Nuisance and Rylands v Fletcher Lecture

Just as tort law extends to cover more than personal injury, into property damage and economic harm, it has also developed a mechanism to deal with the ongoing annoyance that can arise as a result of certain land usage. This is known as the tort of private nuisance. A good preliminary definition can be found in Miller v Jackson.

There are two primary features of nuisance - firstly, it involves the protection of the use of land (or property). Secondly, that protection is from unreasonable interference.

This can cover a wide range of neighbour-neighbour relationships. There is no requirement that the claimant and defendant properties be adjoined - so a neighbour two doors down can be a defendant in a case of nuisance. Conversely, there is no need for the properties to be separate buildings, so claimant and defendant can live in flats in the same block. Nuisance does not have to be artificial - it can be naturally occurring, so encroaching branches can constitute nuisance, or a neighbour could plant a nursery of extremely smelly corpse flowers. As seen in Miller v Jackson, it can cover activities which take place on a piece of land. A factory might pour acrid smoke into a residential area - but it should also be noted that private nuisance does not just protect residential rights, but also the use and enjoyment of business premises. A residence can, thus, cause nuisance to an industrial site. The person who creates the nuisance may be liable. An occupier who adopts or continues a nuisance created by someone else may also be liable. For a naturally arising hazard, what the occupier knew or ought to have known and the measures reasonably available to them matter (Leakey v National Trust [1980] QB 485). A landlord is not liable merely for letting the premises or knowing about the nuisance. Liability may arise from authorising it or participating in it (Coventry v Lawrence (No 2) [2014] UKSC 46).

Property Interests and Private Nuisance

Since nuisance deals with property rights, a claimant ordinarily needs a right to exclusive possession of the affected land, for example as an owner or tenant. Exclusive possession can suffice even if title cannot be proved. A reversioner can sue for sufficiently permanent damage to the reversion. Further details on the concepts of proprietary interests and beneficial interests can be found within property law resources.

The need for proprietary interest stems from Malone v Laskey.

For a brief period of time in the mid-90s, the Court of Appeal allowed an exception to this requirement, in the case of Khorasandjian v Bush [1993] QB 727. The claimant, an 18-year-old woman, was subjected to a campaign of harassment by a 23-year-old man. He threatened her with violence and behaved aggressively towards her, even spending time in prison for threatening to kill her. An injunction was obtained against the defendant on the basis of private nuisance. The majority held that the claimant could obtain protection against nuisance telephone calls to her mother’s home despite lacking a proprietary interest there.

This stance changed in 1997, however. It should be noted that the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 came into force, providing a non-nuisance basis for injunctive protection from Khorasandjian v Bush-type behaviour. The proprietary right requirement was reinstated in Hunter v Canary Wharf [1997] AC 655. A number of residents living in the Canary Wharf area experienced interference with their television signals due to the construction of the 800-foot Canary Wharf Tower. Some of the claimants were homeowners and leaseholders, whilst some were family members, lodgers, and others who lacked a proprietary interest. The House of Lords reinstated the proprietary interest requirement of Malone v Laskey, and held that the mere presence of a building blocking a television signal was not actionable. A spouse’s entitlement depends on their rights in the land. Marriage or residence alone is insufficient.

This means that, as in 1907, private nuisance remains a matter of property rights, rather than personal rights.

What Constitutes Unreasonable Interference?

The second key element of private nuisance is that of unreasonable interference - there must be a substantial interference, judged objectively. For interference with use and enjoyment, the question is whether it affects ordinary use of the claimant’s land and whether the defendant is making a common and ordinary use of their own land, carried on with proper consideration for neighbours (Fearn v Board of Trustees of the Tate Gallery [2023] UKSC 4). The character of the neighbourhood, claimant sensitivity, duration and malice may all matter. Public benefit bears on the remedy.

Character of Neighbourhood

Character of neighbourhood refers to what might reasonably be expected of a particular area - so whilst it would be unreasonable for a factory to cause a lot of noise in the middle of an idyllic countryside setting, the same noise would likely be found reasonable if found in an industrial estate. Thus, the relative amplitude of a nuisance depends on its context. This principle can be found in Sturges v Bridgman [1879] 11 Ch D 852.

The defendant ran a confectionary shop, and used a noisy pestle and mortar in his kitchen for the purpose of grinding up ingredients. A physician moved into the neighbouring property, and built a consulting room next to the noisy kitchen. The claimant brought an action in nuisance against the defendant, aiming for an injunction against the noise. The claim succeeded on the basis that the activity was unreasonable, given the character of the area. In giving his judgement Thesiger LJ provided the principle of neighbourhood consideration:

"…whether anything is a nuisance or not is a question to be determined, not merely by an abstract consideration of the thing itself, but in reference to its circumstances; what would be a nuisance in Belgrave Square would not necessarily be so in Bermondsey;"
- Thesiger LJ, at 865.

It should be noted that the factor of neighbourhood character only comes into play when the nuisance is one which causes inconvenience to the claimant, rather than physical damage. So, if the subject of the complaint is noise or smell, then the defendant will be able to refer to the character of their neighbourhood as a demonstration of how their behaviour is not unreasonable. If the nuisance causes physical damage (such as acid discharge damaging a claimant’s trees, or cricket balls damaging paint and roof tiles), then neighbourhood character will not form a valid defence. Material physical damage to ordinary property is not excused merely because the area is industrial. This principle can be seen in St Helen’s Smelting Co v Tipping [1865] 11 HL Cas 642. The claimant owned a manor house and some 1300 acres of land. This was situated nearby to the defendant’s copper smelting business. Discharge from the smelting process caused damage to greenery on the claimant’s land. The defendant argued that his business was located amongst a number of other heavy industrial processes, including an alkali processing plant, and that the claimant had purchased the property in the knowledge of this. The claim succeeded - neighbourhood character had no bearing on claims in tort of the nuisance of property damage.

Sensitivity of the Claimant

Whilst claimants will by definition be annoyed by a nuisance (else why would they bring a claim?), this is not the test for private nuisance. Instead, the existence of nuisance will be judged against its effect on a reasonable person. If the interference causes harm only because the claimant or their use of the land is unusually sensitive, it will not ordinarily amount to a nuisance. In Thomas v Nicholas [2026] EWCA Civ 847 the Court of Appeal rejected a nuisance claim for harm to unusually sensitive breeding falcons from activities on neighbouring farmland, although the claim in negligence succeeded.

This can be argued to be a theoretical inconsistency within the tort of nuisance - the claimant who brings the case to court must have a personal (and thus subjective) proprietary interest, but in examining their claim the courts take an objective, rather than a subjective view of nuisance. This can perhaps be explained by reference to the fact that whilst the need for a proprietary interest is a personal hoop the claimant must jump through, it provides a convenient gatekeeping mechanism to prevent all-comers from lodging claims (and by extension, stops businesses from using nuisance as a way to stop competitors’ operations.)

The use of the reasonable person/ordinary land use test can be seen in Robinson v Kilvert [1889] 41 Ch D 88. The defendant ran a business which manufactured boxes. This process required that the basement of the defendant’s property was kept at a warm, dry temperature. The defendant let out the room above the basement to the claimant, a paper merchant, who stored his stock in the room. Due to the heat of the basement operation, the claimant’s stock was damaged, and he brought a claim in nuisance. The claim failed - it was held that the nuisance was not one which would affect the reasonable claimant, and it was only the claimant’s particular business which caused the nuisance to manifest.

It should be noted that there exist circumstances in which the claimant’s annoyance will be because a particular activity of theirs is affected by a nuisance, but it is nonetheless one which would still interfere with the ordinary person. So in the case of Robinson, if the room above the heated basement was uncomfortably warm at all times of the day so that an ordinary person wouldn’t have been able to spend their time there, then the claim would likely have succeeded.

It should also be noted that the relevant standard is that of ‘ordinary use’. This should not be taken as meaning that the disruption of a specific activity is not grounds for nuisance, as long as that activity is considered by the courts to constitute normal use. So it might be that a nuisance prevents rugby from being played in a field - if playing sport in the field constitutes ordinary use, the claimant must still show a substantial interference for which the defendant is answerable.

Duration of Nuisance

Duration and frequency matter, but a single event can be actionable. ‘Continual’ is a distinct concept from ‘constant’ as far as private nuisance goes. So whilst loud trucks five days a week leaves an occupier with two days of peace, the fact that the noise recurs can make the interference substantial. This is a practical principle - it wouldn’t be sensible to allow a defendant to point to brief periods of non-nuisance as a defence. At the same time, a one-off music festival might annoy the neighbours without causing a substantial interference. Damages can still be claimed for an actionable interference after it ends, as in Crown River Cruises v Kimbolton Fireworks [1996] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 533. The defendant put on a firework display, during which some burning debris from the display landed on the claimant’s barge, setting it aflame. Although the display lasted only about 20 minutes, the claim succeeded. Potter J considered private nuisance separately from the Rylands doctrine (see the discussion of Rylands below.)

Although the courts will look for an ongoing nuisance, that ongoing nuisance can be instigated by a single act. This can be seen in Spicer v Smee [1946] 1 All ER 489. A contractor installed faulty wiring on the defendant’s property, which eventually caused a fire to break out which damaged the claimant’s property. Although the act of installing faulty wiring was a one-off, the ongoing threat of fire from that wiring was considered an ongoing state of affairs, and thus satisfied the test for nuisance. A continuing nuisance requires repeated activity or an ongoing state of affairs for which the defendant is responsible. Lasting damage from a completed escape does not start a fresh limitation period each day (Jalla v Shell International Trading and Shipping Co Ltd [2023] UKSC 16).

It should be noted that temporary nuisances can still be considered continual - so a month-long music festival which goes on all night can be considered a nuisance. An example of both the continuance principle and of temporary nuisance can be seen in De Keyser’s Royal Hotel v Spicer Bros (1914) 30 TLR 257.

The defendants were using a noisy pile driver to complete a construction project. The claimants - hoteliers, had complaints from their guests that they could not sleep, and that after-dinner speakers could not be heard. The claimants sought an injunction against the defendant’s activity. The claim was successful - the interference was of an unreasonable nature, and its temporary nature was not an obstacle to a finding of nuisance.

Public Benefit

Public benefit is not a defence to private nuisance (Fearn). A neighbour playing thrash metal loudly all day is doing little to benefit the public, but a hospital which is carrying out building works to create a new treatment wing is. That benefit may affect whether the court grants an injunction or awards damages instead.

Of course, defendants are rarely given free rein to annoy their neighbours; ordinary building work must be carried out with reasonable consideration for neighbours. Building a new library is great, but not if work continues 24/7 in a residential area without good reason.

Malice

If it is found that the defendant is acting with deliberate hostility or spite, this makes it far more likely that their actions will be found to be unreasonable. A use whose purpose is to harm the neighbour lacks the justification of ordinary land use. This can be seen in Hollywood Silver Fox Farm Ltd. v Emmett [1936] 2 KB 468. The claimant was engaged in the (now banned) practice of fox fur farming. Silver foxes are particularly timid, and if disturbed whilst pregnant are especially prone to miscarriage. They are also prone to infanticide if they are disturbed whilst they have cubs. The defendant took issue with the claimant’s farm, on the grounds that he thought it devalued his neighbouring property. He, therefore, had his son fire a shotgun in order to disturb the claimant’s foxes. The claim succeeded - whilst it was ordinarily reasonable for a farmer to fire his shotgun on his land, and the claimant’s activity was out of the ordinary, the fact that the farmer’s actions were malicious rendered them unreasonable.

Private Nuisance Must Cause Harm

Once it has been established that a claimant has the necessary interest in land, the claimant must demonstrate that there has been some harm from the defendant’s actions. Three types of recognised harm were laid down in Hunter v Canary Wharf (described above.) The first category is encroachment - where something extends from the defendant’s land onto the claimant’s property. The classic scenario here will be where subsidence is caused in the claimant’s property, usually by tree or hedge roots from the defendant’s property. The claimant must prove that the nuisance caused the loss claimed. In Davies v Bridgend County Borough Council [2024] UKSC 15, the loss in value from Japanese knotweed already existed before the council’s actionable failure to treat it.

Secondly, where the defendant’s use of their land causes physical damage to the claimant’s property, as in St Helen’s Smelting Co v Tipping, discussed above.

Thirdly, where there is an interference with the claimant’s enjoyment of their property. This category includes cases involving noise or odour. De Keyser provides an example of the former category. In Fearn, the sustained observation and photographing of residents in their homes from the Tate’s viewing platform substantially interfered with ordinary residential use. Ordinary overlooking between neighbours is different.

Certain scenarios will present a combination of these harms, so Miller v Jackson (above) involved both property damage and the prevention of the claimants being able to safely use their garden. Damages may compensate for physical damage or loss of amenity. For a continuing nuisance the court may grant an injunction, limit the activity or award damages in lieu. Personal injury as such is not compensable in private nuisance (Hunter).

Public Nuisance

There exists a second category of nuisance cases, distinct from private nuisance. This category of cases is called public nuisance. Public nuisance was historically a common law criminal offence. However, the common law offence was abolished and replaced by a statutory offence under s.78 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 in England and Wales. The prosecution must prove an act, or a failure to do something required by law, that causes or risks serious harm to the public or a section of it, or obstructs the exercise or enjoyment of a public right. Permission to use a private road to reach business premises is not such a right (R v McCafferty [2026] UKSC 20). The defendant must intend that consequence or be reckless as to it. Reasonable excuse is a defence. Section 78 expressly preserves the civil tort. Alongside the criminal offence, if an individual can demonstrate that they, as an individual, have been especially affected by a public nuisance, then they can make a claim in tort. A working definition for public nuisance can be found in Attorney General v PYA Quarries.

Thus, the key to public nuisance is a common injury to a class of the public. It may interfere with public rights, health, safety or comfort, whether or not members of the public have an interest in the land. The Attorney General may seek an injunction on behalf of the public. An individual who suffers special damage may bring a separate civil claim without a criminal prosecution.

What Constitutes a ‘Class of People’?

A sufficiently large class of people is required before a public nuisance case can succeed. The nuisance may be so widespread in its range or indiscriminate in its effect that, in the words of Denning LJ in Attorney General v PYA Quarries: “it would not be reasonable to expect one person to take proceedings […] to put a stop to it but that it should be taken on the responsibility of the community at large.”

This doesn’t give us a direct number, however. This is because whether a class is large enough will depend on the facts of the case at hand. There are several examples of note, however.

In R v Ruffell [1991] 13 Cr App R (S) 204 the organiser of a rave in a field pleaded guilty to the former common law offence. The loud music, blocked road and fouling of the woods affected local residents. It can, thus, be seen that a local community can constitute a class of people.

In R v Ong [2001] 1 Cr App R (S) 117 (p.404) the defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to cause a public nuisance. The plan was to switch off the floodlights at a Premiership football ground and cause the match to be abandoned. This meant that the defendant could profit from a rule of their betting syndicate which stipulated that the result of an abandoned match would be recorded as it stood at the point of abandonment (so if the bookie’s favoured team was winning, they could effectively end the match at will.) The plan, if carried out, would have plunged the spectators into darkness and prevented them from seeing the match. Thus, a group of people with a common interest can constitute a class of people.

A group of road users can be a class of people, as in Castle v St Augustine’s Links [1922] 38 TLR 615. Golf balls were regularly hit onto the road from a nearby course - constituting a public nuisance.

Even if the effect of a nuisance action is indirect, it can still affect a class of people. So in R v Lowrie [2005] 1 Cr App R (S) 95 (p.530) the defendant made a number of hoax calls to emergency services, putting emergency resources needed by the public at risk. The appeal concerned sentence after guilty pleas. In R v Rimmington the House of Lords questioned whether the convictions on the individual hoax calls were soundly based.

A series of separate wrongs against individuals does not, by itself, establish an injury common to the public. In R v Johnson [1997] 1 WLR 367 a group of women who all lived in a similar area were subjected to obscene phone calls from the defendant. The House of Lords held that Johnson was wrongly decided in R v Rimmington [2006] 1 AC 469. The defendant sent racially abusive communications to over 500 individuals. A distinction was made between nuisances which affect communities as a whole, and those which affect several individuals. This should not be regarded as a rejection of the criminalisation of the conduct in the case at hand - indeed, the judiciary noted that statutory offences existed which covered such conduct (namely, the Malicious Communications Act 1988), but the letters did not inflict the common injury required for public nuisance.

The Special Damage Requirement

In order for a claim in tort to be made, the claimant must show that they have suffered damage over and above the class of people affected by the public nuisance. More than one person may sue if each can show such particular damage. Damage can be personal injury, property damage, economic loss, or substantial discomfort or inconvenience distinct from that suffered by the public generally. This will purely be a matter of the facts at hand, since whether a claimant is especially affected by a nuisance will depend on the extent to which the general class of persons is affected. Separate provision is made for statutory nuisances listed in s.79 of the Environmental Protection Act 1990. Where the statutory conditions are met, a local authority must serve an abatement notice under s.80, and a person aggrieved may complain to a magistrates’ court under s.82.

Nuisance Defences

Prescription

The defence of prescription, which only applies to private nuisance, is a claim that a defendant has acquired a right to cause the relevant nuisance because they have done so for at least 20 years as of right, without force, secrecy or permission. This is similar to the manner in which certain property rights come into existence. It is the right to cause the particular interference that must have been exercised for the required period. It is essential to note that the start of this 20-year period is not from the start of the activity itself, but from the start of the time that the activity became a nuisance. This can be seen in Sturges v Bridgman (the case of the confectioner and the doctor discussed above). The defendant claimed that he had been operating his pestle and mortar for over 20 years, but this argument failed - the activity only took on the nature of being a nuisance when the doctor built his consulting room.

Statutory Authority

Statutory authority is a defence where the nuisance is an inevitable consequence of carrying out what Parliament authorised, even with reasonable care. This is based on the fact that statutes are the creation of Parliament, and the judiciary is reluctant to usurp its authority. Certain statutes give express protection. For example, s.76(1) of the Civil Aviation Act 1982 protects flight at a reasonable height and its ordinary incidents, subject to compliance with the relevant statutory requirements. Others will simply authorise the activity - this will not form a barrier to using the statute as a defence. Ordinary planning permission does not itself authorise a nuisance. This can be seen in Wheeler v JJ Saunders Ltd [1996] Ch 19. The defendant built pig houses with planning permission. The claimants complained of smells affecting their farmhouse and holiday accommodation. The claim for nuisance succeeded since the activity of the pig house was held to be unreasonable. The relationship between planning permission and nuisance was further considered by the Supreme Court in Coventry v Lawrence [2014] UKSC 13, which confirmed that whilst planning permission may be relevant to the character of the neighbourhood, it does not in itself authorise what would otherwise be a nuisance. In Manchester Ship Canal Co Ltd v United Utilities Water Ltd (No 2) [2024] UKSC 22 the Water Industry Act 1991 did not bar a claim for discharges of untreated sewage into the canal merely because the undertaker had acted without negligence or deliberate misconduct.

Ineffective Defences

There are a number of arguments which are often put forward in nuisance cases which the courts usually regard as invalid. It is often argued by defendants that the claimant has ‘come to the nuisance’, and thus as the newcomer they shouldn’t be allowed to disrupt the activity of the established resident. This can be seen in Miller v Jackson and Sturges v Bridgman. The law will ignore this argument - an activity is a nuisance whether it starts the year before or the year after a claimant has moved to their property, and the time of arrival does not determine the parties’ rights. A change in the use of the claimant’s land may still bear on whether the present interference is actionable. Furthermore, this defence could effectively allow a defendant to singlehandedly make their area unappealing to newcomers.

It should also be noted that a defendant cannot successfully argue that their actions only constituted a nuisance when combined with the actions of another. The prime example here is a loud band - a musician who materially contributes to the combined noise cannot escape liability simply because their instrument alone would not have created a nuisance (Lambton v Mellish [1894] 3 Ch 163).

Rylands v Fletcher

There also exists a rule of strict liability established in Rylands v Fletcher, described by the House of Lords in Transco as a special form of nuisance.

The rule remains part of English law. In Transco plc v Stockport MBC [2004] 2 AC 1 the House of Lords confined it to exceptional risks and suggested that it protects interests in land rather than compensating personal injury. In Rubis Bahamas Ltd v Russell [2026] UKPC 9, [73]–[75], a Bahamian appeal, the Privy Council questioned the suggested exclusion of personal injury. It did not decide that point or overrule Transco in England and Wales.

The tort can be broken down into four elements - collecting and keeping on land, non-natural use of land, likely mischief, and escape and harm.

Collecting and Keeping on Land

The defendant must bring something onto land and keep it there for their own purposes. As the Privy Council explained in Rubis, the person responsible for bringing and keeping it there need not own or occupy the land. Blasting provides an early example. In Miles v Forest Rock Granite Co (Leicestershire) Ltd (1918) 34 TLR 500, the defendant kept explosives on his land which then caused an explosion, causing rocks to be ‘freed’ from his land, injuring the claimant. This does not mean that any escape caused by something kept on land is sufficient.

This is particularly important for cases of fire. In LMS International v Styrene Packaging and Insulation Ltd [2005] EWHC 2065 (TCC), the High Court applied the rule to a factory fire involving the hot-wire cutting of expanded polystyrene. The Court of Appeal in Stannard v Gore [2012] EWCA Civ 1248 held that storing tyres which caught fire was insufficient. The tyres had not escaped, and the defendant had neither brought the fire onto the land nor deliberately started it there.

It is worth noting the requirement for the active collection of the mischievous object - so naturally occurring objects will not be covered by Rylands. So if the rocks in Miles were simply knocked loose by a falling tree which happened to be on the land, then the claim would not have come under the Rylands doctrine.

Non-natural Use of Land

Non-natural use of land is largely context dependent. So, in Rickards v Lothian [1913] AC 263, the Privy Council, on appeal from Australia, held that supplying water to a building for ordinary domestic use was not a non-natural use of the land. A stranger had blocked a basin and left a tap running.

What is natural and what is not is a matter of context, and thus the definition of ‘natural’ can change over time. This can be seen in Musgrove v Pandelis [1919] 2 KB 43. A car was stored in a garage below the claimant’s rented property. Petrol in the carburettor caught fire while the defendant’s employee was starting the car, and he failed to turn off the petrol supply promptly. The fire spread, damaging the claimant’s property. The court treated keeping a car with petrol in its tank in the garage as a non-natural use. That reasoning cannot now be relied on in light of Stannard v Gore. The current working definition of “unnatural” can be seen in Transco plc v Stockport MBC [2004] 2 AC 1. A pipe managed by the defendant developed a leak, causing an embankment to collapse. This exposed a gas pipe, and so the claimant had to carry out emergency maintenance, at some cost. The claim, however, failed - the water pipe was not an unnatural use of the land. Non-natural use was described as “an exceptionally dangerous or mischievous thing in extraordinary or unusual circumstances”. In Rubis, the Privy Council held that bulk underground fuel storage in a residential area was a specialised, exceptionally dangerous use, even though petrol stations were commonplace.

Likely Mischief

Likely mischief can be obvious (like keeping deadly bees) but the risk of harm if the thing escapes must be exceptionally high. This can include things which are not dangerous whilst contained, but become dangerous when released - so the water in the reservoir in Rylands was not dangerous whilst contained, but caused substantial damage when released. This can be seen in Crowhurst v Amersham Burial Board [1878] LR 4 Ex D 5. The defendant kept yew trees on his land. The branches of the trees hung into a neighbouring field, and were eaten by the claimant’s horse. The horse died as a result of eating the poisonous leaves.

Escape and Harm

There must be an escape from a place under the defendant’s occupation or control to somewhere outside it. Liability is strict, but the kind of harm caused by the escape must be reasonably foreseeable (compare the remoteness principle in Wagon Mound (No 2).)

This change was brought about by Cambridge Water Co. v Eastern Counties Leather plc [1994] 2 AC 264. Solvent used by the defendant tannery repeatedly spilled onto the floor and seeped into the ground. The claimant tested its water, and it emerged that the defendant’s chemicals had tainted it. The claim, however, failed - at the time of the spills it was not reasonably foreseeable that the chemicals could taint the water supply.

It should be noted, however, that a defendant cannot simply take reasonable steps to prevent the escape to discharge their duty. If the requirements of the rule are met, reasonable care to prevent the escape is not in itself a defence.

Defences

Both contributory negligence and consent can be used in Rylands cases - so if a claimant freely accepts the risk of the escape, they will not be able to rely on Rylands.

Defendants can also advance an act of god/nature defence. For example, if an extraordinary natural event that could not reasonably have been anticipated or guarded against were the sole cause of an escape, the defence could succeed. Unusually heavy rain does not in itself establish the defence.

An unforeseeable intervention by a stranger outside the defendant’s control can provide a defence if it caused the escape. This can be seen in the aforementioned Rickards v Lothian - flooding was caused by a mischievous third party who blocked a water outlet and then left a tap running. The defendant was, thus, able to avoid liability.

Finally, statutory authority may also provide a defence under Rylands. Its scope depends on the statute. Permission to undertake an activity does not by itself authorise every escape it might cause.

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