General Inchoate Offences Lecture
This lecture covers the following areas of general inchoate offences in England and Wales as part of our series of criminal law lectures:
- Introduction to General Inchoate Offences
- Assisting or Encouraging an Offence
- Conspiracy to Commit a Crime
- Criminal Attempts
1.0 Introduction
There are often instances where despite the intentions of a defendant, their desire to commit their intended crime is not sufficient to fulfil the requirements of the offence. This intended offence will be referred to throughout as the substantive offence. In these instances, where the substantive offence has not itself been committed there may well be an offence of a different nature committed due to the actions or agreements of the defendant in preparing to commit the substantive offence. These offences are referred to as general inchoate offences, inchoate meaning incomplete!
The various offences that exist under this general heading are set out and discussed further.
Examination Point
Inchoate offences are a wide category of offences and each offence has many different provisions relating to it. This unit focuses on the common offences that you will come across in your studies and provides a general oversight as to the main points you will need to know in relation to each offence. If you are aiming for a higher grade then it is worth conducting some further research once you have gained a general understanding of the offences, looking into journal articles and books in order to further your ability to appreciate and critique the offences.
2.0 Assisting or Encouraging an Offence
The Serious Crime Act 2007 sets out three offences relating to assisting or encouraging an offence:
- Section 44: Intentionally encouraging or assisting an offence
- Section 45: Encouraging or assisting an offence believing it will be committed
- Section 46: Encouraging or assisting offences believing one or more will be committed
These offences essentially provide for a defendant who does an act capable of encouraging or assisting another person to commit an offence to be prosecuted regardless of whether the offence is ever actually attempted, let alone committed. These offences replaced common law incitement for acts done from 1 October 2008.
2.1 Intentionally encouraging or assisting an offence
Section 44 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 provides:
(1) A person commits an offence if-
(a) he does an act capable of encouraging or assisting the commission of an offence; and
(b) he intends to encourage or assist its commission.
(2) But he is not to be taken to have intended to encourage or assist the commission of an offence merely because such encouragement or assistance was a foreseeable consequence of his act.
2.1.1 Actus Reus
- Defendant commits an act, and;
- The act is capable of encouraging or assisting the commission of an offence
Note that under s.65(2)(b) of the Act, a reference to doing an act includes a reference to failing to take reasonable steps to discharge a duty. Accordingly, liability may arise by way of omission where the defendant has a pre-existing duty. Under s.65(3), simply failing to respond to a constable’s request for help in preventing a breach of the peace does not suffice.
2.1.2 Mens Rea
- Intention to encourage or assist in the commission of the offence
This is a specific intention and will not be satisfied by mere recklessness. Under s.47, the intention must relate to encouraging or assisting the act constituting the anticipated offence. For all three offences, if that act requires fault, the defendant must believe it would be done with that fault, be reckless about this, or have that fault himself if he were to do it. Where particular circumstances or consequences are required, belief or recklessness about them suffices. For s.44, intention also suffices.
2.2 Encouraging or assisting an offence believing it will be committed
Section 45 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 provides:
A person commits an offence if—
(a) he does an act capable of encouraging or assisting the commission of an offence; and
(b) he believes:
(i) that the offence will be committed; and
(ii) that his act will encourage or assist its commission.
2.2.1 Actus Reus
- Defendant commits an act, and;
- Act is capable of encouraging or assisting the commission of an offence
2.2.2 Mens Rea
- Belief that the offence will be committed, and;
- Belief that his act will encourage or assist the commission of the offence
Belief here can be compared with belief in the context of handling stolen goods. Following R v Hall [1985] 81 Cr App R 260, that will be taken to mean something more than mere suspicion but short of actual knowledge. The question is what the defendant actually believed. The court may infer that belief from everything said and done.
2.3 Encouraging or assisting offences believing one or more will be committed
Section 46 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 provides that:
(1) A person commits an offence if—
(a) he does an act capable of encouraging or assisting the commission of one or more of a number of offences; and
(b) he believes—
(i) that one or more of those offences will be committed (but has no belief as to which); and
(ii) that his act will encourage or assist the commission of one or more of them.
2.3.1 Actus Reus
- Defendant does an act, and;
- The act is capable of encouraging or assisting in commission of one or more offences.
2.3.2 Mens Rea
- Belief that one or more offences will be committed, without a belief as to which, and;
- Belief that his act will encourage or assist their commission.
Belief should be interpreted in the same manner as in the s.45 offence. For both offences, s.49(8) allows for a belief that an offence will be committed if a particular condition is met.
Applying s.46(2), it is irrelevant whether the person has a belief as to which of the offences his own act will encourage or assist. This is distinct from the requirement in s.46(1)(b)(i) that he has no belief as to which offence will be committed.
2.4 Defence
Section 50 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 provides a general defence where the defendant knew the circumstances and acted reasonably in them, or reasonably believed that particular circumstances existed and acted reasonably in the circumstances as he believed them to be. The court may consider the seriousness of the anticipated offence and any purpose or authority the defendant claims. This defence could cover pulling over to allow a car travelling in excess of the speed limit to overtake where it is reasonable to do so for safety. The defendant must establish the defence on the balance of probabilities. Where jurisdiction depends on Schedule 4, s.50A also provides a defence for an act necessary for the proper exercise of an intelligence service function or an armed forces intelligence function. Once sufficient evidence raises that issue, the prosecution must disprove it beyond reasonable doubt.
Section 51 of the Act further provides limitation of liability to the offences where the offence that was encouraged or assisted by the defendant was one which was created in order to protect a description of person which the defendant fulfils and accordingly the defendant was the victim, or the intended victim of the offence. For example, consider the topical case study of the teacher Jeremy Forrest who ran away with one of his 15-year-old pupils. Forrest was convicted of child abduction and pleaded guilty to sexual activity with a child. The pupil could not be guilty under Part 2 of encouraging her own abuse, because she was the very person the offences were designed to protect.
2.5 Charging and Sentencing
Where the defendant believes that one or more offences will be committed, a single s.46 count may specify several offences, even if they carry different maximum sentences (R v Sadique [2013] EWCA Crim 1150).
Under ss.46(3) and 48, the indictment must specify the offences alleged. It is sufficient to prove the matters in s.47(5) by reference to one of those offences, subject to the provisions for alternative verdicts. Where penalties differ, the basis of the verdict must be clear for sentencing.
Section 49 of the Act further provides the CPS with the remit to charge a person who intentionally encourages or assists another party to in turn encourage or assist someone to commit an offence. This would cover behaviour for example such as saying “if you tell him to do it he’ll listen to you”. Section 49(4) excludes Part 2 and Schedule 3 offences as anticipated offences under ss.45 and 46. Section 44 can apply to intentional encouragement of another’s encouragement. Under s.66, if a person arranges for someone else to do an encouraging or assisting act and that person does it, both are treated as having done the act. Section 51A excludes the specific offences of encouraging or assisting suicide or serious self-harm from s.44.
Offences under ss.44 and 45 are triable in the same way as the anticipated offence. An offence under s.46 is triable only on indictment. Under s.58, the maximum penalty is generally that of the anticipated or reference offence. If a s.46 conviction is based on several offences, the longest applicable maximum term governs, or a fine if none is punishable with imprisonment. If one is murder, life imprisonment is discretionary.
3.0 Conspiracy
The offence of conspiracy is provided for both under statute and in the common law.
Examination Point
These two ways of committing conspiracy should be considered separately and should not be confused with one another.
3.1 Statutory Conspiracy
Section 1 of the Criminal Law Act 1977 provides that:
if a person agrees with any other person or persons that a course of conduct shall be pursued which, if the agreement is carried out in accordance with their intentions, either
(a) will necessarily amount to or involve the commission of any offence or offences by one or more of the parties to the agreement, or
(b) would do so but for the existence of facts which render the commission of the offence or any of the offences impossible
he is guilty of conspiracy to commit the offence or offences in question
An intended victim of an offence cannot be guilty of statutory conspiracy to commit it. Section 2 of the Act also exempts a defendant where the only other party or parties to the agreement, both initially and throughout, are:
- The defendant’s spouse or civil partner
- A person under the age of criminal responsibility (10 in England and Wales)
- An intended victim of the offence or of each of the offences
Although there is no requirement for any action in preparation for the offence to be carried out past the agreement, in practice there will often be steps taken towards committing the offence past a mere discussion as without this it would be very difficult to prove the conspiracy in a court. Section 1A also covers certain agreements to commit an offence abroad where the statutory conditions are met, including criminality in both jurisdictions and the required connection with England and Wales.
3.1.1 Actus Reus
- An agreement
- As to a course of conduct
Agreement
There must be an agreement between parties. This cannot be established by a mere thought, but it may be tacit and inferred from conduct.
It is not necessary for every party to be involved in actioning the agreement for them to satisfy this element of the actus reus, simply being part of the agreement is sufficient. For example, if three people get together and agree that one of them will steal a car, all three would be considered party to the agreement. The actus reus will still be satisfied even where the defendant was to renege on the agreement or change his mind and withdraw straight after the agreement has been made.
The motives of the parties in reaching the agreement are irrelevant.
Case in Focus: Yip Chiu-Cheung v The Queen [1994] 2 All E.R. 924
Two people came to an agreement to commit an offence, one of whom was an undercover police officer who only entered the agreement to catch the drug dealers. The officer genuinely intended to carry the heroin out of Hong Kong as agreed. His motive did not prevent the offence of conspiracy being committed on the part of the other party to the agreement.
The case of R v Shillam [2013] EWCA Crim 160 clarifies that whilst the motive behind the agreement is irrelevant, there must be a shared criminal purpose or plan between the conspirators. This is not the same as a requirement for all parties to be in direct contact with one another, so long as a particular common purpose exists between them. This must necessarily amount to a single jointly shared plan and not separate yet similar plans. All parties need not be privy to the full extent of the scheme but each must have joined the common plan alleged. Consider the case of R v Griffiths [1966] 1 QB 589 below for an illustration of this.
Case in Focus: R v Griffiths [1966] 1 QB 589
A number of farmers purchased lime from Griffiths and his employee, who then sought to make fraudulent claims against the government for financial subsidies. All of the farmers who had purchased the lime were charged jointly with conspiracy to defraud. Whilst each individual farmer had acted dishonestly, there was no evidence that any of them were aware of the arrangements being made between Griffiths and any of the other farmers, yet they were all charged under one single count of conspiracy. The farmers appealed their convictions and these were quashed by the Court of Appeal who held that whilst it is not necessary that a party to a conspiracy charge should be privy to all of the details of the scheme to which he has joined, all must join in the one agreement with all of the other parties in order to constitute one conspiracy. They need not join at the same time or know all the other parties, but a series of separate agreements with Griffiths did not establish that the farmers had joined a common scheme.
Course of conduct
This does not need to be to a certain set course and could be dependant on external factors. For example, an agreement that the defendants will attack a person if he happens to be at the house when they arrive would be sufficient.
Case in Focus: R v Jackson [1985] Crim LR 442
The defendants got together and agreed to shoot their friend in the leg in the event that their friend was convicted of the burglary he was on trial for, in the hope that this would assist him by gaining sympathy in mitigation. They were charged with conspiracy to pervert the course of justice. They argued that this did not satisfy the actus reus for conspiracy as this was not a set in stone course of action. The Court of Appeal nevertheless upheld the convictions, holding that it did not need to be an inevitability that they would carry out the offence in order to have conspired to commit it.
3.1.2 Mens Rea
- Intention to be party to the agreement, and;
- Intention that the offence will be carried out by one or more of the conspirators.
Only intention will suffice and mere recklessness will be insufficient. Under s.1(2), where the substantive offence can be committed without knowledge of a necessary fact or circumstance, the defendant and at least one other party must intend or know that it will exist at the relevant time.
Case in Focus: R v Saik [2006] UKHL 18
The defendant owned and operated a currency exchange bureau and in the course of running his business he exchanged a large sum of money from pound sterling to other foreign currencies for one of his clients. He was charged with conspiracy to launder the proceeds of criminal conduct. He pleaded guilty on the basis that he had suspected the source of the money. His appeal succeeded in the House of Lords. Knowledge or reasonable grounds to suspect the criminal source could suffice for the substantive offence then in force. Mere suspicion did not establish that he and another party knew or intended that the money would be the proceeds of crime when exchanged.
The offence must actually be intended and not just discussed as a theoretical possibility.
Case in Focus: R v G and F [2012] EWCA Crim 1756, [2013] Crim LR 678
Two defendants exchanged numerous text messages about raping a young boy. Nearly three years passed between the messages and their arrest. The pair never met or acted upon their discussions. They were convicted of conspiracy to rape, but the Court of Appeal quashed both convictions. On the evidence a jury could not be sure they intended to carry out the plan rather than merely discussing a fantasy.
3.1.3 Charging and Sentencing
The offence of statutory conspiracy is triable only on indictment even if the agreed offence is summary only. Where all the agreed offences are summary, proceedings require the consent specified in s.4, normally that of the Director of Public Prosecutions. Under s.3 the longest applicable maximum term governs. Life imprisonment is discretionary for conspiracy to murder, and a fine is available where none of the offences is punishable with imprisonment.
3.2 Common Law Conspiracy
Common law conspiracy was abolished by the enactment of the Criminal Law Act 1977 except in relation to two things provided for in s.5 of the Act, where it is stated that the abolition will not affect the common law offence where it is committed by entering into an agreement to engage in conduct that:
- Tends to corrupt public morals or outrages public decency; or,
- Amounts to a conspiracy to defraud
It should be noted that the s.5(3) preservation of conspiracy to corrupt public morals or outrage public decency is limited to agreements where the agreed conduct would not amount to or involve the commission of an offence if carried out by a single person otherwise than in pursuance of an agreement.
3.2.1 Conspiracy to corrupt public morals or outrage public decency
This preserves the common law conspiracies to corrupt public morals and to outrage public decency. Shaw v DPP [1962] AC 220 is the leading authority on conspiracy to corrupt public morals, whilst Knuller v DPP [1973] AC 435 confirmed the continued existence of that offence and also concerned conspiracy to outrage public decency.
Case in Focus: Shaw v DPP [1962] AC 220
The defendant created and published a compilation of nude photographs of prostitutes next to their contact details the services they offered under the title of a ladies’ directory. The defendant charged the ladies listed an inclusion fee and made further money by selling the directory on to interested parties. He was charged with conspiracy to corrupt public morals. The defendant appealed contending that no such offence existed. His appeal was, however, dismissed on the basis that the offence existed at common law. At pages 267-268 Viscount Simonds explained, “In the sphere of criminal law I entertain no doubt that there remains in the courts of law a residual power to enforce the supreme and fundamental purpose of the law, to conserve not only the safety and order but also the moral welfare of the State, and that it is their duty to guard it against attacks which may be the more insidious because they are novel and unprepared for. That is the broad head (call it public policy if you wish) within which the present indictment falls. It matters little what label is given to the offending act. To one of your Lordships it may appear an affront to public decency, to another considering that it may succeed in its obvious intention of provoking libidinous desires it will seem a corruption of public morals. Yet others may deem it aptly described as the creation of a public mischief or the undermining of moral conduct. The same act will not in all ages be regarded in the same way. The law must be related to the changing standards of life, not yielding to every shifting impulse of the popular will but having regard to fundamental assessments of human values and the purposes of society.”
Case in Focus: Knuller v DPP [1973] AC 435
The defendants created a magazine which contained as part of the wider publication a section where adverts could be placed by homosexuals seeking to meet other homosexuals in order to engage in sexual activity. The defendants were charged with conspiracy to corrupt public morals and conspiracy to outrage public decency following the decision in Shaw. The House of Lords declined to depart from Shaw and upheld the conviction for conspiracy to corrupt public morals. It recognised conspiracy to outrage public decency but quashed that conviction because of the direction to the jury.
3.2.2 Conspiracy to Defraud
This offence exists to deal with dishonest agreements to prejudice another’s proprietary rights or otherwise to defraud, including situations not adequately covered by specific statutory offences. A dishonest agreement to put another’s economic interests at risk may suffice without actual loss. It may also be a fraud to deceive a public officer into acting contrary to his public duty. Under s.12 of the Criminal Justice Act 1987, overlap with a statutory offence does not preclude a charge of conspiracy to defraud. In R v Hayes and R v Palombo [2025] UKSC 29, it was for the jury to decide whether the benchmark submissions were false or misleading and whether the agreement was dishonest.
Examination Point
It is vital to have knowledge of and understand key areas where this offence will arise. Consider the Ponzi case study as a very topical example for discussion in an exam. Ponzi was an Italian businessman who paid earlier investors from the contributions of new investors. In a pyramid scheme the rewards depend on recruiting new members. Both may involve conspiracy to defraud.
A pyramid scheme can be highly profitable, but only for a very small number of people at the top of the pyramid. The idea works on people making money by recruiting other members. So the first person encourages others, say three people, to give him money which is invested and they reap massive rewards. They are thrilled by this so each encourage three other people to invest for a further fee. The main characteristic of a pyramid scheme is that people only continue to make money by recruiting other members. The number of people involved in the scheme grows quickly so that the “base” of the pyramid becomes wider and wider:
- One person encourages three others to invest in his exciting, lucrative opportunity for a fee of say £50.
- The three new recruits each pay the £50 to the individual
- The individual recruiter then tells them to recruit three more people and do the same. If they do they will be returned with £100 with him keeping £50 to himself for every three people they recruit.
- The nine new people now recruited will each have to recruit even more people in order to deliver the same return.
- This gets out of hand exceptionally quickly due to exponential growth with the numbers becoming physically unsustainable and the chain collapses. Almost everyone in the chain at this stage will lose their money.
Those who dishonestly agree to operate such a scheme to the prejudice of investors will be guilty of conspiring to defraud. Joining as an unsuspecting investor does not make someone a conspirator.
3.2.3 Actus Reus for Common Law Conspiracy
The actus reus is satisfied by either:
- Conspiring to corrupt public morals or outrage public decency or;
- Conspiring to defraud
3.2.4 Mens Rea for Common Law Conspiracy
For conspiracy to defraud, the parties must intend to put the agreement into effect and to prejudice the interests of another by dishonest means. For this offence, dishonesty should now be assessed using the modern test explained in Ivey v Genting Casinos (UK) Ltd [2017] UKSC 67 and applied in criminal cases by R v Barton and Booth [2020] EWCA Crim 575:
- First, ascertain the actual state of the defendant’s knowledge or belief as to the facts;
- Then determine whether, in light of those facts as the defendant believed them to be, the conduct was dishonest by the standards of ordinary decent people.
This replaced the previous two-stage Ghosh test, which had included an additional subjective limb asking whether the defendant realised that his actions were dishonest. That subjective limb no longer forms part of the law.
3.2.5 Charging and Sentencing Common Law Conspiracy
There is not a set sentence in place for conspiracy to corrupt public morals or outrage public decency and it is left to the discretion of the judge upon a successful conviction.
Conspiracy to defraud carries a maximum sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment.
4.0 Attempt
Section 1 of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 provides:
If, with intent to commit an offence to which this section applies, a person does an act which is more than merely preparatory to the commission of the offence, he is guilty of attempting to commit the offence.
(2) A person may be guilty of attempting to commit an offence to which this section applies even though the facts are such that the commission of the offence is impossible.
(3) In any case where—
(a) apart from this subsection a person’s intention would not be regarded as having amounted to an intent to commit an offence; but
(b) if the facts of the case had been as he believed them to be, his intention would be so regarded,
then, for the purposes of subsection (1) above, he shall be regarded as having had an intent to commit that offence.
Subsection (4) further provides that s.1 generally applies only to offences triable on indictment and lists exemptions to which the Act will not apply. It is not possible under the Act to be guilty of the attempt to commit:
- A summary offence other than low-value shoplifting (s.1(5)). Other statutes may expressly criminalise attempts at particular summary offences
- Conspiracy
- Aiding, abetting, counselling, procuring or suborning the commission of an offence
- Assisting offenders, or accepting or agreeing to accept consideration for not disclosing information in relation to a relevant offence
- An offence under s.2(1) of the Suicide Act 1961 (encouraging or assisting suicide)
- An offence under s.184(1) of the Online Safety Act 2023 (encouraging or assisting serious self-harm)
Where a defendant is on trial for the charge of the full offence but it cannot be established on the facts that the offence was completed, then, where an offence of attempt exists, on indictment the court may still convict the defendant for the attempt. At summary trial this can only be done if the defendant has been charged separately with the attempt.
4.1 Actus Reus
- An act which is more than merely preparatory in the commission of an indictable offence.
Whether the defendant in any case has gone far enough to complete the actus reus of the attempt of their intended offence is a question of fact that will require assessment in the circumstances of each individual case. It is a question of whether they have passed the preparatory stages and done something more. Section 4 of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 provides that the question of whether there is enough evidence to suggest this may be the case is one for the judge. If so the judge must direct the jury to rule on whether they believe this stage has been surpassed. The courts have taken a narrow interpretation of the legislation holding that this requires the defendant to have embarked upon the crime properly. R v Geddes (1996) 160 JP 697 establishes that the jury must ask themselves whether the defendant actually tried to commit the offence. The defendant need not have done the last possible act. In R v Jones [1990] 1 WLR 1057 the defendant pointed a loaded gun at the victim. The safety catch was still on, but there was sufficient evidence of attempted murder to go to the jury.
Case in Focus: R v Geddes (1996) 160 JP 697
The defendant was trespassing on the premises of a school when he was caught by a teacher in the boy’s toilets. He had with him a rucksack. A police officer who was already on the premises shouted at him and he ran away. A cider can belonging to the defendant was found in a cubicle. His rucksack, which contained a knife, rope and a roll of tape, was found in bushes where he had discarded it. The defendant was charged with attempted false imprisonment on the basis that the drink was evidence that the defendant had been inside the toilets and the items inside the bag could have been used to restrain a child who entered the toilet. The defendant successfully appealed his conviction with the Court of Appeal holding that the line between acts which were merely preparatory and those acts which amount to an attempt is not always clear cut and there is no decisive test that could be used to establish when this line was crossed. The defendant had not approached or tried to detain a pupil. There was insufficient evidence to leave the case to the jury. The court asked: Does the evidence suggest that the defendant had actually tried to commit the offence in question, or had he merely put himself in a position where he was equipped to do so if he so wished?
In Geddes, although the defendant’s intention was clear and he had placed himself ready to commit the offence, he had not done anything more than this, and therefore nothing which was more than merely preparatory to wrongfully imprisoning an unknown victim could be shown on the facts.
Case in Focus: R v Campbell [1991] 93 Cr App R 350
The defendant was under observation by police officers as he walked up to a post office where he stopped. The police officers then approached and searched him and he was found to have on him sunglasses, an imitation firearm and a threatening note. The defendant was convicted of attempted robbery and appealed. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, quashing his original conviction on the basis that the judge was wrong to allow the case to go before the jury. On these facts he had not progressed from preparing for the robbery to trying to rob anyone. Going equipped under s.25 of the Theft Act 1968 is a separate offence. It requires possession, away from one’s place of abode, of an article for use in the course of or in connection with a burglary or theft.
If the jury hold that the preparatory stage has been surpassed then the actus reus is complete, even where the defendant then withdraws their desire to commit the intended offence.
4.2 Mens Rea
- Intention to commit the offence
As an attempt is an offence of specific intent, it requires the defendant to harbour an actual intention to commit the offence in question. Recklessness as to bringing about the prohibited result will not be sufficient, even where it would be sufficient as the mens rea for the full offence. So for example, intention or recklessness as to some physical harm is sufficient for the completed offence under s.20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 if a wound or GBH results. For attempted GBH, the defendant must intend really serious harm.
The position can differ for other elements of the offence. Consider the case of Attorney General's Reference No. 3 of 1992 [1994] 2 All ER 121, where on a charge of attempted aggravated arson under s.1(2) Criminal Damage Act 1971, once the actual intent to cause damage by fire had been established, recklessness as to whether life would be endangered by the damage was sufficient, it was not necessary that this element of the offence was specifically intended. Similarly, in R v Khan [1990] 2 All ER 783, as long as the intent to have sexual intercourse was established, the defendant’s recklessness as to the absence of consent was sufficient mens rea for the attempted rape. It should be noted that Khan was decided under the pre-2003 law. Under the Sexual Offences Act 2003, the modern offence of rape requires absence of consent and that the defendant does not reasonably believe that the complainant consents. In R v Pace and Rogers [2014] EWCA Crim 186, suspicion that the property was criminal property was insufficient for attempted conversion, although it would have sufficed for the completed offence had the property been criminal property.
R v Shivpuri [1987] AC 1 establishes that factual impossibility to follow through on the attempt will not negate the intention to commit the offence where if the facts had existed as the defendant believed them to be the offence would have been possible. It should also be noted that where, on the facts as the defendant believed them to be, no offence would have been committed at all, there is no attempt liability.
Case in Focus: R v Shivpuri [1987] AC 1
This is a case relating to factual impossibility.
The defendant received a suitcase which had been smuggled into England from India and believed that it contained controlled drugs. Acting on instructions, he went to Southall railway station to hand over part of the substance to another person and was arrested outside the station. Further similar material was found at his flat. Scientific analysis later showed that the substance was not a controlled drug but a harmless vegetable matter. The defendant was nonetheless charged and convicted with attempting to be knowingly concerned in dealing with and harbouring a controlled drug. On appeal the conviction was upheld with the House of Lords holding that the correct interpretation of s.1 of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 would hold the defendant to be guilty in spite of his mistake.
4.3 Charging and Sentencing
Attempt is triable according to the offence attempted: where the full offence is indictable only, the attempt is triable only on indictment; where the full offence is triable either way, the attempt is also triable either way. Section 4 of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 provides that the offence of attempt generally carries the same maximum sentence as the full offence attempted. For attempted murder, life imprisonment is discretionary. The Act also covers attempted low-value shoplifting (goods worth £200 or less), ordinarily tried summarily, subject to an adult defendant’s right to elect trial on indictment.
Hands on Example
The following scenario will give you the opportunity to put your knowledge of the inchoate offences to the test, and examine your ability to identify the offences and apply the provisions and surrounding case law in a practical setting.
Take a look at the following passage and have a go at highlighting the material facts and legal issues, making a note of any ideas or relevant law that springs to mind as you go through. Once you have done this have a go at putting together an answer to the question. Good luck!
If you’re feeling stuck there is really no need to worry. If you haven’t seen one of these questions before then they can be daunting, but there is nothing in the scenario that we haven’t covered in this unit. Use the outline answer provided below as a prompt to help you with your answer or to check any answer you have produced on your own.
Jan is in a restaurant with her friend Sebastian. The pair enjoy a lovely meal together and have a good chat, during which Sebastian offloads to Jan about his unrequited love for their friend Samantha, desperate to understand why she isn’t interested in him. Jan ribs Sebastian saying that the reason why Samantha will never fancy him is that he is too boring and that he doesn’t break the rules enough. “Samantha prefers a bit of a rebel” she tells him. When the bill arrives Jan jokes to Sebastian “go on, let’s do a runner, show Samantha that you aren’t boring after all”. She goes to the toilet and then when she comes back, the pair walk out. Jan believes that Sebastian has paid the bill already but in fact Sebastian has decided to take Jan up on her suggestion and live a little more dangerously, leaving the restaurant without paying for the food. As they leave the waitress goes to run after them but another customer Dave who is annoyed at the poor service and wants to see the restaurant pay sees this and gets in the way, allowing Jan and Sebastian to exit the restaurant without being stopped.
Walking back to the car the pair see Jan’s ex-boyfriend James who recently cheated on Jan leaving her heartbroken. Jan tells Sebastian that she wants to hurt him and make him pay before announcing that she will go and break his nose. She runs off and gets behind James who is facing away from her and swings a punch just as Sebastian catches up with her and restrains her from doing anything further.
Discuss the liability of the parties for any inchoate offences.
Jan
Restaurant
- Possible offence of encouraging and assisting the offence of making off without payment under either s.44 or s.45 of the Serious Crime Act 2007. Under s.3 of the Theft Act 1978 the person making off must know that payment on the spot is required or expected and dishonestly intend to avoid payment permanently.
s.44
Actus Reus
- Defendant commits an act, and;
- The act is capable of encouraging or assisting the commission of an offence
This is satisfied on the facts. Jan commits the act of suggesting that Sebastian leave without paying and the act is capable of encouraging Sebastian to do that through persuasion and knowing how Sebastian feels about Samantha.
Mens Rea
- Intention to encourage or assist in the commission of the offence
On the facts as it appears that Jan is only joking and teasing Sebastian and has no intention to genuinely encourage Sebastian to commit the offence.
- The mens rea is not satisfied so no liability for an offence under s.44 arises.
s.45
Actus Reus
- Defendant commits an act, and;
- The act is capable of encouraging or assisting the commission of an offence
As above this is satisfied by Jan’s behaviour on the facts.
Mens Rea
- Belief that the offence will be committed, and;
- Belief that her act will encourage or assist the commission of the offence
Applying Hall Jan must harbour more than mere suspicion that her actions will encourage or assist the offence and must actually believe that Sebastian will commit it. This is contentious on the facts and could be argued either way. It is likely, however, that given that Jan was joking and that she believes Sebastian to be very well behaved and reluctant to break the rules, coupled with the fact she is oblivious to the fact that Sebastian carries out the offence, suggests that at no point does it cross her mind that she is encouraging Sebastian.
- According to the interpretation of the facts the mens rea is not satisfied therefore no offence is committed by Jan.
Punch
- In relation to trying to punch James and break his nose, Jan may be guilty of an attempt under s.1 of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 if the intended full offence is indictable and the necessary intent can be shown. On these facts, an intention to break James’ nose does not necessarily show the intent required for attempted GBH with intent (s.18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861), which requires an intention to cause really serious harm. A broken nose may constitute GBH, but may also amount to ABH. The distinction between s.18 and s.20 is important here: s.18 requires intent to cause GBH, making it straightforward for attempt purposes if such intent is proven, whereas for a completed s.20 offence it is enough to intend or foresee some physical harm, which would be insufficient mens rea for an attempt charge given that attempt requires specific intent.
Actus Reus
- An act which is more than merely preparatory in the commission of an indictable offence.
Applying Geddes, Jan has embarked upon the offence proper, doing the last possible act she can in throwing the punch, without making contact.
Mens Rea
- Intention to commit the offence.
This depends on the offence alleged. On the facts, Jan plainly intends to assault James, but an intention to break his nose does not automatically establish an intention to cause really serious harm. An intention to cause actual bodily harm could support attempted assault occasioning actual bodily harm under s.47. If James neither saw the punch coming nor otherwise apprehended immediate unlawful violence, and it missed him, there was no completed common assault or battery. Common assault itself is summary only and cannot be attempted under s.1.
Dave
- Dave may be guilty of intentionally assisting with an offence under the Serious Crime Act 2007.
s.44
Actus Reus
- Defendant commits an act, and;
- The act is capable of encouraging or assisting the commission of an offence
This is satisfied on the facts. Dave commits the act of getting in the way of the waitress allowing Sebastian to successfully leave the restaurant and complete the offence of making off without payment. The act need only have been capable of assisting him.
Mens Rea
- Intention to encourage or assist in the commission of the offence
On the facts it appears that Dave intends to assist Sebastian in making off without payment by doing the act of getting in the way of the waitress as he is annoyed at the service he has received and wants to see them lose money.
- Dave will likely be liable under s.44 if he intended to help Sebastian leave dishonestly without paying and the requirements of s.47 are met as to Sebastian’s fault. Wanting the restaurant to lose money because of poor service does not make his intervention reasonable under s.50. The position could be different if he reasonably believed the waitress was about to assault them and acted reasonably on that belief.
…For extra marks
Sebastian
It should briefly be mentioned that in relation to Jan’s intention to punch James, Sebastian will not be guilty of conspiracy under s.1 Criminal Law Act 1977 as he is not in agreement as to the course of action, he is merely informed of it seconds before it takes place and does everything he can to prevent Jan thus highlighting that he is not party to any agreement.
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