Mens Rea Lecture
The Mental Element of a Crime
In addition to meeting all of the actus reus elements of an offence, a defendant must have any guilty state of mind required by that offence at the time that they commit the actus reus. This guilty mind, or mental element, is known as mens rea. It may arise during a continuing act (Fagan v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1969] 1 QB 439). In Thabo Meli v The Queen [1954] 1 WLR 228, the acts carrying out a plan to kill were treated as one transaction, although the defendants mistakenly thought their victim was already dead when they disposed of him.
Depending on the offence, the prosecution may have to prove that the defendant intended a consequence, knew or believed that a circumstance existed, or was reckless as to a circumstance or consequence. However, in certain circumstances a defendant will satisfy mens rea if they are considered to have acted negligently and, for certain offences, known as offences of strict liability, no mens rea is required for at least one element.
There are therefore four broad areas of mens rea that will be considered:
- Intention
- Recklessness
- Negligence
- Strict Liability (although this must be considered inside mens rea, it arises, as mentioned, where no mens rea is required for a particular element).
Intention
Intention is a word that is often given its ordinary meaning. That is, a defendant will be found to have intended a consequence if bringing it about is their aim or purpose. This is the case irrespective of whether the consequence is very likely or extremely unlikely to occur. This means that a defendant who shoots at another person with the aim of killing them intends to kill regardless of whether their intended victim is standing next to them or is several hundred metres away. The defendant has the intention to kill whatever the outcome of their actions and can be liable for attempted murder, for example, even if they do not manage to shoot the victim.
Indirect/Oblique Intent
The definition of intention (often defined as direct intent) is not limited to this simple definition. This is because a defendant can be considered to intend a consequence of their actions if the consequence is one that the defendant does not want but which he knows is virtually certain to occur as a result of their actions. This is known as indirect or oblique intent.
Unfortunately, the definition of indirect or oblique intent is far from clear. It was, for a time considered that intention could be found, if the consequences of the defendant’s actions were foreseen as highly probable (Hyam v DPP [1975] AC 55). However, in R v Moloney [1985] 1 AC 905 it was held that the jury should ask two questions where the issue of intention arose.
Firstly, the jury should ask themselves whether they thought that the consequence was a natural consequence of the defendant’s actions. If this was the case, the question should be asked as to whether the defendant foresaw the consequence as a natural consequence of their actions. If the answer to both of these questions was yes, the jury could (but did not have to) infer intention on the part of the defendant.
The difficulty with this approach is that the notion of a ‘natural consequence’ is not clear. In R v Hancock and Shankland [1986] AC 455 the House of Lords explained the importance of probability as evidence of intention. In R v Nedrick [1986] 1 WLR 1025 the Court of Appeal directed attention to whether the consequence was virtually certain and whether the defendant appreciated this.
The current position in respect of indirect intent was set out by the House of Lords in R v Woollin [1999] AC 82. The jury may find intention if sure that the consequence was virtually certain, barring some unforeseen intervention, and that the defendant appreciated this. The House substituted ‘find’ for ‘infer’ in the Nedrick direction. Foresight of virtual certainty is evidence from which the jury may find intention, not a finding it must make (R v Matthews and Alleyne [2003] EWCA Crim 192).
Although Woollin concerned murder, the same approach to oblique intention can apply to other offences requiring an intended result. For example, foresight of a risk of serious injury alone does not establish an intention to cause grievous bodily harm under section 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861.
Overview of the current position
- In most cases, the facts of the case will be sufficiently clear. Therefore, where it is clear that the defendant aimed to bring about the consequences of their actions, it will not be necessary to provide the jury with a detailed direction.
- A detailed direction is needed only in the exceptional case where the ordinary meaning of intention does not give the jury sufficient guidance.
- The jury should be directed that it is able to find that the defendant intended the consequences of their actions if the consequences were virtually certain and the defendant knew that they were virtually certain. Even if the jury is satisfied that this is the case, they are not required to find that the defendant intended those consequences.
Examination Consideration
It can be seen that the area of intention gives a great deal of scope for discussion. It is therefore important that you are aware of the difference between the two main types of intention and extremely important that you are able to trace the development of indirect intent through the various judgments. You must be careful to identify that the consideration is only necessary where the offence is one that requires intent. Where recklessness satisfies the mens rea it will not be necessary to consider the notion of indirect intent.
Ulterior Intent, Basic Intent and Specific intent
It was mentioned above that a consideration of indirect or oblique intent is only really necessary where the offence is one that requires intention as the mens rea element. The distinction between specific and basic intent matters particularly for voluntary intoxication. Murder and wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm are offences of specific intent. An offence for which recklessness suffices is generally one of basic intent, but an offence can require an intentional act and still be one of basic intent, as sexual assault illustrates (R v Heard [2007] EWCA Crim 125).
Offences of ulterior intent are those that require proof of a second mens rea element. For example, section 9(1)(a) of the Theft Act 1968 provides that a person is guilty of burglary if he enters a building or part of a building as a trespasser, with intent to (steal anything in the building, inflict grievous bodily harm on any person within the building or commit unlawful damage to the building or anything within it) (s. 9(2)).
The first mens rea element of burglary concerns the defendant’s state of mind about entering as a trespasser. The defendant must be found to know that they are entering as a trespasser or at least foresee a risk that they are doing so (intention or recklessness). Satisfying this mens rea element is not enough however, because it is also necessary to show that the defendant intended to commit one of the additional offences (stealing, inflicting grievous bodily harm or cause unlawful damage). This additional mens rea element is the ulterior intent that must be proven.
Examination Consideration
Whilst it is unlikely that you will be required to consider ulterior intent as a separate concept in an examination. You should however, always consider whether there are additional mens rea elements for particular offences that you are faced with and make sure when considering these offences that you address all of the separate mens rea elements in turn. This is particularly important for practical questions. It would not be possible, for example to find a person liable for burglary under section 9(1)(a) of the Theft Act 1968 if they entered a building intending to steal, but neither knew nor foresaw a risk that they were trespassing. Conversely, if they enter knowing they are trespassing, but form the intention to steal only after entry, the later theft does not establish burglary under section 9(1)(a) in the absence of another qualifying intent on entry. They will not satisfy the mens rea of this section, and therefore you must consider some alternative type of liability (section 9(1)(b) covers this type of circumstance).
Summary on Intention
- Intention is direct where a defendant aims to bring about the consequences of their actions.
- Indirect Intent may be found where the defendant does not desire the consequences of their actions, but these consequences are virtually certain and the defendant knows that they are virtually certain.
- Specific intent offences include murder and burglary with intent to steal.
- Basic intent offences include battery and sexual assault, even though sexual assault requires intentional touching.
- Ulterior intent refers to offences where an additional it is necessary to show that the defendant intended to do something in addition to the basic mens rea of the offence.
Recklessness
The narrow definition of intention means that it is often difficult to show that a defendant intended the consequences of their actions. Where the offence permits it, proof of recklessness will suffice.
The definition of recklessness differs in concept significantly from that of intention, in that the word is never given its ordinary meaning. The ordinary meaning of this word could be considered as ‘carelessness’ or ‘dangerous’ - the legal definition is far more specific than the ordinary meaning.
Where the definition of recklessness is similar to intention is that it is also somewhat unclear as to what the proper definition should be. In a general sense, it refers to a defendant’s unjustified risk taking. It is the degree of this risk taking and the defendant’s awareness of the risk that has caused the issues surrounding the definition.
Subjective Recklessness
This type of recklessness was initially set out in R v Cunningham [1957] 2 QB 396 and is therefore often described as Cunningham recklessness. Under R v G [2003] UKHL 50 the defendant must be aware of a risk that a circumstance exists or will exist, or that a result will occur. Taking the risk must be unreasonable in the circumstances known to the defendant.
This approach means that a defendant must foresee a risk or result and unreasonably go on to take the risk. Foresight of the risk is subjective. The reasonableness of taking it is for the jury. It is true that a defendant who may be aware of a risk, but can be considered justified in taking it will not be considered reckless. A surgeon carrying out a dangerous operation, knowing that the patient may die from the treatment, but also knowing that the patient will die if the operation is not carried out. The risk is known and significant, but it is a reasonable one to take. It is also the case that at the opposite end of the scale is a person knows that one in a thousand cans of baked beans is poisonous, but decides to offer them for sale anyway. The risk of harm to a purchaser may be slight, but it would be unreasonable for the defendant to take even this small risk and the defendant would be reckless. The result is that a greater degree of risk can be tolerated where the justification for running it is greater.
The prosecution must prove that the defendant was aware of the risk. Its obviousness may be evidence that this defendant recognised it, but a jury cannot convict merely because a reasonable person would have recognised it.
In R v Stephenson [1979] QB 695, for example, the defendant had a mental disorder and therefore their subjective view of risk was significantly different from a reasonable person and in R v G [2004] 1 AC 1034, the two children lit newspapers and left them under a wheelie bin. Neither foresaw that the fire might spread to the shop. It was Stephenson who lit a fire in straw to keep warm.
It is important to note that a defendant cannot avoid liability by deliberately closing their mind to a risk (R v Parker [1977] 1 WLR 600). This is because, the view is taken that in order for a defendant to close their mind to a risk, they must first be aware of the risk that they are avoiding. A person rushing through a crowd to catch a train may recognise a risk of knocking someone over and press on regardless. Having recognised a similar risk in the past is not enough by itself to prove awareness at the material time.
Once awareness is proved, the question is whether it was reasonable to run the risk.
The Reasonableness of the Risk
The test in this context is necessarily objective. Whilst the circumstances are those known to the defendant, it is of course, the jury’s view of what is reasonable that is determinative. Any other approach would allow all defendants to assert that they believed that the risk they were taking was reasonable, however objectively unreasonable it might be.
A clear example of this can be found in Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset Constabulary v Shimmen(1986) 84 Cr App R 7 where a defendant was demonstrating his martial arts skills and was aware that there was a slight risk that he may misjudge his actions and break a window. It did not matter that he was very confident in his abilities and thought that the risk was extremely slight. The fact that he was aware of the risk was sufficient to satisfy the subjective element of recklessness, the slight risk was considered objectively unreasonable and the defendant was considered reckless.
Conversely, there are certain risks that are apparent in everyday life. Walking down a street, for example, carries the risk of bumping into somebody and injuring them. This risk is slight and, in the circumstances, is considered a reasonable one to take. Therefore, despite a potential defendant being aware of this risk and therefore satisfying the subjective element of the test, the objective reasonableness element will prevent a defendant who happens to bump into somebody from being considered reckless.
Objective Recklessness
For a number of years, criminal damage could be committed without actual foresight of the risk. In Metropolitan Police Commissioner v Caldwell [1982] AC 341 it was held that a defendant would be reckless if they foresaw a risk and went on to take it, or where the act created an obvious risk and the defendant gave no thought to it.
Although Caldwell was overruled in R v G and recklessness was returned to the previously described subjective test, it was made clear in the judgment in R v G that an objective approach could not be completely disregarded. In this judgment, it was held that Parliament had not intended the provisions of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 to apply to those who inadvertently caused damage to property and therefore, recklessness must be considered subjectively (it being remembered that the defendants in this case were both children and therefore fell within a category of those whose appreciation of risk might differ from what is ordinarily reasonable). However, it was held that Parliament may expressly make liability turn on an objective test.
Summary on Recklessness
- A defendant will be reckless if they are aware that a risk exists and go on unreasonably to take that risk.
- The defendant’s awareness of the risk is considered subjectively.
- The reasonableness of taking the risk is assessed objectively.
- For criminal damage the jury cannot substitute what the defendant ought to have foreseen for proof of actual awareness.
Examination Consideration
A discussion of the subjective/objective nature of recklessness is a common examination question. You should be aware of the objective elements of the subjective test, specifically the objectiveness element of the reasonableness of taking a particular risk. You may be asked to consider whether the test should be objective and therefore, you should take into account how much of the current test is objective. You could also consider whether there is any merit to the Caldwell definition of recklessness. It is extremely important that you understand exactly the approach that is taken with respect to the stages that are worked through in relation to each element of the test.
Transferred Malice
In certain circumstances, a defendant will have the required mens rea against one victim, but will satisfy the actus reus of an offence against a person against whom the mens rea is not satisfied. The majority of texts refer to transferred malice, but you should be aware that the Supreme Court suggested in R v Gnango [2012] 2 WLR 17 that the term transferred mens rea is more appropriate and accurate.
In R v Latimer (1886) 17 QBD 359, the defendant was involved in an argument with a person described as C in the judgment. The defendant swung his belt at C intending to cause him harm. The belt bounced off C and hit another person (R) causing them serious injury. When charged with an offence of maliciously and unlawfully wounding R under section 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, the defendant argued that he did not possess the required mens rea against the victim. On appeal it was held that where a defendant has the required mens rea for an offence, but injures a third party, the law holds that the malice that the defendant holds, is transferred to the inadvertent victim.
Transferred malice is limited to offences of the same type (R v Pembliton (1874) LR 2 CCR 119). Therefore, a defendant who intends to injure a victim will not be found liable for damaging property merely by transferring that intent. Liability for criminal damage may still arise if the defendant foresaw the risk of damage to the property and unreasonably took it. The offence with which the defendant is charged must be of the same type as the one that the defendant had the required mens rea for.
Examination Consideration
It is unlikely that you will be given a question that is based entirely on transferred malice. However, it is an issue that you should consider when faced with a practical question. You should make sure that you do not disregard a defendant’s liability because the result of their actions is different from the one that they intended.
Negligence
Negligence concerns a failure to meet the required standard of care. Whether harm must result and how serious the failure must be depend on the offence. It could be suggested that negligence does not fall within the notion of mens rea because it does not expressly require a mental consideration on the part of the defendant. However, in this context, mens rea relates to the fault of the defendant, the fault arising when the defendant does not meet the standard that might be considered reasonable.
Save for manslaughter by gross negligence, very few offences are defined as requiring the defendant to be negligent. They are however stated in terms of the defendant failing to meet the standard that a reasonable person would meet. The Intoxicating Substances (Supply) Act 1985 has been repealed. Under section 5(1) of the Psychoactive Substances Act 2016, a person must intentionally supply a psychoactive substance. It is sufficient as to the nature of the substance that they ought to know or suspect it is psychoactive. They must also know, or be reckless as to whether, it is likely to be consumed for its psychoactive effects.
Whether a mistake of fact must be reasonable depends on the offence. The bigamy cases R v King [1964] 1 QB 285 and R v Gould [1968] 2 QB 65 concerned an honest and reasonable mistake about the status of a marriage. Where actual knowledge is required, an honest mistake may negative knowledge even if it is unreasonable.
A clear example of the importance of negligence can be found in section 1(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, which provides that a person will be guilty of rape if the defendant intentionally penetrates the other person’s vagina, anus or mouth with his penis, that person does not consent and the defendant does not reasonably believe that the victim consented. An asserted belief in consent answers this element only if the defendant actually held it and it was reasonable. Under section 1(2), reasonableness is assessed in all the circumstances, including any steps taken to ascertain consent.
It can be seen that the absence of the word negligence does not mean that it is not an important concept in criminal liability. In this sense, the mens rea element is closely linked to the idea of blameworthiness. Whilst the defendant’s state of mind is not entirely relevant as an individual requirement for negligence, it is relevant in terms of the standard of consideration that a defendant must, or ought, to give to a particular set of circumstances. Failing to meet what is considered a reasonable level in respect of this standard of consideration renders a defendant potentially liable.
Strict Liability
Strict liability dispenses with proof of fault for the element to which it applies. Under these types of offences, it will not be necessary to show that a defendant possessed the relevant mens rea for at least one part of the actus reus of the offence. In R v Prince (1875) LR 2 CCR 154, for example, the defendant was charged under a former statutory offence with taking a girl under the age of 16 out of the possession and against the will of her father. It was no defence that the defendant reasonably believed that the girl was over the age of 16 - the defendant’s state of mind in respect of this actus reus element was irrelevant and therefore liability was strict. However, for the other elements of the offence, liability was not strict. It would, for example, have been a defence for the defendant to show that he reasonably believed that the father had given his consent for the taking, even if this belief was wrongly held. The reasonable belief in this context would negate mens rea. A current example is section 5 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. Penetration must be intentional, but a belief that the child was 13 or older is no defence (R v G [2008] UKHL 37).
It could be suggested that making a defendant liable when they have no guilty state of mind could have harsh results. This was a consideration that was made in Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132. The facts of this judgment are not particularly relevant to its impact, but it should be noted when the case is read, that Lord Reid refers to crimes of absolute liability in judgment. For the purposes of this judgment, the term absolute liability means strict liability.
In Sweet v Parsley it was held that where statute makes it clear that mens rea is required, no issue arises and the wording of the statute should be followed. Where the statute is silent as to the requirement of mens rea, a presumption arises that Parliament did not intend make a person who lacked a guilty state of mind liable for the offence and the courts should read in words that cause mens rea to be required. The presumption can be rebutted by clear wording or necessary implication. The court considers the statutory language in its context and in light of its purpose (R v Lane and Letts [2018] UKSC 36).
Lord Reid suggested in Sweet v Parsley that the courts may be able to draw a distinction between ‘truly criminal acts’ and ‘quasi-crimes’, the latter being acts which are not criminal in any real sense, but which, in the public interest are prohibited under penalty. No specific definition of quasi-criminal offences was given, but using an unlicensed vehicle contrary to section 29 of the Vehicle Excise and Registration Act 1994 is an example of a regulatory offence. The courts may be more willing to impose strict liability for these quasi-crimes than they are for truly criminal offences.
The limitation on strict liability was taken slightly further in Gammon (Hong Kong) Ltd v Attorney-General of Hong Kong [1985] AC 1, where the Privy Council explained that the presumption is particularly strong for truly criminal offences. In deciding whether it is displaced by implication, the court considers the social concern addressed by the statute and whether strict liability would further its purpose by encouraging greater vigilance.
It is important to recognise the difference between strict liability and negligence. For negligence the prosecution must establish a failure to meet the required standard. For an element of strict liability the prosecution need not prove even that failure. The remaining elements of the offence must still be proved, and any statutory defence remains available.
Examination Consideration
You may be asked to consider the nature of negligence and strict liability offences and to consider whether you believe that the existence of criminal liability in these types of circumstance is justifiable. For negligence, you should be aware of the impact of the term across a number of differing types of offence where the word ‘negligence’ is not directly used and consider whether liability should be adjudged against what is reasonable, or whether some stricter approach is preferable, or indeed whether the state of the defendant’s mind should be the only consideration. For strict liability, a consideration should be made as to whether the benefit to the public of strict liability offences is sufficient to allow criminal liability to arise without a blameworthy state of mind. Are the limitations placed on strict liability sufficient?
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