Defences and Limitation of Liability Lecture

Edited by: Barclay Littlewood

Last updated: 3 November 2026

In England and Wales, just as tort law uses remoteness or lack of duty as mechanisms to control which claims are and are not actionable, defences provide a way in which a defendant can negate liability either by reference to their own positive behaviour or through pointing out the claimant’s own misdeeds. Some of these defences will only reduce the award of damages, and are thus referred to as ‘partial defences’. Others will dispel all liability, and are therefore known as ‘complete defences’.

Compensatory damages reflect the loss caused by the tort. In torts where aggravated damages are available, the defendant’s conduct may increase the injury for which compensation is due. A failed defence of necessity does not itself reduce compensation because the defendant meant well.

Finally, it should be remembered the best defence available will often be an argument that the claimant doesn’t have a case at all (so for negligence claims, that no duty existed etc.)

Exam Consideration: Many of these defences function slightly differently depending on the tort that they are being applied to. It would therefore be wise to check the content on the relevant tort before zealously applying any of these to a given case. Conversely, the defences listed in relation to each tort will need to be read in conjunction with this chapter.

Contributory Negligence

A contributory negligence defence is quite simply an argument that the claimant, through some action or omission of their own, failed to take reasonable care for their own safety and thereby contributed to their damage, and that this fact should be reflected in the awarded damages. Since it affects the damages, rather than the verdict of the case itself, it is a partial defence.

The effect of a contributory negligence defence is easy to understand. It involves asking what reduction is just and equitable in view of the claimant’s share of responsibility for the damage, and then taking that percentage off of his or her damages. Thus if the courts regard a claimant as having made a 40% contribution to their own injuries, the court will reduce their damages by 40%. Because of this mechanism, the defence is not available where the relevant remedy is not damages (because it’s impossible to reduce an injunction by a percentage!).

The authority for the defence and a description of how it works can be found in s.1(1) of the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945, although the defence itself was developed before then.

Exam Consideration: Whilst it has ‘negligence’ in the name, do not make the mistake of thinking that contributory negligence only applies to negligence claims. It is, however, unavailable in an action for assault or battery (Co-operative Group (CWS) Ltd v Pritchard [2011] EWCA Civ 329).

There are two main elements of a contributory negligence defence. The defendant must establish both fault on the claimant’s part and a causal contribution to the damage. Only then does the court apportion responsibility.

Finding Claimant Fault

As per s.4 of the 1945 Act, claimant fault includes negligence, breach of statute or any other form of tortious liability or conduct which would, apart from the Act, give rise to the defence of contributory negligence. The claimant need not have committed a tort or owed the defendant a duty of care.

Exam Consideration: Ask whether the claimant took reasonable care for their own safety. Someone who does not put a seatbelt on can contribute to the injury they suffer without contributing to the collision.

An example of the negligent fault principle can be seen in Jones v Livox Quarries.

Case in Focus: Jones v Livox Quarries [1952] 2 QB 608

The claimant worked in a quarry owned by the defendant. He decided to hitch a lift on the back of a traxcavator by standing on the tow bar, unbeknownst to the driver, and a policy was in place forbidding this behaviour. A dump truck, negligently driven by another employee, hit the back of the traxcavator, crushing the claimant’s legs, leading to amputation.

Whilst the dump truck’s driver was to blame for the accident, the court held that the claimant was 20% to blame for his injuries - he had acted negligently, and had acted against orders. Denning LJ identified the foreseeability requirement:

"Just as actionable negligence requires the foreseeability of harm to others, so contributory negligence requires the foreseeability of harm to oneself. A person is guilty of contributory negligence if he ought reasonably to have foreseen that, if he did not act as a reasonable, prudent man, he might be hurt himself…"
- Denning LJ, at 615

Thus, contributory negligence is not based on being in the wrong place at the wrong time, but rather on whether the claimant had acted reasonably in the circumstances, with ‘reasonable’ defined as taking action to avoid foreseeable harm. It should be noted that reasonable behaviour is not based on acting to prevent any and all foreseeable accidents, but rather just taking precautions to avoid generally foreseeable harm. All that can be asked of claimants is that they take reasonable precautions to protect themselves, since the nature and extent of the tort that affects them will be determined by the behaviour of the defendant who has harmed them. In other words, you can wear a seatbelt, but you can’t stop someone from hitting you with their car.

What is reasonable will depend on the context, and a protracted discussion of the reasonable standard of care is discussed in the chapter on breach of duty. There are a few common situations which are worth mentioning, however. Claimants will normally be expected to wear a seatbelt where one is fitted, subject to exceptions such as medical exemption, regardless of length or road conditions. This can be seen in Froom v Butcher.

Case in Focus: Froom v Butcher [1976] 1 QB 286

The claimant was involved in a negligently caused car accident, in which the claimant was not wearing a seatbelt. After discussing the evidence for wearing seatbelts at 293, Lord Denning came to the following conclusion (in reference to failures to wear seatbelts):

“Sometimes the evidence will show that the failure made no difference. […] In such case the damages should not be reduced at all. At other times the evidence will show that the failure made all the difference. […] In such cases I would suggest that the damages should be reduced by 25 per cent. […] often enough the evidence will only show that the failure made a considerable difference. […] In such case I would suggest that the damages […] should be reduced by 15 per cent.”
- Lord Denning MR at 296

It is perhaps odd that situations in which the entire harm of the accident can be attributed to non-seatbelt wearing only attract a 25% reduction in damages. However, it should not be forgotten that whilst a claimant has a responsibility to wear a seatbelt, they have a greater right to not be hit by a negligent driver. Of course, this only refers to non-seatbelt wearing - it may well be a case that a claimant contributes to an accident in more than one way, and so the reduction may be greater. So a claimant who isn’t wearing a seatbelt and is speeding and on their mobile phone may see a reduction beyond 25% if the speeding or phone use also contributed to the damage.

The same principle applies for motorcycle drivers who do not wear helmets, as per O’Connell v Jackson [1971] 3 WLR 463. The claimant was injured whilst riding his moped without a helmet. A negligent driver pulled out into his path and the moped struck the car. The court used the Highway Code as their benchmark for responsibility, and noted that it told motorcyclists to wear helmets. Since the motorcyclist did not contribute to the accident, and the lack of a helmet only caused some but not all of his injuries, damages were reduced by 15%. Motorcyclists must now normally wear a protective helmet on the road, with an exemption for a Sikh wearing a turban. Under s.38(7) of the Road Traffic Act 1988, failure to follow the Highway Code may be evidence of liability.

The defendant must show on the evidence that wearing a seatbelt would have prevented injury or made a considerable difference. The Froom figures should normally be followed (Stanton v Collinson [2010] EWCA Civ 81). This principle can be seen at work in the case of Owens v Brimmell [1977] QB 859. The claimant knowingly got into a car with the defendant, with whom he had been drinking at a pub. He also failed to wear his seatbelt. The defendant negligently caused an accident in which the claimant was injured. Watkins J noted (at 867) that the defence in relation to accepting a lift from a driver affected by drink depended on the circumstances: “whether this principle can be relied upon successfully is a question of fact and degree to be determined in the circumstances out of which the issue is said to arise”. The reduction was 20% for accepting the lift. There was no additional reduction for the seatbelt because the defendant had not proved that wearing it would have made the injuries less serious.

The relevant standard of care can change depending on the characteristics of the claimant. Thus, children will be expected to act less carefully than adults, as in Gough v Thorne [1966] 1 WLR 1387. Three siblings aged seventeen, thirteen and ten were waiting to cross a road. A lorry driver slowed down, and beckoned them to cross. They did so, but then a car overtook the lorry via a narrow gap, and hit the two youngest siblings. At trial, the thirteen year old was held to have contributed a third to her injuries, for not checking the road for any other oncoming traffic. On appeal this decision was struck out on the basis that her behaviour was acceptable for a thirteen year old, even if an adult might have acted differently. The question is what could reasonably be expected of a child of that age. In Morales v Eccleston [1991] RTR 151 an eleven year old was held 75% responsible for running out into a road without looking and getting hit by a car.

The situation that the claimant is in affects what reasonable care requires, so the circumstances facing a rescuer must be taken into account and those who act quickly when placed in an emergency situation will not be handled as if they were capable of rational, calculating thought. Thus in Jones v Boyce [1816] 171 ER 540, the defendant provided an unsafe horse-drawn coach in which the claimant was a passenger. The claimant thought the coach was about to crash, and so jumped from it to avoid the danger, injuring himself. The coach did not crash. Nevertheless, the claimant was not held to have contributed to his injuries - whilst he had acted unreasonably by normal standards, he had acted reasonably for someone put in a position of perceived danger. However, there is a limit to when ‘emergency’ behaviour will be considered reasonable. Thus in Sayers v Harlow [1958] 1 WLR 623 the claimant was negligently locked in a toilet cubicle which had no inside handle. In a desperate attempt to escape the claimant tried to climb out. As she climbed down, she put weight on the toilet roll, which rotated and caused her to fall. The court held that attempting to escape was reasonable but relying on the roll for support was careless, and thus applied a 25% reduction to the claimant’s damages.

Apportionment

Once claimant fault has been established the court will seek to ascertain the contribution the claimant has made to their harm, expressed as a proportion, as per s.1 of the 1945 Act.

It should be noted that courts are prevented from making deductions of 100%. In Pitts v Hunt [1991] 1 QB 24, the claimant was injured whilst riding on the back of the defendant’s motorcycle. The defendant was driving negligently, and hit an oncoming car, killing himself and permanently disabling the claimant. Both parties were drunk, and the claimant was encouraging the defendant to drive recklessly. The defendant had no motorcycle licence or insurance. The court of first instance held that the claimant was 100% contributorily negligent. On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the claim was barred by the defence of illegality (ex turpi causa), since the claimant’s injuries arose out of a joint criminal enterprise. However, the bench also noted that a finding of 100% contributory negligence was inherently illogical - the function of contributory negligence is not to defeat a claim entirely, but merely to reflect a claimant’s contribution to that claim. A defendant who is regarded as 0% to blame for a tort is not at fault at all, and the claim should fail on liability rather than through the mechanism of contributory negligence.

Whilst the reduction in damages will be a matter of factual context, there are two general factors that the court will take into account - relative blameworthiness and causative potency. Fault refers to the claimant’s lack of care - so not wearing a seatbelt demonstrates a lack of care. Consider two drivers who are hit from behind whilst driving, both of whom suffer the exact same damage. The first is not wearing a seatbelt (a moderately careless act), whilst the second has failed to repair a broken brake light (a minor careless act). The court would ask how blameworthy each omission was and what part, if any, it played in the damage. The two drivers need not receive the same reduction.

Causation refers to the extent to which the claimant’s lack of care affected the damage they sustained. Consider two drivers, neither of whom are wearing seatbelts. The first is involved in an accident which is made a lot worse by the lack of a seatbelt. The second is involved in an accident the result of which is only made slightly worse by the lack of seatbelt. The courts will consider whether the failure made a considerable difference to the injuries in each case (this is essentially the Froom decision).

These two factors are combined, so a very foolish act or omission which makes an accident massively worse may justify a far higher reduction in damages than a minor omission which only makes an accident a little worse.

Consent

Consent refers to situations in which the claimant can be regarded as having consented to a risk which then manifests itself. This is sometimes referred to via the Latin maxim volenti non fit injuria (to a volunteer, injury is not done). Consent is a complete defence - if consent is found, a claim will be defeated.

Consent defences can be broken down into two categories. In the first are situations of negligence where a claimant agrees that the defendant will not be held liable for any injuries they might incur whilst undertaking a particular activity. So an individual might sign a waiver in which they acknowledge the inherent risks of a bungee jump. That does not release a commercial operator from liability for personal injury caused by its negligence. In the second are where the claimant effectively tells a defendant to do something. So an individual who tells another to burn down his house cannot sue that person for damaging his property.

Consent is made up of three factors. The claimant must have a knowledge of the nature and extent of the risk they consented to, the claimant’s consent must be voluntary, and they must be shown to have agreed to the risk.

Knowledge of Risk

Before consent can be effective, a claimant must know what it is that they are consenting to. This is subjective, so the courts will ask what a claimant knew at the time consent occurred. This can be seen in Morris v Murray.

Case in Focus: Morris v Murray [1991] 2 QB 6

The claimant had been drinking with the defendant all day (to the point at which the defendant had consumed the equivalent of roughly seventeen whiskies). The defendant, who had a pilot’s licence, suggested that they take his light aircraft for a flight. The claimant agreed and drove to the airfield. In a perhaps predictable turn of events the plane crashed, killing the defendant and seriously injuring the claimant, who brought a case against the defendant’s estate. The defence argued that the claimant had consented to the risk, since he must have known how glaringly dangerous the flight would have been.

This argument was successful - the claimant was held to have appreciated and freely accepted the obvious risk of flying with a seriously intoxicated pilot, and thus the defence of consent applied.

It can thus be seen that whilst knowledge is subjective, there is no need for an explicit expression on the part of the claimant that they are aware of the risk they are running. Instead, the court will infer the likely knowledge of the claimant (although they will of course pay attention to any explicit evidence that the claimant knew of a particular risk).

Since this requirement is subjective, the defence will fail if the claimant was not aware of a risk, even if they should have been. Thus in Smith v Austin Lifts Ltd [1958] 2 Lloyd's Rep 583 the claimant knew that a door was defective but did not appreciate the full danger of using it as a handhold. Knowledge of the defect did not establish acceptance of that risk.

Exam Consideration: Remember, none of these defences operate in a vacuum, and thus can overlap. It will quite often be the case that where consent fails, contributory negligence can still apply.

Voluntariness

Key to the employment of a consent defence is that the claimant must have been given true freedom of choice before they can be said to have consented. This can be seen in Bowater v Rowley Regis Corp.

Case in Focus: Bowater v Rowley Regis Corp [1944] KB 476

The claimant was employed by the defendant as a road sweeper. Part of this work involved using a horse-drawn cart to collect sweepings. He was ordered by his foreman to use a horse which was known for misbehaviour. The claimant protested, but his protests were ignored. A few weeks later the horse bolted, throwing the claimant from his cart and injuring him. The defendant raised a consent defence. The defence failed - the claimant could not be regarded as willing since he had no real choice in the matter, and thus consent did not apply.

This case also demonstrates a couple of other points. Firstly, employees can rarely be described as consenting to risk, where that risk comes about as part of their employment. Since the actions of employees are usually dictated by a manager, it is the manager who is effectively making the choices in such scenarios. This can be seen in Smith v Baker & Sons [1891] AC 325. The claimant was injured on a building site when a stone fell from a crane. Whilst he was aware of this risk, and continued to work on the site, this was not effective consent - he had no control over the risk, and thus no choice over whether he was exposed to it or not (outside of his general consent to employment on the site). This principle also fits into wider legal views of the employer-employee relationship, which tend to emphasise the duty of employers to avoid harm and their ability to bear losses via organisational coffers or insurance policies. Being paid ‘danger money’ may be relevant to what the employee understood, but it does not by itself show agreement to run the risk of the employer’s negligence.

Secondly, freedom of choice does not mean merely ‘it was possible to avoid the risk’. So in Bowater the employee had the freedom to refuse the order to use the dangerous horse and potentially run the risk of dismissal or disciplinary action. Still, it would be disingenuous to assert that the claimant had a free choice between using the horse and not. To put it another way, a choice between fighting a bear or jumping off a cliff is not a freely made choice.

Agreement

Agreement can take one of two forms - express and implied.

Express agreements include explicit forms of consent such as the eponymous consent form, or else an explicit agreement between claimant and defendant. A contractual term or notice which seeks to exclude liability is subject to statutory controls. Most notable is s.2(1) of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, which prevents a business from excluding or restricting liability for negligently caused personal injury or death. Since the Consumer Rights Act 2015, UCTA s.2 no longer applies to consumer contracts; the equivalent protections for consumers are now found in ss.62 and 65 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015. UCTA s.2(1) continues to apply to business liability within its scope. Under UCTA s.2(2), a term or notice excluding liability for other loss caused by negligence must be reasonable. Under UCTA s.2(3) and CRA s.65(2), agreement to or awareness of a term or notice does not of itself establish voluntary acceptance of a risk. A paintball player may accept the ordinary risks of the game, including an eye injury, without agreeing to negligent equipment or supervision. Express agreements are, overall, much more simple than implied agreements, since they will usually make it clear what the consent pertains to.

Exam Consideration: The effectiveness of an exclusion clause is largely a matter of contract law, and so it would be impossible to cover in full all of the rules and regulations which apply to it. In short, a proper understanding of such a clause is predicated on a proper knowledge of contract law.

Implied consent includes situations in which a claimant can reasonably be held to have consented to a particular risk, but do not make this consent explicitly known (after all, the phrase ‘I consent to that risk’ is hardly a common phrase in everyday life). However, the courts are relatively reluctant to imply consent unless it is very clearly (but not explicitly) in place, since this is effectively putting words into the claimant’s mouth. Awareness that a danger is obvious is evidence from which agreement may be inferred. It does not establish agreement on its own. This can be seen in Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd v Shatwell (also discussed in employers’ statutory breach).

Case in Focus: Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd v Shatwell [1965] AC 656

In defiance of express instructions and statutory regulation, two brothers tested mining explosives in a quarry in an unsafe manner. They could have undertaken a safe test had they just waited for a colleague to return with a longer detonator wire. The explosives detonated early, and both brothers were injured. One sued the employer for his brother’s breach of statutory duty. The employer was itself free from fault. The House of Lords accepted the defence because both men had freely agreed to take the risk in full knowledge of the danger.

Explicit warnings do not necessarily establish an agreement to run the risk. This can be seen in a series of cases where passengers have knowingly ridden in the vehicles of drunk drivers. Thus in Dann v Hamilton [1939] 1 KB 509, the driver had been drinking. Another passenger got out of the car after commenting on the driver’s condition. The claimant stayed in the car and remarked that if anything was going to happen, it would happen. A negligently caused accident did occur, injuring the claimant. Nonetheless, a consent defence was not accepted - the claimant was not held to have consented to absolve the defendant from any acts of negligence. The same principle can be seen in Owens v Brimmell (discussed in contributory negligence.) The claimant passenger’s decision to accept the lift reduced his damages for contributory negligence.

These cases can be contrasted with Morris v Murray (drunken pilot), in which the danger was held to be so incredibly obvious and extreme that consent could succeed. The question is whether the claimant freely accepted the particular risk.

It should be noted that statute now prohibits a consent defence being used against passengers in motor vehicles, in respect of liability for death or bodily injury for which compulsory motor insurance is required, as per s.149 of the Road Traffic Act 1988.

Authorisation

As noted in previous chapters, statutory authorisation can render ordinarily tortious activities legal. Examples include police searches under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, mental health detentions under the Mental Health Act 1983, and the ordinary incidents of aircraft flight at a reasonable height, subject to the statutory conditions in s.76 of the Civil Aviation Act 1982. There are dozens and dozens of such acts and so it is impossible to cover them all. The key thing to note is that certain instances of negligence are held to go beyond the authorisation of statute, and thus can still give rise to tort. Whether a statute authorises the conduct complained of is a question the court can decide in the tort claim itself.

Exam Consideration: Identify what the statute authorises. For nuisance, consider whether the interference was an inevitable consequence of the authorised activity despite the exercise of reasonable care (Allen v Gulf Oil Refining Ltd [1981] AC 1001).

Necessity

The complete defence of necessity applies in cases of trespass (personal, property or goods), and has been discussed as such in the relevant chapter. The interference must be reasonably necessary and proportionate to the danger. Acting with good intentions alone is insufficient. Self-defence is distinct. In a civil battery claim the defendant must have honestly and reasonably believed that force was necessary and have used no more force than was reasonably necessary (Ashley v Chief Constable of Sussex Police [2008] UKHL 25).

Illegality

Illegality, sometimes referred to as ‘ex turpi causa’ (from a foul cause), is a complete defence which may bar a claim founded on unlawful conduct. This should not be regarded as a rule that prevents all claims from succeeding - if this were the case then every road user not wearing a seatbelt or speeding would have their claims in tort barred. Whether allowing the claim would undermine the integrity of the legal system is considered below. A statutory defence may instead explain why a trespasser’s claim fails. In Cummings v Granger [1977] QB 397, the claimant entered a scrap yard as a trespasser and was bitten by the Alsatian kept there. Her claim failed under the Animals Act 1971. She knew of and accepted the risk, and it was reasonable to keep the dog there for protection.

The common law defence of illegality can be seen at work in Vellino v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police.

Case in Focus: Vellino v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police [2002] 1 WLR 218

The claimant, a serial criminal and escapee, jumped from a second floor window. He suffered serious injuries, including tetraplegia. The claimant brought a case against the police, asserting that the police owed him a duty to prevent him from injuring himself. The claim failed, on the basis that the claimant’s criminal enterprise precluded the imposition of a duty of care. Sir Murray Stuart-Smith summarised the law as it then stood (at 72 of the transcript, 70 in the report). On that approach the claim had to be linked inextricably to the claimant’s criminal enterprise, the defence had to be justified by public policy, and the criminal conduct had to be sufficiently serious.

The approach to illegality was significantly reformulated by the Supreme Court in Patel v Mirza [2016] UKSC 42. The Supreme Court moved away from the rigid rules-based tests previously applied by the courts and adopted a more flexible, policy-based approach. Under this approach, the court must consider whether allowing the claim would be harmful to the integrity of the legal system, having regard to: (a) the underlying purpose of the prohibition that has been transgressed and whether that purpose would be enhanced by denial of the claim; (b) any other relevant public policy on which the denial of the claim may have an impact; and (c) whether denial of the claim would be a proportionate response to the illegality. Patel v Mirza is now the leading authority on the illegality defence and should be considered alongside earlier cases such as Vellino. In Lewis-Ranwell v G4S Health Services (UK) Ltd [2026] UKSC 2 the claimant had been found not guilty of murder by reason of insanity. Applying Patel, the Supreme Court nevertheless barred his negligence claim for the consequences of the killings. A criminal conviction is not essential.

Limitation of Liability

The law dictates that there is a limit on how much time can pass after a claim arises before it becomes inactionable. This is generally ascribed to two factors. Firstly, the more time that passes after a claim arises, the harder it is to deal with them. Injuries heal, damage is repaired, and records of events are destroyed or forgotten by witnesses. This makes such claims onerous and expensive to deal with inside of the legal system. Secondly, defendants have a right to eventually consider themselves finished with a particular dispute or conflict, and it is just to expect claimants to bring a case in a timely manner (and to prevent them from holding the potential claim over the heads of defendants, or using it as a tool to economically harm someone when they are most vulnerable).

The primary body of law on this matter is found within the Limitation Act 1980, the most important part of which is s.2, providing a general six-year limitation period from the date on which the cause of action accrued. Limitation normally gives the defendant a defence if pleaded. In negligence the cause of action accrues when actionable damage occurs. A tort actionable without proof of damage, such as trespass, accrues when the wrongful act occurs.

As per s.4A, claims for defamation or malicious falsehood are subject to a time limit of one year. Section 32A permits the court to disapply that limit where it is equitable. For substantially the same statement republished by the same person, s.8 of the Defamation Act 2013 generally counts time from first publication to the public unless the manner of later publication is materially different.

Non-Personal Injury Damage Caused by Negligence

In the case of non-personal injury damage, time normally runs from when actionable damage occurs, even if it is not readily apparent. So if a car crashes into a house and smashes down a wall, the action will accrue from the point the car crashes into the house. As per s.14A(4)(b), if damage is latent (i.e. not readily apparent) then the same six year timer will start running from the point of damage, but a second three year timer will run from the earliest date the claimant had both the right to sue and the knowledge required to bring the action. The later expiry date applies. So if a builder negligently builds a chimney and it damages neighbouring property, the six years run from that damage. If the owner first has the requisite knowledge ten years after construction, the three-year period can still allow a claim. Section 14B normally imposes a longstop of 15 years from the last relevant act or omission. Under s.32(5), ss.14A and 14B do not apply in cases of deliberate concealment within s.32(1)(b). Separate limits apply to claims under the Defective Premises Act 1972. Section 4B of the Limitation Act gives 30 years for claims under s.1 of the 1972 Act which accrued before 28 June 2022, and 15 years for later s.1 claims and claims under s.2A.

Knowledge includes what the claimant actually knew and what they could reasonably have been expected to learn, including with appropriate expert advice. Sections 14A(6)–(10) cover the material facts about the damage, its attribution to the act or omission alleged, and the defendant’s identity. Where someone else did the act, their identity and the facts supporting a claim against the defendant also matter. The test of significance is in s.14A(7). Knowledge that the conduct amounted in law to negligence is unnecessary.

Personal Injury Damage

Under ss.11 and 14, the usual time limit for an action for negligence, nuisance or breach of duty involving personal injury is three years from accrual or, if later, the injured person’s date of knowledge. The claimant must know that the injury is significant, that it is attributable at least in part to the act or omission alleged, and the defendant’s identity. If someone else did the act, the claimant must also know their identity and the facts supporting a claim against the defendant. Knowledge includes what the claimant could reasonably be expected to find out. It is unnecessary to know that the act amounted in law to negligence, nuisance or breach of duty. Since 29 June 2026, s.11ZA removes the ordinary time limits for qualifying personal injury claims attributable to sexual abuse where the claimant was under 18 when the cause of action accrued. It covers earlier causes of action but does not reopen claims already settled or decided before commencement. It excludes claims under s.3 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 and estate claims unless the injured person started the action before death. For a claim outside the former limit, s.11ZB requires dismissal if the defendant proves that a fair hearing is impossible.

Exceptions to All the Rules

Under ss.28 and 38(2), if the claimant was a minor or lacked capacity to conduct the proceedings when the right of action accrued, the applicable extension generally runs from the end of the disability or death, whichever occurs first. This is a statutory extension. Its length depends on the claim. Section 28A makes separate provision for disability at the start of the three-year knowledge period under s.14A, subject to the s.14B longstop.

Under s.32, where the action is based on the defendant’s fraud, a relevant fact has been deliberately concealed by the defendant, or the action seeks relief from the consequences of a mistake, time does not begin until the claimant has discovered the fraud, concealment or mistake or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it. For deliberate concealment it is not enough that the defendant was merely reckless (Canada Square Operations Ltd v Potter [2023] UKSC 41).

As per s.33, the court may disapply specified time limits, including those under ss.11 and 12, where that is equitable having regard to the prejudice to each side. For a fatal accident claim, s.12 generally allows three years from death or, if later, the beneficiary’s date of knowledge, subject to the conditions in that section. The factors that the court will have regard to are listed under s.33(3). They include the reasons for delay and its effect on the cogency of the evidence.

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