Parties to Crime Lecture
1.0 Introduction
It is not always just the person who carries out the actus reus of the offence who has been involved. Other people can play a part in the crime alongside this person and they too can be liable for it in law, despite not committing the crime and getting their hands dirty themselves. For example, a person hiring a hitman to carry out their undesirable activities for them will not be absolved of any liability for the killing they have hired the hitman to carry out, even though they themselves did not physically commit the offence.
In England and Wales, the different roles that people can play in the commission of an offence can be broken down as follows:
- The principal offender
- Joint principals
- Innocent agents
- Secondary parties
2.0 The principal offender
The principal offender is the person who carries out the actus reus, or in lay terms, the main perpetrator of the offence.
3.0 Joint principals
A joint principal contributes to the actus reus by committing their own independent act. For example, in a battery a joint principal would throw a punch of their own at the victim, so would be equally liable.
4.0 Innocent agents
It is possible that the principal offender will not carry out the actus reus of their chosen offence themselves, but instead utilise an innocent third party to carry out the actus reus instead. There are two distinct situations where this could arise.
- Where the agent lacks the mens rea for the offence
- Where the agent has a defence available to them
4.1 Where the agent lacks the mens rea for the offence
It is possible to carry out the actus reus of a crime without holding the requisite mens rea and thus no offence will be committed. This can arise in the case of innocent agents where they are tricked into carrying out the actus reus. As the agent does not appreciate the nature of what they are doing, the requisite accompanying mens rea is not present in order for it to be an offence.
Consider as an example an ex-wife who wants to kill her ex-husband. The husband has a fatal peanut allergy, so the woman gives their adult daughter a batch of peanut brownies to take over to the ex-husband’s house. As far as the daughter is aware, they are nut-free, and she gives these to the man, whereupon he eats one and is killed instantly. The daughter has no idea that the brownies contain nuts so cannot have the mens rea for the murder of the ex-husband – the intention to kill or cause really serious harm. The ex-wife, however, holds the mens rea and brought about the actus reus by using the daughter as an agent to carry out her desired act. In this scenario, the ex-wife would remain the principal offender.
4.2 Where the agent has a defence available to them
Where there is a defence available that negates liability, this will relieve the agent of responsibility for the offence. In relation to innocent agents, for example, if the agent is tricked by the principal offender, a mistake of fact may mean they lack the required mens rea. Alternatively, where the innocent agent is below the criminal age of responsibility (10 in England and Wales), this too would negate liability. Consider for example the above scenario where the ex-wife wants to kill her ex-husband. Adapting the facts so that the daughter is only 5 would absolve her of any liability on this basis. Now consider a different situation where a person goes hunting with another and convinces them that a dark shadow moving in the distance is a bear coming for them and tells them to shoot it. Actually, the dark shape is a person they have had an argument with and want dead. An honest belief that the target was a bear would mean the shooter did not intend to kill or seriously injure a person. The person who deliberately deceived the shooter could be guilty of murder if the victim dies.
5.0 Secondary parties
Secondary parties are more commonly described as accomplices or accessories to the crime. They are people who help or encourage the principal offender without themselves physically carrying out the actus reus. The help must be provided before or during the commission of the offence, as any help that comes after the offence has been completed (for example, providing the offender with help escaping) will not give rise to accomplice liability, although it may give rise to liability for other offences, such as assisting an offender under s.4 of the Criminal Law Act 1967. A promise made beforehand to help the offender escape may itself encourage the offence.
There are separate charging provisions in relation to being a secondary party to an indictable offence and to being a secondary party to a summary offence.
Indictable offences
Section 8 of the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861 provides:
Whosoever shall aid, abet, counsel, or procure the commission of any indictable offence, whether the same be an offence at common law or by virtue of any Act passed or to be passed, shall be liable to be tried, indicted, and punished as a principal offender.
Summary offences
Section 44 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 provides:
(1) A person who aids, abets, counsels or procures the commission by another person of a summary offence shall be guilty of the like offence and may be tried (whether or not he is charged as a principal) either by a court having jurisdiction to try that other person or by a court having by virtue of his own offence jurisdiction to try him.
(2) Any offence consisting in aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of an offence triable either way (other than an offence listed in Schedule 1 to this Act) shall by virtue of this subsection be triable either way.
The effect of these provisions is that the person who intentionally assists or encourages the principal offender with the necessary knowledge of the circumstances may incur the same liability as the principal offender, as if they had committed the offence themselves.
The imposition of secondary liability is very useful to the prosecution in cases of gang crime where the question of “who did it?” is not always easy to establish. For example, in a mass attack it is not always possible to establish who in the group dealt blows to the victim, let alone who dealt the fatal blow. Under the above provisions, it is possible for members of the group to be convicted even if the fatal blow cannot be attributed to an individual. The prosecution must prove each defendant’s participation and the necessary intent. Membership of the group is insufficient. This has given rise to notable prosecutions over the years, including those of David Norris and Gary Dobson, who were both convicted for the racially motivated murder of Stephen Lawrence, carried out by their gang.
Case in focus: R v Craig and Bentley (1952) The Times, 10 December
The case of Craig and Bentley is a famous and tragic example of the secondary parties provisions in operation. The two defendants climbed onto the roof of a Croydon warehouse. Craig was armed with a pistol, ammunition and a knife, and Bentley had a knife. Bentley had learning difficulties. Police were called to the scene. Police witnesses said that Bentley shouted “let him have it, Chris” before Craig shot and wounded Detective Constable Fairfax. Craig later shot and killed PC Sidney Miles. Both defendants were convicted of murder. Craig was under 18 and was sentenced to detention, but Bentley was an adult and was hanged for his part in the crime. Bentley denied saying the words. The defence also argued that, if spoken, they could have meant handing over the gun. He was given a posthumous pardon in respect of his sentence in 1993, and his conviction was subsequently quashed by the Court of Appeal in 1998 (R v Derek William Bentley (Deceased) [2001] 1 Cr App R 21) because the summing-up deprived him of a fair trial.
The extent of the involvement of each individual will be considered in sentencing, and conviction as an accessory carries the same statutory penalties as conviction as a principal for the same offence. As the secondary party shall be tried and punished as the principal offender, it is unnecessary for the prosecution to establish and distinguish whether each party involved was the principal offender or the secondary party, as long as it is definite that they were one or the other.
Case in focus: R v Giannetto (1996), [1997] 1 Cr App R 1
The defendant was accused of the murder of his wife. The prosecution alleged that he had either killed her himself or employed a killer to carry out the act for him, but it was not certain which. This was irrelevant: applying the provision correctly, it was unnecessary to distinguish the exact nature of his involvement provided each juror was sure he had either killed her himself or intentionally encouraged another person to kill her. The defendant was accordingly convicted.
The two provisions set out in relation to secondary party liability are very similar, so for the purposes of understanding the principles behind them, the focus will be on the s.8 provision.
5.1 Actus reus
- An offence
- Which is aided, abetted, counselled or procured
- A connection with the principal offence (causation is required for procuring)
5.1.1 An offence
The principal must generally commit an offence, which may itself be an attempt. For example, a person can intentionally assist an attempted murder. If the intended crime is never even attempted, ss.44–46 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 may instead apply. Provided that it can be proven that an offence was carried out, the secondary party may be charged and convicted even if the principal offender is never identified or caught. It is further possible for the conviction of a secondary party to occur in circumstances where the principal offender is acquitted due to lack of evidence or a defence personal to that offender.
Case in focus: R v Bourne (1952) 36 Cr App R 125
The defendant forced his wife into engaging in sexual intercourse with a dog, thus completing the then offence of buggery (now abolished by the Sexual Offences Act 2003, which deals with intercourse with an animal under s.69). As the defendant’s wife was acting under duress, she was relieved of liability for the offence as the principal offender, but her personal defence did not prevent the defendant being convicted as a secondary party. This case remains good authority for the principle that a secondary party can be convicted even where the principal has a personal defence.
There is, however, an exception to the requirement that a principal offence is committed for secondary liability to occur, and that arises in relation to procuring. Procuring means causing or instigating. In some cases the person who performs the actus reus lacks the necessary mens rea, but a defendant who intentionally brought that act about with the necessary knowledge may nevertheless be convicted.
Case in focus: R v Millward [1994] Crim LR 527
The defendant instructed his employee to take a tractor and trailer, which the defendant knew had a defective hitch, out driving on a public road. The employee did so with no knowledge of the vehicle’s condition and was subsequently involved in a fatal collision with another car. The defendant and the employee were charged with causing death by reckless driving, but the employee was acquitted in the absence of the mens rea due to his lack of knowledge of the vehicle’s state. The Court of Appeal upheld the defendant’s conviction for procuring the offence.
5.1.2 Aided, abetted, counselled or procured
Section 8 of the 1861 Act provides for liability to arise in four separate instances:
- Where an offence is aided
- Where an offence is abetted
- Where an offence is counselled
- Where an offence is procured
It was previously thought that these words were interchangeable; however, Attorney General’s Reference (No 1 of 1975) clarified that they instead create four individual modes of behaviour by which this element of the actus reus may be satisfied. Any one of these elements is sufficient, and it is not necessary to show all four occurred. Each word shall be afforded its ordinary and natural meaning. The definitions have been set out for each below in order to gauge an exact understanding of the behaviour that is encompassed.
Aided: Helped in a practical way or offered support and assistance.
Abetted: Encouraged or assisted in the commission of the offence.
Counselled: Advised, urged or instructed another to carry out the commission of the offence.
Procured: Brought about the commission of the offence through their own efforts.
Whether the defendant has behaved in a way that amounts to any one of these behaviours is a question of fact for the jury, and there is no definitive legal test established to assist. It has been established, however, in R v Gnango [2011] UKSC 59 that provoking is not the same as encouraging. If a defendant throws a punch, it might provoke their victim to throw one in return, but this will not without more amount to an encouragement to throw the punch.
Due to the absence of a Good Samaritan requirement in English law, simply spectating at a crime and failing to report it is insufficient to constitute any secondary liability. Presence intended to lend support can amount to encouragement. A person with a right or duty to control what is happening may also encourage it by deliberately allowing it to continue.
5.1.3 Causation
A traditional causation element of the actus reus applies only to procuring. This is due to the fact that procuring means to cause, so it must be shown that the defendant did in fact, in legal terms, cause the act. In R v Kennedy [2007] 3 WLR 612 the issue was whether a drug supplier caused the death of a person who freely injected himself. For aiding, abetting or counselling, there must be assistance or encouragement, but the prosecution need not show that it changed the principal’s conduct or the outcome.
Case in focus: R v Calhaem [1985] QB 808
The defendant had fallen in love with her solicitor and became obsessed with him. She hired a man named Zajac to kill the solicitor’s girlfriend, as she wanted her out of the picture. Zajac said he had decided in the days before the killing not to follow through on her instruction. He had instead planned to go to the girlfriend’s home so that it looked like he had tried unsuccessfully to kill her, in order that the defendant would still have to pay him the money as promised. When he arrived at the girlfriend’s house, she screamed. He had, in his own words, “gone berserk,” panicked and killed her. At trial, the Court held that it was not necessary to establish that the defendant’s actions in counselling the offence caused the offence, as a less direct connection would suffice. In Calhaem’s case, the jury had to be sure she counselled Zajac to kill and that the murder he committed was within the scope of her instruction. The Court of Appeal upheld her conviction.
Encouragement need not change the principal offender’s mind. Words relied on as encouragement must be communicated to the principal offender, so a text of encouragement that was never received or a shout of encouragement that was never heard would be insufficient. Where the encouragement is very remote from the time and place the principal offence is committed, the necessary link may be difficult to establish.
Case in focus: R v Clarkson [1971] 1 WLR 1402
Two soldiers entered a room after hearing a disturbance. Inside they found one of their colleagues raping a woman. Rather than intervening, they stayed at the scene to watch. Their convictions were quashed. Mere presence, even as voluntary spectators, did not establish intentional encouragement. Under Jogee, where intentional encouragement is proved it is unnecessary to show that it influenced the rapist.
Any aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring must occur prior to or during the commission of the offence in order to satisfy the necessary link. A participant may withdraw before the offence. What is needed depends on the help already given and how imminent the offence is. A private change of mind is insufficient. Timely, unequivocal communication will normally be needed, and prior assistance may call for steps to counteract it (R v O’Flaherty [2004] EWCA Crim 526).
5.2 Mens rea
Once it has been established that an act took place that could give rise to secondary party liability, the accompanying mens rea needs to be shown in order for liability to be complete.
- Knowledge that the existing facts giving the principal’s conduct its criminal character were present
- Intention to encourage or assist the commission of the offence
The defendant must intend to encourage or assist the principal offender. If the offence requires a particular intent, the defendant must intend to help or encourage the principal to act with that intent (R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8).
Case in focus: National Coal Board v Gamble [1959] 1 QB 11
An employee of the National Coal Board operated the weighbridge, which involved checking the weights of the lorries leaving the colliery to ensure they were within limits. One of the lorry drivers had filled his lorry with coal at the yard and taken it to be weighed, whereupon the employee noticed that the lorry was overweight and told the driver. The driver replied that he was happy to take the risk and the employee accordingly signed off on it, gave him a weighbridge ticket and allowed him to leave. The driver was subsequently found guilty of driving the overloaded lorry on the highway. In law, ownership in the coal passed on delivery and acceptance of the ticket. The employee could have refused to release the load. The majority upheld the Board’s conviction. Its employee deliberately issued the ticket that allowed the load to leave the yard, knowing that it was overweight. He did not have to want the driver to offend. His indifference did not prevent the assistance from being intentional.
5.2.1 Knowledge that actions and circumstances constituting a crime existed
This is not the same as knowledge that the specific offence existed, only knowledge of the circumstances. This can be a difficult concept to understand, so it helps to consider an example. If a person encourages another person to shoot at someone, intending to kill them, they do not need to know that this is unlawful and gives rise to the crime of murder. They must intend to help or encourage the shooter to kill or cause really serious harm. Similarly, intentionally encouraging penile penetration, knowing that the person does not consent and intending to encourage penetration without a reasonable belief in consent, can suffice for secondary liability for rape. There is no need for them to know that this is a crime; they must know the essential facts and intend their encouragement. This is due to the fact that, as with any liability for any crime, ignorance of the law is no defence.
Case in focus: Ferguson v Weaving [1951] 1 KB 814
The defendant was charged with aiding and abetting the offence of consuming intoxicating liquor on licensed premises outside permitted hours. The defendant was the licensee of the premises in question, but had no knowledge that the customers were consuming alcohol on the premises after closing time and therefore did not hold the requisite mens rea. The licensee was not liable as a secondary offender.
Mere knowledge that some kind of illegal activity might be undertaken is insufficient for the purposes of the mens rea; the defendant must have a clearer idea of the precise activity being undertaken. Consider the case of R v Bainbridge [1960] 1 QB 129, where the defendant supplied cutting equipment which was later used to break into a bank. The defendant admitted that he thought the equipment would be used for some sort of crime, without knowing which, but suspicion of some crime would not have sufficed. The jury was entitled to find that he knew the equipment was for a break-in without knowing the particular premises. DPP for Northern Ireland v Maxwell [1978] 3 All ER 1140 confirmed that knowledge of the specific offence was not necessary, as long as the offence committed fell within a range of offences within the defendant’s contemplation. Read with Jogee, the question is whether the offence was one which the defendant intended to assist if the occasion arose. There are no fixed groups of offences.
In these types of situations, a defendant will not escape liability by practising wilful blindness – for example, by deliberately shutting their eyes to the obvious. Failure to ask questions does not by itself prove knowledge or intent.
5.2.2 Intention to encourage or assist
The defendant must intend to encourage or assist the offence. Knowledge that their act is capable of doing so is evidence from which intention may be inferred.
Case in focus: R v JF Alford Transport Limited [1997] 2 Cr App R 326
A company, its managing director and their transport manager were all charged with aiding and abetting their drivers in making false entries on their record sheets. It was submitted by the prosecution that the defendants must have accepted what the drivers were doing in falsifying the entries. The Court held, however, that while this was likely the case, it was insufficient for the purposes of imposing secondary liability. It needed to be shown on the facts of any case that something more than mere knowledge of the activity existed. Given their power to control the drivers, the jury could infer encouragement from a deliberate decision to let the falsification continue. The convictions were quashed for deficiencies in the jury directions.
Intentionally assisting an offence is not the same as wanting it to succeed. In fact, the defendant could be very much against the crime but still be liable. This was confirmed in DPP for Northern Ireland v Lynch [1975] AC 653, where the defendant was ordered by Meehan, a member of the IRA, to drive armed men to the place where they killed a police officer and then to drive them away. The defendant knew that Meehan had a fearsome reputation as a violent individual, and said that he believed he would be shot if he refused. The House of Lords held that the jury should have been allowed to consider duress. That ruling on duress was overruled in R v Howe [1987] AC 417. Duress is no defence to murder in England and Wales, whether the defendant is the killer or an accessory. An unwilling driver can still intend to assist.
6.0 Joint enterprise
Joint enterprise can be explained as a joint plan, where two or more people plan together to commit an offence and then go ahead and execute that plan together, committing the offence. Each participant must satisfy the requirements for liability as a principal or an accessory. Agreement is not essential to secondary liability, which can arise spontaneously.
Exam consideration
The law on joint enterprise was substantially reformed by the Supreme Court in R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8, which overruled the previous approach based on foresight of what the principal might do. This is now settled law, but it remains an area of considerable academic debate and has generated significant post-Jogee case law on the question of when historic convictions can be reopened. You should ensure your understanding reflects the current legal position as set out below.
The Court in R v A and others [2010] EWCA Crim 1622 set out three situations where traditionally the existence of a joint enterprise could be found.
- Joint enterprise between principals
- Joint enterprise between principals and accomplices
- Parasitic accessorial liability
6.1 Joint enterprise between principals
This is the most conceptually straightforward scenario, where two or more people jointly plan to commit a specific offence and then go ahead and commit it together. For example, a plan to commit grievous bodily harm which is executed by both defendants laying punches on their chosen victim. Whilst the joint enterprise is useful in prosecuting the defendants in these situations, it does not affect their liability in any way, as each would be separately liable for the offence if their blows jointly caused the grievous bodily harm and each had the required mens rea.
6.2 Joint enterprise between principals and accomplices
This arises where a person aids and abets the commission of an offence by the principal offender, and they share the same common purpose in intending the crime should be committed.
6.3 Parasitic accessorial liability
This is an area of law which you may come across in older reading. It used to arise where two or more people planned to commit one offence, but one of them then went beyond the plan and committed a separate offence – for example, a jointly planned armed robbery that goes wrong and ends up with one offender killing the owner of the premises. Under the old law, this could give rise to all of the planners being liable for the unplanned offence of murder, provided they held the necessary mens rea for the parasitic liability – that is, foresight that the subsequent offence might be committed.
In the past this proved problematic for the courts. R v Gnango [2011] UKSC 59 considered the guiding principle where the offence subsequently committed was encompassed within the common purpose of the planned offence. In Gnango, the defendant had agreed to engage in a public shoot-out (an affray), which resulted in a passerby being shot and killed. The gunmen shared an intention to shoot and be shot at with intent to kill or cause really serious harm. The other gunman’s intent transferred to the passerby whom his shot killed. As R v ARU [2024] EWCA Crim 1101 explains, this ground of liability survives R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8. Merely provoking return fire does not establish an agreement to exchange shots.
6.4 Mens rea
Exam consideration
The decision in R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8 fundamentally changed the mens rea required for secondary liability in joint enterprise cases. Although Jogee is now well established, it remains a rich area for critical analysis. You should be familiar with the decision itself and with the subsequent case law on appeals against historic convictions, particularly the ‘substantial injustice’ threshold.
The development of the law on joint enterprise
Traditionally, the main significance of a finding of joint enterprise was to lower the mens rea required by secondary parties: knowledge was not necessary, merely foresight, thus making liability easier to impose. This was a greatly criticised principle, with prominent campaigns lobbying against ‘guilt by association.’ Where there was a finding of a joint enterprise and one of the parties committed an offence that went beyond the scope of the joint enterprise, the other parties could be liable so long as they had foresight that the offence might be committed. This, however, all changed in R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8, which overruled R v Chan Wing-Siu [1985] AC 168 in this respect.
Case in focus: R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8
The defendant was charged with murder. He had spent the evening with another man, Hirsi, drinking and taking drugs. They became intoxicated and aggressive. They went to Ms Reid’s house, whereupon she told them to leave as she was expecting Mr Fyfe to return home. They replied that they were not scared and would sort him out. They then left, but Hirsi returned and was there when Mr Fyfe arrived back. Ms Reid rang the defendant asking him to come and get his friend. Jogee collected him, but within minutes both returned. Hirsi entered the house, took a knife from the kitchen and there was a confrontation between him and Mr Fyfe. The defendant remained outside with a bottle and shouted to his friend Hirsi to do something to Mr Fyfe. He then came to the door and threatened to smash a bottle over Mr Fyfe’s head. Hirsi then stabbed Mr Fyfe to death, and the Supreme Court held that the jury’s verdict showed it was sure Jogee knew Hirsi had the knife.
At trial, the judge directed the jury that the defendant could be found guilty of murder if he encouraged Hirsi in the attack and realised that it was possible that Hirsi might use the knife with intent to cause serious harm. The defendant was convicted, but the Supreme Court overturned the conviction, holding that the law had been incorrectly decided in Chan Wing-Siu and that the correct direction was that the defendant must have intended to encourage or assist the principal to commit the offence with the relevant mens rea. At the retrial he was convicted of manslaughter.
In handing down the judgment in Jogee, Lord Hughes and Lord Toulson (giving the joint leading judgment) confirmed that the distinction between foresight and intent is a fine one but nonetheless exists. They stated that the correct position in joint enterprise situations is that the secondary party’s foresight of what the principal offender may do is evidence from which the jury may infer a criminal intent, but is not without more proof of guilt itself. Just because a person foresees that something might occur does not mean they intend or authorise it to occur. That intention may be conditional. A robber may hope that a weapon will not be used but intend to assist its use to cause really serious harm if someone resists. Knowledge of the particular weapon is evidence bearing on intent, but is not essential.
The effect of this ruling goes beyond adapting the mens rea for joint enterprise, as it renders parasitic accessorial liability as it was previously understood a redundant area of the law. This is due to the fact that liability in this area was based entirely on the defendant having foresight of something that might occur. As foresight alone is no longer sufficient mens rea, liability can no longer arise through this means alone. A participant who intentionally assists an unlawful attack without intending to assist murder may nevertheless be guilty of manslaughter if the attack causes death and all sober and reasonable people would recognise the risk of some harm. An overwhelming intervening act may leave the participant’s earlier assistance as mere background.
The aftermath of Jogee: appeals against historic convictions
The decision in Jogee raised immediate questions about whether individuals convicted under the old foresight-based test could appeal against their convictions. The Court of Appeal addressed this in R v Johnson [2016] EWCA Crim 1613, holding that the change in law brought about by Jogee does not automatically render previous convictions unsafe. An applicant seeking exceptional leave to appeal out of time on that ground must demonstrate ‘substantial injustice’. This is a deliberately high threshold. In R v Crilly [2018] EWCA Crim 168 that threshold was met and the murder conviction was quashed. R v Anwar [2016] EWCA Crim 551 addressed a different question: evidence which formerly supported an inference of foresight may still support an inference of intent. In practice, relatively few historic convictions have been overturned following Jogee, although the issue continues to generate academic and public debate, particularly in relation to cases involving young defendants and gang-related violence.
7.0 Charging and sentencing
Secondary liability means that the offence will be charged and sentenced as if the defendant had carried out the offence themselves, although the extent of involvement can be taken into account with regard to sentencing.
Exam consideration
This is an area in which you can excel by offering critique. It is criticised as it can be seen as lowering the threshold of criminal liability. Traditionally, both the actus reus and mens rea are required, as no one should be guilty of an offence that they did not commit and for which they did not hold the requisite mental element; but imposing secondary liability in this manner may be said to circumvent this most basic requirement. Would a lesser charge and sentence be more appropriate in this respect? Consider looking at journal articles to gain a better understanding of suggestions for reform in this area to enhance any critique carried out.
Hands-on example
This is an unusual area for you to be tested solely on in an exam under a problem-style question and will usually instead be brought up alongside another topic. It is vital that you can identify the parties and the role they play in the crime, but in order to do that you will need to complete the question alongside the wider context of a different criminal offence. To gain practice in this area, different scenarios have been set out, and the actus reus and mens rea of any relevant offences have been provided for you.
Scenario 1
Murder
Actus reus: The unlawful killing of a human being under the King’s peace
Mens rea: The intention to kill or cause grievous bodily harm
Sam is working out the back of Moonbucks, a popular coffee shop, when his ex-wife Linda comes in with her new boyfriend Jim. Sam harbours a lot of hatred towards Linda since he caught her cheating on him with another man, whereupon she ended their marriage. Sam knows that Linda suffers from a heart condition that means she is entirely intolerant to caffeine, the consumption of which could prove fatal. Sam tells Jane, a fellow barista, that the decaf machine has broken so he has put the decaf beans into the main machine. This is untrue, and subsequently the coffee that Jane pours is actually caffeinated. Linda drinks this and suffers a fatal heart attack and dies.
Identify the liability of the parties.
Jane: Innocent agent. Jane completes the act of giving Linda the deadly coffee but has no knowledge of this and does not hold the requisite mens rea of intention to kill or cause really serious harm.
Sam: Principal offender. He brings about the actus reus by utilising Jane to carry out the act under a misapprehension. The deception and his knowledge of Linda’s condition are evidence of intent. The jury must be sure he intended to kill or cause really serious harm. Knowing that death was possible is insufficient.
Scenario 2
Theft
Actus reus: Appropriation of property belonging to another
Mens rea: Dishonesty, with an intention to permanently deprive another of the property
Alf and Phoebe really want to buy the latest Xbox but cannot afford the price tag. The security at the game shop is very strong, so the risk of taking an Xbox from the store is too high. The two of them get together and decide instead to steal money from handbags in the street. They are walking past a café together when they see two old ladies sitting in the window with their bags open and in view. They walk in and chat with the ladies, and whilst the ladies are distracted, both place a hand on one of the bags and together pick it up and remove it from the shop. Once outside they empty the bag and are delighted to find that the lady had just been to collect her pension for that week and her purse is full of cash.
Identify the liability of the parties.
Alf and Phoebe: Joint enterprise liability, as they have together planned and executed the offence of theft. Both are liable as joint principal offenders, as they both individually satisfy the actus reus and mens rea of theft.
Scenario 3
Grievous bodily harm
Actus reus: Unlawfully wounds or causes grievous bodily harm
Mens rea: For s.18 on these facts, intention to cause grievous bodily harm. For s.20, intention to cause some physical harm or recklessness as to such harm
N.B. Under s.18 or s.20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, both offences can be tried on indictment. Section 18 is indictable only and s.20 is triable either way.
James and Niall go over to Niall’s ex-girlfriend Sophie’s house. Sophie is Harry’s sister and Harry is good friends with Niall. Unbeknown to James, Niall has been to visit Harry and asked him to lend him his key for Sophie’s house as he needs to collect some things he left there before they broke up. Harry believes that Niall actually wants the key so he can steal from Sophie, but nonetheless obliges and hands it over. When they arrive at the house, Sophie will not come down to speak with them. The bedroom light is on and the boys can hear voices. James tells Niall to go inside and sort out whoever it is that has his hands on Sophie. He goes into his pocket and pulls out a knife, handing it to Niall saying “that’ll help.” Niall then bangs on the door one last time before unlocking it and going upstairs. He stabs Sophie’s boyfriend in the arm, causing severe bleeding.
Niall
- Principal offender. Stabbing Sophie’s boyfriend in the arm and causing severe bleeding is evidence of a wound. A s.18 conviction requires proof that Niall intended really serious harm. If he intended or foresaw some physical harm, s.20 is available even if an intent to cause really serious harm is not proved.
James
- Indictable principal offence, so possible secondary liability under s.8 of the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861.
Actus reus
- An offence
- Which is aided, abetted, counselled or procured
- A connection with the principal offence (causation is required for procuring)
Wounding or causing GBH under s.18, or wounding or inflicting GBH under s.20, is the possible principal offence, depending on Niall’s intent.
The offence may be abetted by James, who encourages the commission of the attack and supplies the knife.
There is a sufficient link between James’s encouragement and handing over of the knife and Niall’s decision to carry out the offence.
Mens rea
- Knowledge that the existing facts giving the principal’s conduct its criminal character were present
- Intention to encourage or assist the commission of the offence
James’s lack of knowledge of the key does not prevent liability for the stabbing. His words and the knife are evidence that he intended to help Niall attack the person upstairs. For s.18, the jury must be sure James intended to help Niall wound or cause GBH with intent to cause really serious harm. Mere foresight that Niall might do so is insufficient.
- Conclude as to liability as a secondary party on the basis of whether the mens rea was held to exist.
Harry
- Indictable principal offence, so possible secondary liability under s.8 of the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861.
Actus reus
- An offence
- Which is aided, abetted, counselled or procured
- A connection with the principal offence (causation is required for procuring)
The principal offence is the wounding or GBH committed by Niall, under s.18 or s.20 according to the intent proved.
Harry provides practical help by giving Niall the key to the house.
Providing the key helped Niall gain entry. Under Calhaem and Jogee, the prosecution need not prove that without the key the attack would not have occurred.
Mens rea
- Knowledge that the existing facts giving the principal’s conduct its criminal character were present
- Intention to encourage or assist the commission of the offence
Applying Bainbridge and DPP for Northern Ireland v Maxwell, Harry believed Niall wanted to steal. Giving him the key with that belief does not by itself establish that Harry intended to assist an attack, even if one proved necessary.
- Accordingly, on these facts Harry lacks the mens rea for secondary liability for the attack. No theft by Niall is described. His belief that Niall would steal, and giving him the key, could instead raise liability under s.45 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 if he believed the key would assist the theft.
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