Saunders (Executrix of the Will of Rose Maud Gallie, Decd.) v Anglia Building Society [1971] A.C. 1039
Contract – Term of Contract – Costs – Legal Aid – Entitlement to payment
Facts:
A widow was induced by a fraudster to sign her leasehold interest in her house over to him. He then mortgaged her property to the Anglia Building Society (ABS). The mortgage deed stipulated that any costs incurred by ABS under the mortgage were to be paid by the mortgagee. The widow brought action claiming the contract for a mortgage over her property with ABS was void and that the title should return to being in her name. She succeeded in her claim. Proceedings were funded by legal aid. The court held that even though the mortgage deed was void, the assignment of the title was not and that costs had been incurred by ABS so they were at liberty to recover their costs. The widow appealed.
Issues:
Whether the legal aid funding of the case affected whether the building society could recover their incurred costs on the assignment.
Held:
The claim for costs were found not conflict the provisions of s 2(2)(e) of the Legal Aid Act 1964. The order for costs was not against the widow and had no bearing on her to make payment out of the estate. The costs were found to be properly incurred, incurred without any relevance to the actual fraud and were reasonable. On the court’s decision, it was also found that even though ABS were an unassisted party in the proceedings, as the appeal costs had been incurred getting the case to its final decision, those costs were also considered reasonable. ABS were entitled to have them paid.
Updated 20 March 2026
This case summary describes the House of Lords decision in Saunders (Executrix of the Will of Rose Maud Gallie, Decd.) v Anglia Building Society [1971] AC 1039 accurately in its broad outline, including the core facts concerning the fraudulent assignment, the non est factum plea, and the costs question. However, readers should be aware of the following points.
First, and most importantly, the article focuses on the costs and legal aid aspect of the decision, but the case is primarily significant in English contract law for its treatment of the doctrine of non est factum. The House of Lords substantially narrowed that doctrine, holding that it is available only in very limited circumstances where the document signed is fundamentally different in character from what the signatory believed it to be, and where the signatory was not careless. This is the aspect of the decision most commonly tested and cited, and the article does not address it.
Second, the Legal Aid Act 1964, which the article cites, has long been repealed. The legal aid framework has since been governed by the Legal Aid Act 1988, then the Access to Justice Act 1999, and currently the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (LASPO). The statutory provision discussed in the case no longer exists in that form, though the case retains its authority on non est factum. Readers should not treat the statutory analysis as reflecting current law on legal aid costs.
The case itself remains good law on non est factum and continues to be cited and applied by the courts.
