the value of a parental relationship can receive substantial weight within welfare analysis without predetermining its significance.

A statutory intervention in an established contact culture

The controversy predates the presumption. The Family Justice Review’s final report in 2011 declined to recommend a legislative statement supporting a meaningful relationship with both parents. Having reconsidered its interim position, the review concluded that the existing welfare framework could recognise the importance of those relationships and identified risks in adding a further statutory formulation. Australian experience, including confusion between parental responsibility and equal time, informed that assessment.[6] The subsequent reform therefore represented a contested policy choice rather than the correction of a previously settled legal omission.

Research conducted before commencement is particularly important to causal analysis. Adrienne Barnett’s study, published in 2014, combined analysis of reported decisions with interviews undertaken in 2010–11 with 29 professionals across five court regions. It identified powerful expectations favouring contact and difficulties in translating knowledge of domestic violence into welfare decisions.[7] Its qualitative design illuminates professional reasoning rather than establishing national frequencies. Chronologically, however, it demonstrates that the cultural problem cannot be explained solely by legislation taking effect later.

Subsequent scholarship also questions the size of the provision’s direct doctrinal effect. Felicity Kaganas’s analysis of reported decisions described considerable judicial discretion and continuity with established approaches, while drawing attention to the presumption’s possible influence beyond formal judgments.[8] Joanna Harwood’s later research, based on 41 interviews in one English county during 2016–17, similarly found limited perceived change in outcomes alongside reinforcement of existing expectations about involvement.[9] The geographical and methodological limits of that study matter: professional accounts provide evidence about understanding and practice, rather than a controlled estimate of legislative effects.

These findings generate an apparent paradox. If judges would ordinarily favour maintaining parental relationships anyway, the statutory presumption may add little to substantive law. Yet its public prominence can give a legal vocabulary to expectations already embedded in professional practice. A provision may be infrequently decisive in appellate reasoning while still influencing the advice given to an unrepresented parent, the terms proposed in mediation or the willingness to raise concerns. The relevant question is therefore wider than whether judgments cite section 1(2A).

This wider perspective also strengthens the argument against assuming that repeal will transform practice. Established habits of reasoning can survive the deletion of a statutory provision. Earlier authorities remain available, and professionals may continue to regard involvement as the usual starting point. Reform consequently requires a clear explanation of the relationship between those authorities and individual welfare. Otherwise, the legal text changes while the practical inquiry continues to ask substantially the same questions.

What the official evidence establishes

The 2020 Harm Panel report identified four interlocking difficulties in private-law children proceedings: resource constraints, a contact-favouring culture, fragmentation between agencies and the adversarial structure of proceedings. Its evidence described the minimisation of abuse and difficulties experienced by children and parents seeking protection. The report also acknowledged important limitations, including the self-selection of respondents and the inability to verify every account against case files.[10] It offers substantial evidence of mechanisms through which decisions can become unsafe, while supporting more cautious conclusions about their prevalence.

The Ministry of Justice’s review of the presumption, published in October 2025, drew together literature reviews, judgment analysis and stakeholder engagement. It concluded that the provision could reinforce a wider contact-favouring culture. Crucially, the review recognised the difficulty of isolating the presumption’s contribution. Its evidence did not extend beyond April 2024, and much concerned earlier practice, limiting conclusions about the effects of subsequent reforms.[11] Publication in 2025 should therefore be distinguished from observation of the system operating throughout that year.

The associated judgment study examined 245 documents, including 233 final judgments or magistrates’ written reasons. Explicit references to the presumption appeared in 22 of those final decisions, with further indirect references in 34. Reference to the statutory exception was identified in one. These are findings about recorded reasoning, rather than proof that all remaining courts disregarded welfare or safety.[12] A judicial decision can assess harm without expressly naming the exception, while a formal recital of the provision can reveal little about the quality of the assessment.

The sample also requires careful interpretation. It was drawn from eight courts through a convenience-based process, and one court supplied just over half the documents. The technical report explains the selection and access difficulties, including a sampling frame focused on cases closed between 2019 and 2022.[13] These features weaken any attempt to extrapolate a national rate of unsafe orders. They also prevent a straightforward comparison between outcomes before and after the 2014 amendment. The evidence demonstrates patterns worthy of attention; it does not quantify the number of harmful outcomes caused by the presumption.

Another limitation concerns the population to which general research applies. The accompanying literature review emphasises relationship quality, parenting and the surrounding family circumstances when considering the association between involvement and wellbeing. It also identifies inconsistent treatment of conflict and abuse across studies.[14] Evidence that supportive parental involvement benefits children generally provides an insufficient basis for assuming that more involvement benefits a child in litigation involving serious allegations. Court-involved families are a selected group, and an association between contact and wellbeing can reflect pre-existing relationship quality or resources.

These limitations should discipline the case for repeal rather than foreclose it. Legislative assessment can respond to credible evidence of harmful mechanisms before their effects are precisely measurable. The argument becomes stronger when it identifies the marginal benefit expected from a presumption, the risks created by its interpretation, and the protections available without it. Equally, claims that repeal will prevent particular categories of harm require evidence beyond the existence of troubling cases. Causal uncertainty applies to optimistic predictions as well as defences of the status quo.

The Government’s own equalities statement supplies an important qualification: repeal, by itself, is considered unlikely to produce substantively different orders because welfare and Convention obligations already govern decisions.[15] This creates a demanding standard for implementation. If the expected benefit is principally a change in culture and understanding, policymakers must explain how that change will reach professional practice and private negotiations. A legislative announcement alone provides a limited mechanism for achieving it.

Domestic abuse and the content of a welfare assessment

The modern understanding of domestic abuse requires courts to consider much more than isolated physical assaults. Section 1 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 encompasses controlling or coercive behaviour, economic abuse and psychological or emotional abuse. Section 3 recognises children who see, hear or experience the effects of abuse, subject to the statutory relationship requirements, as victims for the purposes of that Act.[16] This recognition undermines any simplistic separation between conduct towards the other parent and its significance for the child.

In F v M [2021] EWFC 4, Hayden J explained the importance of examining a pattern of behaviour and its cumulative effects. Conduct which appears ambiguous in isolation may acquire a different meaning when considered alongside intimidation, restrictions on autonomy and repeated demands for compliance.[17] The case illustrates why a welfare inquiry must understand the organisation of family life, including the conditions under which one parent and the children make everyday decisions.

The Court of Appeal developed this approach in Re H-N and Others [2021] EWCA Civ 448. It recognised the danger that incident-based presentation could obscure coercive control and emphasised the continuing relevance of abuse after separation. Physical separation or an injunction may reduce one risk while leaving other controlling conduct possible. The Court nevertheless regarded the structure of Practice Direction 12J as appropriate; much depended on effective implementation and understanding.[18] The significance for repeal is direct: changing a statutory starting point cannot compensate for an evidential method which fails to reveal the relevant pattern.

Suppose a proposed arrangement permits frequent collections from a protected parent’s home and requires that parent to negotiate repeated changes directly. The period spent with the child may appear uneventful, while the arrangement enables surveillance, intimidation or financial pressure. Assessment limited to conduct during the visit would overlook consequences for the child’s daily environment. A properly specified order must therefore address the arrangement as a whole, including transport, communication, disclosure of addresses and the impact on the person providing everyday care.

There is also a distinction between identifying abuse and assessing its implications. Findings may establish past conduct, but the court must still evaluate present insight, the prospect of recurrence, the child’s experience and the reliability of proposed safeguards. Participation in a programme can be relevant evidence; its completion should be examined alongside demonstrated change. Conversely, serious restrictions require an explanation connecting the established concerns to the particular child and proposed arrangements. A welfare judgment gains legitimacy from that reasoning in either direction.

The quality of this analysis matters more than adopting an abstract position for or against contact. A child may benefit from preserving a relationship within carefully controlled conditions. Another may need a period of separation from involvement which perpetuates fear or destabilisation. The same label, such as supervised contact, can describe very different practical protections. Individual welfare requires the court to establish what the arrangement actually entails and whether it can deliver the anticipated benefit safely.

Allegations, findings and procedural fairness

Decisions concerning abuse must distinguish allegation, proof and prospective risk. Re B (Children) [2008] UKHL 35 establishes the ordinary civil standard of proof: a disputed event is established on the balance of probabilities. Seriousness does not create a heightened standard, and inherent probability depends on context. Although that case arose in public-law proceedings, Re H-N expressly applies the standard to private-law allegations.[19] Repealing the involvement presumption would leave this evidential framework intact.

The distinction also prevents two recurrent errors. Where the court has adjudicated upon an allegation and found it unproved, the alleged conduct cannot subsequently be treated as an established fact. Equally, failure to prove an allegation does not establish deliberate fabrication. Those conclusions require different reasoning. The court must evaluate the available evidence and explain what has been found, what has been rejected and which questions remain relevant to welfare. Protective interim decisions occupy a separate position because they must manage uncertainty before a final factual determination.

Fact-finding should be directed towards the issues necessary to decide the child’s arrangements. In K v K [2022] EWCA Civ 468, the Court of Appeal emphasised the need to identify the real welfare questions and whether the alleged abuse was relevant to them. It also set aside findings because of deficiencies in the assessment of evidence.[20] This approach guards against proceedings becoming an unrestricted inquiry into every grievance arising from a relationship. Properly understood, proportionality requires an adequate investigation of material issues.

The subsequent decision, K v K (No 2) [2022] EWFC 171 (B), demonstrates why appellate correction should be described carefully. Following remittal, the court made findings concerning coercive behaviour and harm to the children, rejected the father’s allegations of alienation, and sought further assistance on whether direct contact could be safely managed.[21] The earlier appeal had corrected an unsafe reasoning process; it had supplied no general vindication of the father’s account. Reading the decisions together supports rigorous adjudication while resisting easy conclusions about either party’s credibility.

Evidence must also be evaluated holistically. In Re A (A Child: Findings of Fact) [2022] EWCA Civ 1652, the Court of Appeal criticised compartmentalised reasoning and the unjustified weight attached to a lack of corroboration. Established findings about transnational marriage abandonment had been inadequately integrated into the assessment of other allegations. The court ordered a rehearing, leaving the factual outcomes open.[22] The decision illustrates how an apparently correct statement of legal principle can coexist with an unreliable method of applying it.

Judicial guidance issued in May 2022 confirms that Re H-N did not prohibit schedules of allegations. Specific incidents may be suited to a schedule, while patterns of coercive control may require a narrative statement or a combined approach. Clarity, relevance and a fair opportunity to answer the allegations remain essential.[23] For reform, the lesson is methodological: better presentation should make the alleged behaviour intelligible without depriving the responding parent of precise notice of the case to meet.

Participation measures are part of accurate adjudication. Under Family Procedure Rule 3A.2A, a statement that a party or witness is, or risks being, a victim of domestic abuse triggers an assumption of diminished participation or evidence quality, subject to the person’s ability to request otherwise. The court must consider necessary participation directions.[24] Providing protective arrangements at this stage is compatible with reserving judgment on disputed facts. The aim is to improve the conditions in which those facts can fairly be determined.

Interim arrangements and the meaning of safe involvement

Interim decisions can determine the practical course of a case long before a final hearing. Relationships may deteriorate during an extended interruption, while unsafe arrangements can expose a child or parent to immediate harm. Practice Direction 12J addresses that tension. Where relevant allegations remain undetermined, an interim child arrangements order requires a welfare justification and assurance that it will avoid an unmanageable risk of harm. The court must examine the effect of the proposed arrangement and the alternatives.[25]

Re E, F and G (Interim Child Arrangements) [2024] EWCA Civ 874 provides a particularly useful example. The Court of Appeal held that, on these facts, progressing to unsupervised contact before determining the material allegations was inconsistent with PD12J. Arrangements could not simply be tried experimentally under the supposed protection of continuing proceedings. At the same time, the court upheld an adjournment needed to secure a qualified legal representative for the fact-finding hearing.[26] The judgment combines concern for safety with recognition that a fair hearing may require time and resources.

The practical effect of repeal would depend heavily on decisions of this kind. A general expectation that involvement should continue may influence interim arrangements even where the final hearing will eventually examine the concerns fully. By then, exposure to harm or an extended loss of connection may already have altered the child’s circumstances. Effective early triage, timely evidence gathering and review of genuinely temporary measures therefore deserve as much attention as the final legal test.

Direct and indirect involvement also require separate evaluation. In F v M [2023] EWFC 5, the court considered a recommendation for letters against exceptionally serious established abuse. Hayden J examined whether indirect involvement would provide an identifiable benefit in the children’s actual circumstances and ultimately made no order for it.[27] The decision confirms that the present law already permits a protective outcome extending beyond the restriction of physical meetings. It also demonstrates why indirect contact should receive substantive scrutiny rather than being treated as a harmless minimum.

Similar care is needed with supervised and supported contact. The level of observation, staff expertise and capacity to intervene may differ substantially. Government-commissioned research into contact centres identified information-sharing and risk-review issues, including inconsistent processes when arrangements progressed.[28] An order relying on a service should specify the safeguards it requires and establish that the provider can supply them. A pathway from supervised meetings to less restricted contact should depend on evidence of safety and benefit, with a means of responding promptly if the assumptions underpinning it fail.

These requirements impose responsibilities beyond the courtroom. A carefully drafted order can become ineffective where the necessary service is unavailable, unaffordable or inadequately informed. The court should know whether the proposed provider has the findings, relevant risk information and resources needed to implement the arrangement. A presumption cannot create those resources, and its repeal cannot remove the need for them.

Abusive litigation and access to justice

The proceedings themselves can become a means of continuing control. Repeated applications may create uncertainty, require disclosure of sensitive information and impose financial or emotional demands on the child’s household. In F v M [2023] EWFC 5, the court addressed the use of litigation to extend controlling behaviour, alongside the substantive question of involvement.[27] This reveals a dimension of protection which a change to the contact presumption alone would leave largely untouched.

Sections 91(14) and 91A of the Children Act allow a court to require permission before specified further applications are made. The statutory circumstances include risks of harm to the child or another individual, and the court can act on its own initiative. When permission is subsequently sought, it must consider whether circumstances have materially changed.[29] The mechanism preserves a route for a justified application while providing protection from the harmful use of further proceedings.

Practice Direction 12Q addresses the scope and duration of these orders, the opportunity for representations and the handling of subsequent permission applications. It also contemplates delaying service until an initial assessment of merits, thereby reducing the possibility that the permission process itself recreates the harm the order seeks to prevent.[29] These procedural details matter: protection can be weakened if every attempted application automatically requires the other parent to re-engage.

Restrictions on future litigation must nevertheless be proportionate to the identified problem. An application raising a genuine new concern about a child requires a route to judicial consideration, even where the applicant’s earlier conduct justified restrictions. The distinction is between controlling harmful use of the process and insulating existing arrangements from legitimate scrutiny. Effective protection and access to justice can therefore reinforce each other through careful permission decisions. This provides a useful model for the broader reform: safeguards should respond to evidenced risks while preserving meaningful opportunities to establish the child’s changing needs.

Children’s participation and allegations of alienating behaviour

Children’s welfare is assessed more reliably when their experiences inform the process. Article 12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child requires opportunities to express views and appropriate weight according to age and maturity. Article 9(3) recognises the separated child’s interest in regular relationships and direct contact with both parents, subject to the child’s best interests.[30] Read together, these provisions connect the value of relationships with the child’s participation in decisions about them. They offer a useful interpretative framework alongside domestic law, rather than an automatic formula for orders.

Participation involves more than recording a preference. A child may describe fear, loyalty, affection and anger simultaneously. Understanding those experiences requires attention to the child’s age, communication needs and circumstances. A welfare assessment should distinguish what the child says, the explanation offered by adults, and the court’s conclusions. Where the decision differs from the child’s wishes, the reasons should show how those wishes were considered and why other welfare factors carried greater weight.

A difficult area arises where reluctance to see a parent is attributed to the other parent’s behaviour. In Re C (‘Parental Alienation’; Instruction of Expert) [2023] EWHC 345 (Fam), the President emphasised that the relevant inquiry concerned behaviour and its effect on the child. Alleged alienation was a factual issue for judicial determination, rather than a syndrome to be diagnosed by an expert.[31] This approach permits courts to examine genuine psychological manipulation while requiring a properly evidenced explanation for the child’s response.

The Family Justice Council’s December 2024 guidance develops that discipline. Its framework requires an evidential connection between the child’s resistance and manipulative behaviour, while examining whether the response is explained by the rejected parent’s conduct or other factors. A child’s refusal alone cannot establish manipulation. Nor does an unproved allegation of domestic abuse establish alienating behaviour by default. Even a finding of such behaviour requires a separate welfare assessment of the appropriate response.[32]

The significance of these safeguards is illustrated by Re Y (Experts and Alienating Behaviour: The Modern Approach) [2026] EWFC 38. The President addressed findings made in 2019 following expert evidence without the parents’ factual evidence being heard, and the serious consequences of the resulting procedural failures. The earlier findings were set aside. The judgment reinforces the need to establish the relevant factual foundation, including material domestic-abuse issues, before attributing a child’s rejection to alienating behaviour.[33] It provides an important example of defective adjudication, rather than evidence that the statutory presumption caused every error in the case.

There has also been a concrete procedural development since that judgment. The Family Procedure (Amendment) Rules 2026 introduced a regulated-expert requirement for children proceedings, subject to specified exceptions, including reasoned permission where no regulated expert is available. The relevant amendments apply to proceedings issued from 20 July 2026.[34] Regulation supplies one safeguard, while the court retains responsibility for assessing necessity, expertise and the reasoning connecting an opinion to the evidence.

Repeal should complement this approach by reducing the temptation to treat a child’s resistance chiefly as an obstacle to an assumed beneficial outcome. The converse obligation is equally important: courts must investigate credible evidence that a child’s relationship has been undermined through manipulation. Neither parent’s preferred explanation should determine the inquiry in advance. The child’s account should be examined respectfully, with opportunities for clarification and support appropriate to the child, rather than filtered through competing labels.

Non-resident parents, family life and unjustified exclusion

The strongest argument against repeal concerns the risk of losing safe, important relationships. A non-resident parent may depend on a functioning court system to prevent delay, obstruction or unsupported allegations from determining the practical outcome. The Justice Committee’s June 2026 report recorded concerns that the presumption communicates the importance of both parents and may influence arrangements reached outside court. It also identified uncertainty about those wider effects.[35] These concerns warrant substantive safeguards and careful public communication.

Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides an important foundation independent of the presumption. Section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 binds courts, as public authorities, to act compatibly with Convention rights; the proposed repeal leaves that obligation in place.[36] In Elsholz v Germany, the Grand Chamber recognised the family life of an unmarried father and child and required sufficient procedural protection when contact was restricted. The combined deficiencies in the investigation and appeal process violated Article 8. At the same time, the judgment recognised that parental claims cannot justify measures harmful to the child’s health or development.[37] Its significance lies in the quality and justification of the decision-making process.

Domestic authority similarly places substantial demands on the court. In Re C (A Child) [2011] EWCA Civ 521, Munby LJ emphasised reasonable efforts to preserve relationships, consideration of alternatives and a sufficiently long-term perspective. The appeal nevertheless failed, leaving direct contact suspended while indirect involvement continued. The appellant was the child’s mother.[38] The outcome matters as much as the frequently quoted pro-contact language: the court’s responsibility to examine opportunities for a relationship coexists with its responsibility to recognise when particular arrangements conflict with welfare.

Re A (A Child) [2013] EWCA Civ 1104 demonstrates the consequences of institutional failure in the other direction. After approximately twelve years of litigation, the Court of Appeal found that the process had failed to respect the father’s and child’s Article 8 rights to timely and effective adjudication. It distinguished that procedural violation from the separate question whether the eventual welfare decision was substantively wrong, before ordering a rehearing because of further deficiencies.[39] The court did not itself direct that contact occur.

These cases support a child-centred response to the concerns of non-resident parents. The existing obligations would survive repeal: courts would remain responsible for investigating alleged obstruction, avoiding unnecessary interruption and giving adequate reasons where a worthwhile relationship cannot be sustained. Delay may create a situation which becomes difficult to reverse, particularly for a young child. Effective case management and continuity of judicial oversight are therefore substantive protections for family life.

The obligation is reciprocal in its attention to harm. In I.M. and Others v Italy, the European Court found Article 8 violations arising from inadequately protected contact with a violent father and the treatment of the mother’s opposition to those arrangements. The official court summary identifies failures to assess and manage the risks to the children.[40] Article 8 consequently supports both efforts to maintain beneficial relationships and protection against unsafe arrangements. An analysis which presents Convention rights solely as a barrier to restricting contact captures only one side of the obligation.

The language of gender also requires care. Many objections to repeal concern fathers, and the distributional consequences deserve monitoring. Yet the relevant legal interests belong to children and parents in varied family arrangements. A mother may be non-resident; a father may be the protective parent. Credibility, parenting capacity and risk require assessment through evidence. A system which substitutes assumptions about sex or parental status for that inquiry would undermine the rationale for reform.

Does welfare paramountcy provide a sufficient alternative?

A central objection to repeal is that the existing legislation already contains the necessary qualifications. If courts apply it correctly, harmful involvement should be excluded and beneficial involvement preserved. On that view, the appropriate response is better training, enforcement of PD12J and clearer explanation of the distinction between involvement and direct contact. Removing the provision could sacrifice a useful signal while leaving the underlying operational failures untouched.

This objection establishes the limits of repeal, but leaves a further question: what useful work should the presumption perform beyond the welfare framework and existing obligations to consider parental relationships? If it merely confirms that a relationship can benefit a child, courts can recognise that through evidence. If it shifts the practical starting point where the evidence is uncertain, that shift requires justification in a population containing serious safeguarding disputes. The benefit of retaining a statutory expectation must therefore be assessed against the risk that its qualifications receive less attention than its central message.

A narrower amendment could expressly identify circumstances in which the presumption falls away, or require recorded reasons before ordering involvement following findings of abuse. Such measures might improve clarity. Their design would still need to accommodate abuse which has not resulted in a conviction, forms of harm outside domestic abuse, and cases where limited involvement provides a genuine benefit. Highly specific exceptions can encourage argument about whether the case fits the category, diverting attention from the child’s circumstances. They may also imply a stronger entitlement in cases falling outside the exception.

Individual welfare avoids that particular categorisation problem, although it carries its own risks. A broad discretionary standard can conceal inconsistent values and make outcomes difficult to predict. The answer is disciplined reasoning: identify the child’s needs, establish relevant facts, evaluate the actual options, explain the treatment of risk and show why the chosen arrangement best serves welfare. Removing a presumption makes those responsibilities more visible. It also strengthens the case for consistent judicial guidance and meaningful appellate scrutiny.

The Grand Chamber’s decision in Sommerfeld v Germany illustrates the legitimacy of a contextual approach. It found no Article 8 violation in the assessment of contact where the domestic judge had repeatedly heard the child, aged thirteen at the material hearing, and had an adequate evidential basis. Psychological expertise was not invariably required.[41] The decision supports careful participation and investigation tailored to the case. It offers little support for treating either contact or refusal as the necessary outcome of a general principle.

Repeal would also require careful treatment of earlier authorities. The relationship-preserving principles summarised in Re C would remain relevant, alongside the judgment’s application of paramount welfare and its decision to uphold suspension. Selective reliance on its strongest formulations could allow a substantially equivalent practical presumption to survive the statutory change. Judicial guidance should explain how obligations to investigate and support a relationship differ from an assumption about its eventual form or benefit. This would preserve the authorities’ concern for family life while ensuring that their application reflects Parliament’s revised statutory framework.

The preferable reform therefore preserves the substantive importance of relationships within an explicitly individual assessment. Clear public guidance would be especially important for families negotiating without legal representation: repeal would leave parental responsibilities and the courts’ protective and facilitative functions in place.

Comparative lessons and the limits of legislative analogy

Australia provides a useful comparison, provided the different statutory schemes remain clear. The Family Law Amendment Act 2023 removed the Australian presumption of equal shared parental responsibility, with the principal parenting reforms taking effect on 6 May 2024. That presumption concerned decision-making responsibility; Australian law had never imposed an automatic requirement of equal time. The reforms also changed the best-interests framework and accompanied measures concerning information sharing and harmful litigation.[42]

England and Wales adopted a narrower presumption of beneficial involvement. Australian experience therefore supplies an example of legislative design and communication, rather than a direct prediction of the consequences of repeal here. A change to decision-making responsibility may affect negotiations differently from removing a presumption which can be satisfied through indirect involvement. Differences in procedure, funding and support services further limit the transferability of outcomes.

The more useful comparative question concerns the relationship between a legal rule and its public interpretation. A technically qualified provision can acquire a simplified meaning in everyday negotiations. Repeal creates a corresponding communications challenge: the disappearance of a statutory presumption can be interpreted as the disappearance of legal concern for parental relationships. Both misunderstandings can influence arrangements far beyond reported cases. Legislative simplicity should therefore be accompanied by accessible explanations grounded in children’s welfare.

The Australian reforms also illustrate the value of considering substantive law alongside information systems and procedural protections. A court’s capacity to make an individual assessment depends on the evidence it can obtain and the safeguards it can implement. That institutional lesson is more transferable than an assumption that abolishing a presumption elsewhere proves either the necessity or the success of the proposed English and Welsh reform.

Implementation, resources and the assessment of risk

The developing Child Focused Courts model provides a significant context for repeal. The target operating model published on 28 October 2026 describes earlier information gathering, a Child Impact Report and closer coordination of safeguarding information. It seeks to resolve suitable cases with fewer hearings while expressly preserving necessary and proportionate fact-finding under PD12J.[43] This combination has a coherent rationale: the court should understand the child’s circumstances early enough to identify the actual dispute and the evidence needed to resolve it.

The quality of the initial investigation is decisive. Earlier reports can improve identification of abuse, communication needs and children’s experiences. They can also acquire disproportionate influence if factual uncertainty is obscured or the parties lack a meaningful opportunity to challenge important assertions. A child-focused process should distinguish professional observation, information reported by others, disputed allegations and judicial findings. Streamlining is justified where it removes duplication while preserving the inquiry necessary for a safe and fair decision.

The evidence concerning the Pathfinder pilots, from which this model developed, warrants measured optimism. The 2025 process evaluation identified perceived benefits from earlier investigation and coordination, while acknowledging selection, comparison and cost-modelling limitations. Its financial analysis examined specified direct staffing costs rather than the full cost of implementation or operation.[44] A more efficient process may release resources for difficult cases, but efficiency estimates should be assessed alongside the expenditure required to maintain its safeguards.

Research published in January 2026, drawing on interviews conducted between August and December 2024, examined the experiences of 39 adults and nine children across the Dorset and North Wales pilots. Participants valued aspects of professional engagement and the opportunities for children to express their experiences, while also reporting concerns about safety, information sharing and whether their perspectives affected decisions. The self-selected qualitative sample cannot establish the prevalence of improvement or its causal relationship to the model.[45] Its findings illuminate earlier Pathfinder practice, rather than establish the effects of the subsequently published national operating model.

A useful evaluation would follow children beyond the making of an order. Measures should include their sense of safety, the quality and sustainability of relationships, renewed abuse, repeat proceedings, the operation of handovers and the availability of support. Case duration and the number of hearings provide information about process. Contact rates alone reveal little about welfare: both a reduction in unsafe involvement and an increase in safe relationships could represent success. Outcomes should be interpreted alongside the risks, findings and options in the individual case.

Resources remain central. Reliable assessment requires time for Cafcass or Cafcass Cymru, access to relevant records, appropriately qualified professionals and specialist services where needed. Effective participation may require legal advice, interpreters, disability-related adjustments or support for children’s communication. A court can recognise a problem yet remain unable to implement the most beneficial arrangement if the necessary services are missing. Reform should make those constraints visible rather than allowing a nominally available option to stand in for practical provision.

The Bill’s impact assessment anticipates no monetised costs or benefits for repeal itself, while recognising possible costs of updating guidance and uncertainty about additional applications.[46] That limited assessment should be understood as addressing the legislative measure, rather than the cost of making a wider protective strategy effective. If improved outcomes depend on training, specialist support and more reliable assessment, those elements require their own transparent commitments and evaluation.

Risk assessment should also remain open to change. Findings about past events establish an essential foundation, while decisions about future arrangements require reasoned predictions. Courts should identify the assumptions supporting an order, the safeguards on which it depends and the circumstances that would justify reconsideration. This promotes accountability without making every family subject to indefinite monitoring. It also allows genuine improvement in parenting or relationships to be considered alongside emerging evidence of harm.

Transition and the proper measure of reform

The practical effect of any eventual repeal will depend partly on commencement and transition. Clause 22 of the current Bill permits transitional or saving regulations, while clause 26 leaves commencement of the substantive repeal to regulations. The Bill contains no mechanism automatically cancelling or reopening existing child arrangements orders.[1] Clear guidance will be needed on pending proceedings and the continuing effect of existing arrangements once the final legislation and instruments are settled.

Communication should explain the change in terms accessible to families. A parent should understand that the court continues to consider the value of a safe relationship and that concerns about harm require proper attention. Neither adult gains authority to dictate the outcome through a selective description of the reform. Advice services and public-facing court materials will be important because legal rules influence decisions well before a hearing, including whether proceedings are issued at all.

Implementation should also guard against replacing one inflexible expectation with another. Repeal may appropriately encourage greater scrutiny of contact, but a universal assumption that allegations require indefinite exclusion would reproduce the problem of deciding individual welfare through a general rule. Conversely, retaining the practical expectation that every case must ultimately progress towards direct contact would largely defeat the reform’s purpose. The appropriate discipline is transparent assessment of the child, the evidence and the available arrangements.

Future review should therefore examine reasoning as well as outcomes. Researchers should ask whether courts identify material risks earlier, explain their treatment of children’s views, distinguish allegations from findings and connect protective conditions to the risks established. Comparable attention should be given to unnecessary delay and failures to support safe relationships. A reform directed towards welfare should be assessed through evidence capable of revealing successes and failures in both directions.

Conclusion

The proposed abolition of the presumption of parental involvement is justified, provided its significance is stated accurately. The present provision is qualified, rebuttable and subordinate to welfare paramountcy. It allows indirect involvement and confers no entitlement to a particular division of time. Existing law already permits courts to restrict or exclude involvement where the child’s welfare requires it. Repeal would therefore change the statutory starting point within an established protective framework.

The evidence supports concern about the influence of generalised expectations favouring contact, while demonstrating that those expectations predate the 2014 amendment. It also leaves considerable uncertainty about the provision’s independent effect on outcomes. The strongest case for repeal rests on removing an unnecessary source of interpretative pressure and making the individual child’s circumstances more clearly central. Claims that repeal alone will remedy unsafe practice exceed what the research can establish.

Safe parental relationships retain substantial legal and practical importance. The authorities require serious attention to the consequences of unjustified exclusion, procedural unfairness and delay. The same framework supports protection from abuse and arrangements whose apparent benefits depend on overlooking their wider effects. Children’s participation, reliable findings and realistic assessment of available safeguards connect these obligations.

Reform should ultimately be judged by the quality of that inquiry. A court should be able to explain what a proposed relationship offers this child, what risks it carries, how those risks can be addressed and why the resulting arrangement serves welfare. Removing the presumption can help clarify that responsibility. Delivering it requires sustained investment in the evidence, procedures and services through which family justice is administered.

References

  1. Courts and Tribunals Bill, HL Bill 57 (2026–27), as brought from the Commons on 14 October 2026, cls 16, 22 and 26. See also the official Bill page. Clause numbers refer to this version, rather than earlier versions in which the repeal appeared as cl 17.
  2. Children Act 1989, s 1, particularly subs (1)–(7).
  3. Children and Families Act 2014, s 11; Children and Families Act 2014 (Commencement No 5 and Transitional Provision) Order 2014, SI 2014/2749, arts 3–4.
  4. Explanatory notes to the Children and Families Act 2014, paras 105–109, p 21.
  5. Re B (A Child) [2009] UKSC 5, particularly [18]–[20] and [35]–[41].
  6. Family Justice Review, Final report (November 2011), paras 4.38–4.40.
  7. Adrienne Barnett, ‘Contact at all costs? Domestic violence and children’s welfare’ (2014) 26 Child and Family Law Quarterly 439. Accessible accepted manuscript, particularly the research-method discussion and analysis of professional understandings of contact.
  8. Felicity Kaganas, ‘Parental involvement: a discretionary presumption’ (2018) 38 Legal Studies 549–570, particularly the conclusion; accessible accepted manuscript, pp 42–44.
  9. Joanna Harwood, ‘Presuming the status quo? The impact of the statutory presumption of parental involvement’ (2021) 43 Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 119–142, particularly 120–121 and 130–131.
  10. Ministry of Justice, Assessing risk of harm to children and parents in private law children cases: final report (June 2020), executive summary and methodology discussion.
  11. Ministry of Justice, Review of the presumption of parental involvement: final report (22 October 2025), executive summary and conclusions, particularly pp iii–vi and 38–41.
  12. Mary McKaskill, Tina Haux, Maebh Harding and Annika Newnham, Review of the presumption of parental involvement: judgment analysis research report (National Centre for Social Research, Ministry of Justice Analytical Series, 2025), pp 17–22 and 33–35, particularly table 5.4.
  13. Ministry of Justice, Review of the presumption of parental involvement: judgment analysis technical report (2025), sampling methodology; read with the judgment analysis report, pp 17–22 and table 4.1.
  14. Ministry of Justice, Review of the presumption of parental involvement: literature review (2025), particularly the discussions of relationship quality, conflict, abuse and methodological limitations.
  15. Ministry of Justice, Courts and Tribunals Bill: equalities statement (February 2026), pp 42–43.
  16. Domestic Abuse Act 2021, s 1 and s 3; see also the definitions adopted in PD12J.
  17. F v M [2021] EWFC 4, [2]–[5].
  18. Re H-N and Others (Children) (Domestic Abuse: Finding of Fact Hearings) [2021] EWCA Civ 448, particularly [5]–[6], [24], [28]–[33], [41]–[53].
  19. Re B (Children) [2008] UKHL 35, particularly [2], [13] and [15]; Re H-N (n 18), [5].
  20. K v K [2022] EWCA Civ 468, [1]–[11], particularly [8]. Judgment text checked in the accessible reproduction; identity and date also confirmed by the Judiciary judgment page.
  21. K v K (No 2) [2022] EWFC 171 (B), [92], [95]–[103].
  22. Re A (A Child: Findings of Fact) [2022] EWCA Civ 1652, [33]–[46].
  23. Courts and Tribunals Judiciary, ‘Fact-finding hearings and domestic abuse in private law children proceedings: guidance for judges and magistrates’ (5 May 2022), particularly paras 9–14.
  24. Family Procedure Rules 2010, Part 3A, particularly r 3A.2A.
  25. Family Procedure Rules, Practice Direction 12J: child arrangements and contact orders—domestic abuse and harm, particularly paras 16–20, 25–27 and 35–40.
  26. Re E, F and G (Interim Child Arrangements) [2024] EWCA Civ 874, [28]–[31] and [38]–[43].
  27. F v M [2023] EWFC 5, [17]–[24] and [27]–[32]. The judgment concerns exceptionally serious established abuse; its outcome is fact-specific.
  28. Cordis Bright, Research into safeguarding processes in child contact centres in England: final report (Ministry of Justice, April 2023), particularly the discussion of risk assessment, information sharing and review when contact arrangements progress.
  29. Children Act 1989, ss 91(14) and 91A; Family Procedure Rules, Practice Direction 12Q, particularly paras 2.1–2.7, 3.5–3.6 and 4–6.
  30. UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), arts 3, 9 and 12.
  31. Re C (‘Parental Alienation’; Instruction of Expert) [2023] EWHC 345 (Fam), [100]–[103].
  32. Family Justice Council, Guidance on responding to a child’s unexplained reluctance, resistance or refusal to spend time with a parent and allegations of alienating behaviour (December 2024), particularly paras 10, 24–26, 59–64 and 69–74.
  33. Re Y (Experts and Alienating Behaviour: The Modern Approach) [2026] EWFC 38, particularly [1]–[5], [40]–[42] and [73]–[77].
  34. Family Procedure (Amendment) Rules 2026, SI 2026/699, rr 1(3), 4–6, inserting FPR 25.5A and associated definitions. The amendments concerning experts do not apply to proceedings issued before 20 July 2026.
  35. House of Commons Justice Committee, Courts and Tribunals Bill (First Report of Session 2026–27, HC 192, 10 June 2026), paras 216–225, especially 222–224. Statements attributed to witnesses are evidence received by the Committee, rather than independent findings about prevalence.
  36. Human Rights Act 1998, s 6(1) and (3)(a).
  37. Elsholz v Germany [GC], App no 25735/94 (ECtHR, 13 July 2000), [43]–[53]. Full judgment available through UNHCR Refworld.
  38. Re C (A Child) [2011] EWCA Civ 521, [39]–[47], [55] and [59]–[64].
  39. Re A (A Child) [2013] EWCA Civ 1104, [2], [39], [65]–[66] and [71]–[79].
  40. I.M. and Others v Italy, App no 25426/20 (ECtHR, 10 November 2022), discussed on the basis of the official English court summary, ECHR 353 (2022). No detailed paragraph propositions are attributed here to the full French judgment.
  41. Sommerfeld v Germany [GC], App no 31871/96 (ECtHR, 8 July 2003), [65] and [68]–[75], in the official Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2003-VIII; also available as an accessible judgment reproduction. This is the Grand Chamber judgment, rather than the earlier Chamber decision.
  42. Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia, ‘Family law changes from 6 May 2024’, explaining the Family Law Amendment Act 2023 and Family Law Amendment (Information Sharing) Act 2023.
  43. Ministry of Justice, Child Focused Courts: target operating model (28 October 2026), particularly pp 9–15. See the official publication page.
  44. Charlotte Barlow and others, Private Law Pathfinder Pilot: process evaluation and exploratory financial analysis (Ministry of Justice Analytical Series, March 2025), particularly pp 17–21 and 48–52.
  45. Charlotte Barlow and others, Private Law Pathfinder Pilot: understanding the experience of children and families (Ministry of Justice Analytical Series, January 2026), particularly pp 2–5, 11–14, 39–41 and Appendix D.
  46. Ministry of Justice, Courts and Tribunals Bill: non-IRCC impact assessment (24 February 2026), paras 66–72.
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