Murder Offences Lecture
Definition of Murder
The definition of murder, although adapted to be relevant in a modern context, remains as that set out by Sir Edward Coke. Murder occurs, therefore, where a person unlawfully kills any reasonable creature in rerum natura under the King’s peace with malice aforethought (Coke’s Institutes, 3 Co Inst 47).
Examination Consideration
It is likely that this definition would be required in almost all questions on murder. It is a good idea to learn it.
The actus reus of murder therefore requires the unlawful killing of any reasonable creature in rerum natura under the King’s peace. The mens rea, malice aforethought.
Unlawful Killing
Killing means causing death and the approach in establishing the existence of this element is the same as that discussed in relation to causation. The killing will be unlawful unless there is some justification for it, such as self-defence.
Case in focus - Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789
In this judgment, permission of the court was sought for the withdrawal of life saving treatment from a patient. It was held that the doctors could lawfully withdraw life-sustaining treatment which was no longer in the patient’s best interests. Giving a drug with the intention of ending life is different from giving appropriate pain relief while foreseeing that it may shorten life. Under the Mental Capacity Act 2005, a court order is not invariably required before clinically assisted nutrition and hydration is withdrawn from a patient who lacks capacity, where the Act and professional guidance have been followed and those concerned agree on the patient’s best interests (An NHS Trust v Y [2018] UKSC 46).
R v Inglis [2011] 1 WLR 1110
In this case, a mother deliberately killed her severely brain-injured son by injecting him with heroin. Following Bland the fact that the mother saw her actions as an act of mercy was irrelevant. Mercy killing was and is unlawful and therefore the mother was liable for her son’s murder.
It used to be the case that where death occurred beyond a year and a day following the acts of the defendant, no conviction for murder could be brought. This was known as the ‘year and a day rule’ and was abolished by the provisions of the Law Reform (Year and a Day Rule) Act 1996 where the last act or omission causing death occurred on or after 17th June 1996. However, section 2 of the 1996 Act provides that a prosecution must be brought by or with the consent of the Attorney-General where the injury alleged to have caused death was sustained more than three years before death, or the defendant has previously been convicted of an offence committed in circumstances alleged to be connected with the death.
Any Reasonable Creature in Rerum Natura
This element is most simply defined as any human being. A baby does not fulfil these requirements until it has been fully born. Unborn foetuses, however advanced in their development and close to birth, cannot be murdered (A-G’s Ref (No 3 of 1994) [1997] 3 WLR 421). An injury inflicted before birth can amount to murder if the child is born alive and dies from the injury and the defendant intended to kill or cause really serious injury to the child after birth. An intention to injure the mother does not transfer to the unborn child and then to the child born alive, although unlawful act manslaughter may be established. In R v Poulton (1832) 5 C & P 329 it was held that a baby would not satisfy the requirement of being born until fully expelled from its mother. It is however necessary that, even if fully expelled, the baby must exist separate from its mother, even if just briefly (R v Crutchley (1837) 7 C & P 814). In other words, the baby must be alive as a distinct individual before it can be murdered. However, as mentioned above, the act that causes the baby’s death can occur whilst it is still in utero providing that it lives independently briefly before dying.
Under the King’s Peace
It is recognised that this term may have had a specific meaning in Coke’s time that has been lost in the subsequent period (R v Page [1954] 1 QB 170). An enemy combatant lawfully killed in the course of actual hostilities is outside the King’s peace. A defendant cannot put a victim outside the King’s peace by declaring war on the United Kingdom (R v Adebolajo [2014] EWCA Crim 2779). Territorial jurisdiction is a separate question. Section 9 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 permits a British subject to be tried in England and Wales for murder or manslaughter committed on land outside the United Kingdom, irrespective of the victim’s nationality. Where the fatal injury and death occur in different countries, section 10 of the 1861 Act also deals with trial in England and Wales. Death here does not by itself confer jurisdiction over an injury inflicted abroad by a foreign national (R v Lewis (1857) Dears & B 182). Where the courts would not otherwise have jurisdiction, section 72 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 also covers a UK national or a person habitually resident in England and Wales who acts outside the UK, if the conduct is an offence there and would amount to murder or manslaughter in England and Wales.
Malice Aforethought
Malice aforethought means an intention to kill or cause grievous bodily harm (R v Cunningham [1982] AC 566, A-G’s Ref (No 3 of 1994) [1997] 3 WLR 421). On the basis of the proper definition, the term malice aforethought is misleading because it suggests elements of both ill will against a victim and some degree of premeditation; neither are required.
The requirements of intention have been discussed in detail in relation to mens rea in general and will not be repeated here. A direction on virtual certainty is needed only in the exceptional case where the ordinary meaning of intention does not suffice. The jury may find intention if death or really serious injury was a virtual certainty, barring some unforeseen intervention, and the defendant appreciated that fact (R v Woollin [1999] 1 AC 82).
Grievous bodily harm is given the same meaning as under section 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. This means that an intention to cause really serious harm (DPP v Smith [1961] AC 290) is required. It is not necessary for the harm intended by the defendant to be harm that may endanger life. Therefore, a defendant who intends to break a victim’s arm, but holds no intention to kill, can be liable for murder if the victim dies as a result and the jury finds that the injury intended was really serious (Cunningham). It has been suggested that this is an overly harsh approach (see Lord Edmund-Davies in Cunningham at 582 - 583; and see also R v Powell and English [1997] 3 WLR 959 where Lord Steyn criticised the inclusion of those who intend grievous bodily harm but do not intend to kill), but the position remains good law.
It is not necessary for a defendant to intend to kill the particular victim; the doctrine of transferred malice applies to murder. Furthermore, where a defendant does not intend the death of any particular victim, but simply intends to kill a random group of individuals in a terrorist attack, for example, they will be liable under what is known as general malice and will satisfy the mens rea for murder (A-G’s Ref (No 3 of 1994)).
The Mandatory Life Sentence
The mandatory sentence for murder is life imprisonment (Murder (Abolition of the Death Penalty) Act 1965, s 1(1)). An offender under 18 at the time of the murder is sentenced to detention during His Majesty’s pleasure. An offender who was at least 18 then but is under 21 at conviction receives custody for life (Sentencing Act 2020, ss 259 and 275). The court fixes a minimum term under Schedule 21 unless it makes a whole-life order. At the end of the minimum term, release depends on the Parole Board’s assessment of risk. An offender who is released remains on licence for life. Whilst this reflects the fact that murder is a very serious offence, it should be noted that numerous judgments have suggested that the sentence should be more open to judicial discretion. In R v Howe [1987] AC 417, for example, Lord Hailsham recognised that murders vary in gravity, ranging from brutal or repeat offenders to offences that are nothing more than mercy killings of a loved one.
Examination Consideration
It is possible that you may be asked to consider the nature of murder as a general offence in relation to the efficacy of the particular elements. You should be aware of the limitations placed on the ability to find intent, and the process of doing so, previously considered in the chapter on mens rea. You should also consider the position in respect of grievous bodily harm being sufficient to make a defendant liable for murder, and whether you think that this is appropriate. It may also be relevant in respect of mens rea that limitations should be placed on finding intent because of the mandatory life sentence. Is it important, in this context, that a defendant should only face a life sentence where they intended to kill, or is an intention to cause grievous bodily harm sufficient? Is simply being virtually certain of the harm enough?
Partial Defences to Murder
There are three specific defences that apply only to murder: loss of control (which now replaces the common law defence of provocation); diminished responsibility; and killing in pursuance of a suicide pact. Although these are termed defences, they are not defences in an absolute sense, in that they only provide a partial defence to murder and will make the defendant liable in voluntary manslaughter. A defendant charged with murder may plead guilty to manslaughter on this basis. If the plea is accepted, sentence is passed on the basis of manslaughter (and avoids the mandatory life sentence for murder). If the prosecution does not accept the plea, the matter becomes one for the jury. A jury can also return a manslaughter verdict without a guilty plea. Infanticide is a separate statutory alternative where a woman kills her own child under twelve months in the circumstances set out in section 1 of the Infanticide Act 1938.
It is important to be aware that for killings before 4th October 2010 a different regime existed in respect of loss of control and diminished responsibility. Whilst it is possible that cases may still pass through the courts where the crime was committed prior to this date, the passage of time makes it increasingly less likely that the old law would be examined unless it has been expressly studied. The discussion here, therefore, will deal only with the law for killings on or after 4th October 2010.
Diminished Responsibility
Section 2 of the Homicide Act 1957 provides that:
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A person (‘D’) who kills or is a party to the killing of another is not to be convicted of murder if D was suffering from an abnormality of mental functioning which -
- arose out of a recognised medical condition,
- substantially impaired D’s ability to do one or more of the things mentioned in subsection (1A), and
- provides an explanation for D’s acts and omissions in doing or being a party to the killing.
(1A) Those things are -
- to understand the nature of D’s conduct;
- to form a rational judgment;
- to exercise self-control.
(1B) For the purposes of subsection (1)(c), an abnormality of mental functioning provides an explanation for D’s conduct if it causes, or is a significant contributory factor in causing, D to carry out that conduct.
The effect of the section is to require four elements to be proved by the defendant on the balance of probabilities (section 2(2)):
- The defendant must be suffering from an abnormality of mental functioning;
- The abnormality must arise from a recognised medical condition;
- The abnormality must substantially impair the defendant’s ability to understand the nature of their conduct, form a rational judgment or exercise self-control;
- The abnormality will provide an explanation for the defendant’s conduct if it caused that conduct or was a significant contributory factor in causing it.
Abnormality of Mental Functioning - Recognised Medical Condition
Although the abnormality of mental functioning must arise from a recognised medical condition, it does not follow that the existence of a recognised medical condition will be accepted as demonstrating the existence of an abnormality of mental functioning. In R v Dowds [2012] 3 All ER 154, it was stated that certain conditions that fall within the description of medically recognised would be unlikely to be accepted by the courts as a basis for a plea of diminished responsibility. Unhappiness, irritability and anger, and paedophilia were cited in judgment as examples of such conditions (at paragraph [31]). Voluntary acute intoxication alone cannot found a plea of diminished responsibility. Alcohol dependency may qualify (R v Wood [2008] EWCA Crim 1305; R v Stewart [2009] EWCA Crim 593). Where the defendant has another recognised medical condition as well as being intoxicated, the jury must decide whether the abnormality arising from that condition satisfies the statutory test, disregarding the effects of the voluntary intoxication (R v Dietschmann [2003] UKHL 10).
It is firstly necessary to consider whether, as a question of fact, the condition is a medically recognised one. This will be relatively simple in most cases. It is then necessary to consider whether this condition gave rise to an abnormality of mental functioning. This is a question that is likely to require expert evidence in order to be determined. The question of whether this expert evidence is accepted, of course, is ultimately one for the jury. There must be evidence capable of supporting each element before the judge leaves the defence to the jury. A finding of abnormality does not, by itself, establish substantial impairment or explain the killing.
Substantial Impairment
The existence of the abnormality of mental functioning must have the effect of substantially impairing the defendant’s ability to understand the nature of their conduct, form a rational judgment or exercise self-control. This, once again, is a question of fact and will almost inevitably require medical evidence to demonstrate whether one of the three requirements is in fact substantially impaired (R v Bunch [2013] EWCA Crim 2498).
In R v Brown [2011] EWCA Crim 279 the court considered whether substantial impairment meant anything more than minimal. In R v Golds [2014] 4 All ER 64 the Court of Appeal rejected that interpretation. The Supreme Court upheld its decision ([2016] UKSC 61). Substantial means important or weighty. The judge should normally leave the ordinary statutory word to the jury, but should explain it if there is a real risk of misunderstanding.
Examination Consideration
In answering a question on diminished responsibility, distinguish a substantial impairment from one that is merely more than trivial. In R v Golds the judge was entitled to leave the statutory word to the jury without further explanation.
Provides an Explanation for the Defendant’s Acts or Omissions
Section 2(1B) allows for the abnormality of mental functioning to be a significant contributory factor in causing the defendant’s conduct. It need not be the sole cause. The jury must decide whether the abnormality actually caused or significantly contributed to the killing. A possible explanation, or proof of substantial impairment alone, is insufficient.
Loss of Control
Section 54 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 provides that:
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Where a person (‘D’) kills or is a party to the killing of another (‘V’), D is not to be convicted of murder if -
- D’s acts and omissions in doing or being a party to the killing resulted from D’s loss of self-control,
- The loss of self-control had a qualifying trigger, and
- A person of D’s sex and age, with a normal degree of tolerance and self-restraint and in the circumstances of D, might have reacted in the same or in a similar way to D.
- For the purposes of subsection (1)(a), it does not matter whether or not the loss of control was sudden.
- In subsection (1)(c) the reference to ‘the circumstances of D’ is a reference to all of D’s circumstances other than those whose only relevance to D’s conduct is that they bear on D’s general capacity for tolerance or self-restraint.
Section 55 goes on to provide that:
- A loss of self-control has a qualifying trigger if subsection (3), (4) or (5) applies.
- This subsection applies if D’s loss of self-control was attributable to D’s fear of serious violence from V against D or another identified person.
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This subsection applies if D’s loss of self-control was attributable to a thing or things done or said (or both) which -
- constitute circumstances of an extremely grave character, and
- caused D to have a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged.
- This subsection applies if D’s loss of self-control was attributable to a combination of the matters mentioned in subsections (3) and (4).
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In determining whether a loss of self-control had a qualifying trigger -
- D’s fear of serious violence is to be disregarded to the extent that it was caused by a thing which D incited to be done or said for the purpose of providing an excuse to use violence;
- A sense of being seriously wronged by a thing done or said is not justifiable if D incited the thing to be done or said for the purpose of providing an excuse to use violence;
- The fact that a thing done or said constituted sexual infidelity is to be disregarded.
There are, with certain exceptions, three elements to be satisfied in order for loss of control to be successfully pleaded:
- The defendant must have killed as a result of a loss of self-control;
- That the loss of self-control had a qualifying trigger;
- That a person of the same age and sex as the defendant, with a normal degree of tolerance and self-restraint and in the circumstances of the defendant, might have reacted in the same or a similar way.
Killing Results from the Loss of Self-control
Whilst it appears simple to recognise whether a killing results from a loss of self-control, two specific elements are a little unclear. In the first instance, section 54(2) provides that the loss of self-control need not be sudden. Under the old law (R v Ahluwalia [1992] 4 All ER 889), there could be a delay after the provocation, but the loss of control itself still had to be sudden and temporary. Under section 54(2) the loss itself need not be sudden. Delay and evidence of planning remain relevant to whether the killing resulted from a loss of control. Section 54(4) excludes a defendant who acted in a considered desire for revenge (see also R v Clinton [2012] 2 All ER 497).
It is also unclear from the provisions whether the loss of self-control must be total, or whether a partial loss will suffice. The Court of Appeal declined to address this point in R v Gurpinar [2015] 1 Cr App R 464 on the basis that the case could be decided on other points. There must be evidence of an actual loss of self-control. Anger or the violence of the attack does not by itself establish that the defendant lost the ability to act in accordance with considered judgment or normal powers of reasoning (R v Jewell [2014] EWCA Crim 414; R v Cosier [2026] EWCA Crim 2).
Qualifying Triggers
The first qualifying trigger, the fear of serious violence from the victim against the defendant or another identified person, is relatively self-explanatory and will necessarily be a question of fact. The defendant need not show that the violence feared actually took place. The reasonableness of defensive force is a question for self-defence; the separate comparison in section 54(1)(c) applies to loss of control. Section 55(6) disregards fear to the extent that the defendant incited the thing done or said for the purpose of providing an excuse to use violence.
The second qualifying trigger has a limiting effect on the ability to be able to plead the defence in that the thing done or said must be both of an extremely grave character, and cause the defendant to have a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged. In other words, the defence requires not only the grave character of the thing said or done but, additionally, the requirement for the defendant to have a sense of being seriously wronged, with whether this is justifiable in the circumstances being a question for the jury. The important point in this context that it is irrelevant that a jury may consider the thing said and done to be of an extremely grave character if the defendant does not have a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged; both elements are essential to the defence. The same limitations in respect of inciting the thing done or said apply to this trigger as apply in relation to the fear of violence trigger (s. 55(6)(b)).
Examination Consideration
It is possible that an examination question may focus on the provisions of section 55(6)(c). This is because, in addition to the practical consideration of what exactly constitutes sexual infidelity, the question of the impact of this section has been subject to difficulties in interpretation.
Case in focus R v Clinton [2012] 2 All ER 497
The defendant killed his wife. On his account, she had told him in graphic detail about her sexual infidelity with 5 other men. His wife also taunted him about the fact that he was considering suicide, but had failed to go through with it. She additionally told him that she no longer wanted their children.
At first instance the defence of loss of control was not put to the jury because it was held that section 55(6)(c) prevented it from being so because of the presence of the wife’s sexual infidelity. The Court of Appeal quashed the conviction and ordered a retrial. Sexual infidelity must be disregarded as a qualifying trigger in its own right. Where there is evidence of another qualifying trigger, however, the jury can take infidelity into account if it is integral to the context in which that trigger must be assessed. It may also be relevant to the comparison under section 54(1)(c).
Normal Degree of Tolerance and Self-restraint
The test that is applied under this provisions is both objective and subjective. The first, objective, element is a consideration of the degree of tolerance and self-restraint of a normal person of the same age and sex as the defendant. Then the subjective circumstances of the defendant must be applied. Section 54(3) provides that circumstances are excluded if their only relevance is to the defendant’s general capacity for tolerance or self-restraint. This means that a defendant cannot attempt to assert that they are just more short tempered than an ordinary person and therefore more likely to lose self-control. However, this section does not preclude the application of the circumstances to the other elements of the defendant’s character. Therefore, if an action is likely to have a graver impact on the defendant than an ordinary person without a particular characteristic of the defendant, the defendant’s loss of self-control may be reasonable in that circumstance. For example, a mental disorder may affect the gravity of a taunt but cannot reduce the degree of tolerance and self-restraint required of the comparator (R v Rejmanski [2017] EWCA Crim 2061).
The final requirement under this head, is that a person meeting the statutory standard might have reacted in the same or a similar way. This suggests that the type of action carried out by the defendant is relevant. In other words, once it has been established that the defendant reasonably lost self-control in the circumstances, the defence may still fail if the jury believes that the defendant’s actions, despite the loss of self-control, are beyond how a person meeting that standard might have reacted in the circumstances. The existence of the loss of self-control, even if reasonable, is not sufficient to allow the defence to succeed.
Burden of Proof
The judge must leave the defence to the jury if there is evidence on which a properly directed jury could reasonably conclude that the defence might apply. That evidence may come from either side, even if the defendant has not raised the defence. The burden then shifts to the prosecution to demonstrate on the usual criminal standard (the jury must be sure) that at least one of the three elements was absent.
Examination Consideration
It is clear to see that there is a great deal of scope for discussion in the area of these two partial defences. Problem questions may simply focus on whether a defence is available on the facts, but it is also possible that they will be left open to interpretation regarding the statutory provisions and therefore a more discursive approach may be necessary. The difficulties in respect of sexual infidelity as a qualifying trigger being of particular relevance to this point.
Killing Subject to a Suicide Pact
Section 4 of the Homicide Act 1957 provides that a person will be guilty of manslaughter, not murder, if they are able to demonstrate that they killed another in pursuance of a suicide pact or were party to that person being killed by a third person in pursuance of the pact. A suicide pact is defined by section 4(3) as an agreement between 2 or more people that the result of their actions should be the death of all of them.
In order for this defence to be successfully pleaded, not only must the defendant prove on the balance of probabilities that they were part of a suicide pact, but also that at the time of the relevant act they had a settled intention of dying in pursuance of it. The effect is clearly very limiting. However, a defendant who, for example, administers an overdose to another, then takes one themselves, but lives may be able to succeed in this defence.
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