Acquisition by Prescription Lecture

Last updated: 3 November 2026

INTRODUCTION

This chapter follows on from the previous chapter in which easements and profits à prendre were examined in the context of their creation. We will be touching on creation here also, though in different forms: prescription and reservation. We will also look at how easements and profits à prendre may be terminated and the effect such rights have on third parties.

On the matter of prescription - which is the idea of attaining rights of easement or profit à prendre by a sustained period of exercising that act before it becomes a right - we need to deal with the following topics:

  1. The concept of prescription;
  2. The essential elements of prescription (in particular what is meant by the ‘user as of right’);
  3. The effects of prescription; and
  4. Prescription and statute.

Reservation pertains to the means by which a person, when transferring land formerly held by them to another person, is able to retain certain rights of easement over the land now transferred to another. We will discuss the following:

  1. Express reservation; and
  2. Implied reservation, in particular the distinctions between easements of necessity and easements of common intention.

Termination meanwhile is to do with how easements and profits à prendre may be brought to an end. We will examine the following issues pertaining to termination:

  1. Unity of ownership;
  2. Release (both express and implied forms of release);
  3. Change of circumstances; and
  4. The effect of termination on equitable easements and profits à prendre.

Finally, the effect of the transfer of dominant or servient estates to third parties will be discussed. As part of that discussion we will hone in on the following areas:

  1. Benefits to third parties in legal easements;
  2. Benefits to third parties in equitable easements;
  3. Benefits to third party transferees vis-à-vis profits à prendre;
  4. Burdens on third parties in legal easements;
  5. Burdens on third parties in equitable easements and profits à prendre; and
  6. Burdens imposed on third party recipients of legal profits à prendre.

PRESCRIPTION

The concept of prescription borrows from two distinct concepts: express grants and long user. What prescription does is that it enables the person claiming a right of prescription to refer to a period of long use of an alleged right, usually for at least 20 years, from which a grant of that right may be presumed. This should be distinguished from squatting (the layperson term for adverse possession), because whilst adverse possession concerns title to land and, in registered land, normally requires a successful application for registration, prescription acts to create new rights impliedly from a period of long use. Prescription is about the owner of the servient land being deemed to have acquiesced to the long use (Mills v Silver [1991] Ch 271, CA per Dillon LJ).

Essential elements of prescription

As with the other forms of creation of easements and profits à prendre, invoking prescription requires the fulfilment of various criteria. The criteria are as follows:

  1. User in fee simple: An easement is normally acquired by or on behalf of one freeholder against another. (The fee simple is the ownership of land where the ownership is of unlimited duration.) A tenant’s use can establish a right for the benefit of the freehold, but not over other land of the same landlord. If the servient land is let, the freeholder must have known, or be taken to have known, of the use and been able to prevent it. A freeholder who grants a lease with knowledge of existing use may acquiesce in it even if the lease then prevents intervention (Pugh v Savage [1970] 2 QB 373, CA per Cross LJ; Williams v Sandy Lane (Chester) Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 1738, para 24). Rights to light under the 1832 Act are an exception.
  2. Continuous user: This refers to the frequency of the use of the alleged right exercised by the “dominant tenement” owner. Continuous does not necessarily connote constant, or even regular; the requirement of continuous user may be satisfied where the use of the alleged right is infrequent. In one case, the condition of continuous user was satisfied by the application of the alleged right on as few occasions as six to ten occasions in each year for 35 years (Diment v NH Foot Ltd [1974] 1 WLR 1427, ChD), although the claim failed on other grounds.
  3. User as of right: There are certain limits to how the right of prescription may be acquired. The “dominant tenement” owner cannot have acted illegally to acquire the right (unless the servient tenement owner could have made the use lawful by granting the right, as per Bakewell Management Ltd v Brandwood [2004] UKHL 14). It is possible to acquire a right of prescription where the “dominant tenement” owner had honestly yet mistakenly believed that they actually owned the disputed land or had an express right of grant (Bridle v Ruby [1989] QB 169, CA). With all that said, the right of prescription is subject to certain limits, and those limits are as follows:
  1. User nec vi, translated as “without force”, means that a person cannot have acquired the right of prescription by the use of force. This does not only apply to force against persons; it applies also to force against objects too, such as the deliberate removal of obstructions previously laid down by the owner of the “servient tenement” (R (on the application of Beresford) v Sunderland CC [2003] UKHL 60 per Lord Rodger of Earlsferry). Use in defiance of clearly visible signs prohibiting it can be contentious even without physical force (Winterburn v Bennett [2016] EWCA Civ 482). Use under a statutory right is by right, rather than as of right (R (Barkas) v North Yorkshire County Council [2014] UKSC 31, disapproving the outcome in Beresford).
  2. User nec clam, which means “without secrecy”, refers to the prohibition against any concealment or surreptitious behaviour by the long user regarding the application of that use. In other words, a person intending to claim a right of prescription cannot lawfully acquire that right if they act in such a way as to hide their use of the land from the “servient tenement” owner, whether or not the “dominant tenement” owner intends to conceal it from the servient tenement owner. For example, underground fixings which were long undetected could not give rise to a right of prescription (Union Lighterage Co. v London Graving Dock Co. [1902] 2 Ch 557, CA).
  3. User nec precario refers to “without permission.” It means that prescription cannot arise where the landowner has given their permission or consent to the “dominant tenement” owner to use the land in the manner intended (Odey v Barber [2006] EWHC 3109 (Ch)). If for example the “dominant tenement” owner uses the land as intended in exchange for periodic payments to the “servient tenement” owner (Mills v Silver [1991]), or where a gate placed over a path is locked for periods of time at the owner’s discretion (Goldsmith v Burrow Construction Ltd, CA, 16 July 1987) the circumstances may show that the use was permitted rather than as of right.

The problem with the concept of user nec precario is that the borderline between the giving of permission and deemed acquiescence may not be clear. In order for true acquiescence (as distinct from permission) to be deemed to apply, the court must be satisfied of the following conditions (Dalton v Angus & Co (1881) 6 App Cas 740, HL per Fry J):

  • The “servient tenement” owner knows or ought reasonably to know of the acts done by the person claiming the right;
  • The “servient tenement” owner has the power to stop the acts or to sue in order to stop them; and
  • The “servient tenement” owner nevertheless abstains from the exercise of such powers.

The test for user nec precario is that the manner of the use must be “such as to bring home to the mind of a reasonable person that a continuous right of enjoyment is being asserted” (Mills v Silver [1991]). So if all of these conditions are present - knowledge, power to prevent or stop, and abstaining from acting - it is no defence on the part of the servient tenement owner, raised only later, that he had merely tolerated the user in question (R v Oxfordshire CC, ex parte Sunningwell PC [2000] 1 AC 335, HL per Lord Hoffmann).

Effects of prescription

Where a prescriptive easement, whether at common law or in the statutory form, is shown to exist by satisfying the above conditions, it is said to attain a legal (as opposed to merely equitable) status. The scope of the right depends on the nature and extent of the use proved.

As mentioned above, the concept of prescription requires a period of long user lasting for 20 or more years. At common law, 20 years’ qualifying use raises a rebuttable presumption that the right has existed since time immemorial, meaning since the year 1189. Given the arbitrariness of this choice of date, it is possible to frustrate the concept of prescription if the right is exercised over a structure that clearly was constructed after 1189 (Duke of Norfolk v Arbuthnot (1880)).

A separate basis of prescription is “lost modern grant.” This is intended to counter the arbitrariness of the right existing since time immemorial, i.e. since 1189 CE (see above paragraph). The idea of the lost modern grant infers from the use of the land for 20 years’ or more by the alleged dominant tenement owner that some kind of right, as claimed by the alleged dominant tenement owner, had once been the subject of a formal modern grant that has since become misplaced and lost (Dalton v Angus & Co (1881)). Any completed period of at least 20 years’ continuous use as of right may suffice. Proof that no grant was actually made does not defeat the claim, though proof that a lawful grant was impossible does (Smith v Brudenell-Bruce [2002] 2 P & CR 51, ChD).

Prescription and statute

When claiming a right of prescription under statute via the Prescription Act 1832, use must generally be as of right. The Act makes special provision for consent by deed or writing and for light, as set out below. However, unlike the common law position of prescription, there is the idea of certain rights being ‘absolute and indefeasible’ despite evidence of use after 1189:

  1. For ways, water rights and other easements within s.2 of the Act, a claim based on uninterrupted user for 20 years or more cannot be defeated solely by evidence that such use commenced after 1189.
  2. Where the right claimed is an easement (other than an easement of light) and has subsisted for 40 years or more then the right is said to be ‘absolute and indefeasible’ unless it was brought about by written agreement or consent (Prescription Act 1832, s.2).
  3. For access of light to a building, a period of 20 years is sufficient to render the claimed right ‘absolute and indefeasible’ unless enjoyed under written agreement or consent (s.3). Oral permission does not prevent acquisition, and a tenant may acquire the right against the landlord. The two properties must be separately possessed throughout the period. Section 3 does not bind the Crown. A light obstruction notice registered under the Rights of Light Act 1959, ss.2-3, can interrupt enjoyment without an actual obstruction.
  4. For profits à prendre attached to land the corresponding periods are 30 and 60 years. After 30 years proof that the use began after 1189 is insufficient by itself. After 60 years the right is ‘absolute and indefeasible’ unless enjoyed by express consent or agreement by deed or writing (s.1). A profit in gross can be acquired at common law or by lost modern grant, but not under the Act (s.5). Where s.6 of the Commons Act 2006 is in force, a new right of common cannot be acquired by prescription over land to which Part 1 applies.

For each of these rights, the period claimed must be the period ‘next before some suit or action’ in which the claim is challenged (s.4). An obstruction counts as a statutory interruption only if the claimant submits to it or acquiesces in it for one year after learning both of the obstruction and who made or authorised it. Sections 7 and 8 make separate provision for periods excluded from the calculation, including certain tenancies. The requirement that use run up to the proceedings does not apply to lost modern grant (Mills v Silver [1991]).

Examination Consideration: We have seen that the law of prescription is somewhat still stuck in the past, given the date of the statute (1832) and the common law presumption that a right has existed since 1189. This could be a ripe topic for an essay question. Where would you look to find discussions of this issue? One suggestion is to visit Westlaw, click on the Journals tab, and enter into the free text box “prescriptions reform” (both with and without the speech marks).

RESERVATION

As we briefly discussed in the previous chapter discussing the creation of easements, a reservation is the mirror opposite of a grant. A grant is a right given to a holder of dominant tenement land over servient tenement land. A reservation is where X transfers Blackacre to Y, but X reserves for herself certain rights, i.e. easements or profits à prendre, over a portion of Blackacre. Reservation can be either express or implied.

Express reservation

Where X is in the process of transferring Blackacre to Y, it remains open to X to consider reserving a right over a portion of that land for X’s own use by including in the deed of transfer (or whatever document is used to effect the transfer) words to the effect that X reserves that right of use. Where such wording is included, a reservation of a legal interest operates ‘at law without… any regrant’ (Law of Property Act 1925, s.65(1)). The court reads the deed as a whole in its factual context. Any remaining ambiguity in the reservation may be construed in favour of the person reserving the right (St. Edmundsbury and Ipswich Diocesan Board of Finance v Clark (No. 2) [1975] 1 WLR 468, CA).

Implied reservation

As we have seen previously, in the context of implied easements the court is more likely to imply easements in favour of the transferee (Y in our example) rather than in favour of the transferor (X in our example), such as in Peckham v Ellison (2000) 79 P & CR 276, CA per Cazalet J). It follows that a transferor should not seek to rely on implied reservation, and should instead express their intentions as to a reservation in clear and unambiguous terms in the document effecting transfer of the land; this follows the general rule in Wheeldon v Burrows (1879) 12 Ch D 31, CA. There are only two ways in which reservation may be implied: necessity, and common intention.

  1. Easement of necessity: This form of easement is rarely approved by the court in the context of reservation, because it is almost always would have been more reasonable for the transferor to have expressly reserved their right. However, there are exceptions. For example, if a transferor disposes of all the land which is adjacent to, or surrounds the land which he retains, and the only possible means of accessing the land they still own is by traversing the land now transferred, then, unless the terms of the transfer exclude it, the law will imply a reservation over the transferred land. Otherwise, the land still owned by the transferor would be completely inaccessible and therefore entirely unusable.

But this right is strictly and rarely implied by the court: if the retained land enjoys the benefit of a legal right of access over the land of a party other than the transferee (Barry v Hasseldine [1952] Ch 835, ChD) or if the transferor retains an adjoining property that allows them an alternative means of accessing their land (Ray v Hazeldine [1904] 2 Ch 17, ChD) then the court will not imply a right of reservation.

  1. Easement of common intention: If both parties contemplated a particular use of the retained land and the right is necessary to give effect to that common intention, the court may imply a reservation. The burden of proof lies squarely with the transferor to show that the implied reservation was mutually intended (Re Webb’s Lease [1951] Ch 808, CA; Peckham v Ellison (2000)).

Examination Consideration: The doctrine of reservations is a much smaller portion of the law relating to easements and profits à prendre. It is easy to see why: the transferor of land has the opportunity to make explicit in their transfer the reservation of portions of land for their own uses, and as this is simply a function of a term in a document of transfer, there is little case law needed to detail that policy. Would you be able to distinguish between a grant or a reservation in a problem question? Be clear of the differences, not least because an implied grant can take the form of a quasi-easement or an easement under s.62 of the Law of Property Act 1925.

TERMINATION

There are several ways in which the common law may find that a right of easement or profit à prendre has been extinguished subsequent to its creation. Where a profit has its own registered title, the registrar normally closes that title on satisfactory evidence that the estate has determined (Land Registration Rules 2003, r.79(2)).

You may recall that one of the distinct characteristics of an easement is that the dominant and servient tenements are each owned by different persons. A right granted for a fixed term also ends when the term expires. If both tenements come into the ownership and possession of the same person for the same estate, the easement is extinguished by that unity of ownership and possession. Common occupation alone can suspend its exercise without extinguishing it (Payne v Inwood (1997) 74 P & CR 42, CA).

Release

An easement or profit à prendre can be terminated by a release, and a release can either be express or implied:

  1. Express release of a legal easement or profit à prendre entails wording in a deed that says the right shall no longer exist (Lovell v Smith (1857) 3 CBNS 120) and the release is usually made for valuable consideration. Where section 13 of the Commons Act 2006 applies, a registered right of common cannot be extinguished by operation of common law, and its surrender takes effect at law only on removal from the commons register. For a release affecting entries in a registered title, an application to HM Land Registry should be made to cancel the relevant entries in the land registry.
  2. Implied release will arise where the easement or profit à prendre has been abandoned by the person entitled to exercise the right, and there is evidence of a clear intention to release the right in question. Therefore, if the exercise of the right has temporarily ceased, either unilaterally by the dominant tenement owner, or as per an agreement with the servient tenement owner that the exercise will only cease temporarily, then the court will not say release has occurred. A court will not readily imply release even where the cessation of the exercise of the right has lasted for a long period.

Case in focus: Benn v Hardinge (1992) 66 P & CR 246

A right of way had not been exercised for a period of 175 years, yet the Court of Appeal was unwilling to presume the right of way had been abandoned and thus released. This was based on the inherent value of that right: Hirst LJ saw it as ‘valuable latent property’ and would be of ‘considerable value in the future’, so its non-use did not establish an intention permanently to give it up. The non-exercise of the right was explained by the fact that throughout the period the dominant owner and his predecessors in title had enjoyed an alternative means of accessing the dominant tenement land.

Key Points:

  • The right of way was not exercised for a substantial period of time. Indeed, it was not exercised over the course of several lifetimes i.e. it was not exercised for 175 years.
  • The court said that non-use alone did not establish abandonment, particularly where the right remained valuable.
  • An intention permanently to give up the right may be inferred from conduct, but was not established here.
  • The alternative means of access explained why the owners had no occasion to exercise the right of way.

Change of circumstance

There is no recognition in statute that an easement or profit à prendre can be made redundant and obsolete by the passing of time. A right granted for a particular purpose may end if that purpose permanently ceases. Mere obsolescence does not extinguish an easement. This is regarded as a “change of circumstance.”

Case in focus: Huckvale v Aegean Hotels Ltd

The Court of Appeal indicated obiter that an easement may be extinguished by operation of law when it no longer accommodates the dominant tenement. The Court of Appeal was not terminating the easement in this case, however Slade LJ indicated there may be a different finding where the circumstances ‘have changed so drastically since the date of the original grant of an easement (for example by supervening illegality) that it would offend common sense and reality for the court to hold that an easement still subsisted.’  The Court said by way of mitigation that the court would be slow to make a finding of termination by ‘frustration.’

Key Points:

  • An easement can cease to exist, even where there is no express agreement that such termination should take place, in specific circumstances.
  • Those circumstances should ‘have changed so drastically since the date of the original grant of an easement (for example by supervening illegality) that it would offend common sense and reality for the court to hold that an easement still subsisted.’
  • The main hurdles set by that test therefore are a) that conditions have changed ‘so drastically’ (the word ‘so’ acting to set the bar higher) and b) subsistence of such would ‘offend common sense and reality’. This concerns the continued existence of an easement already granted.

Termination of equitable easements and profits

As with legal easements, an equitable easement can be terminated where the same person becomes entitled in the same capacity to ownership and possession of both tenements for the same estate. Further, an equitable easement can be released either expressly or impliedly. Equity may also prevent enforcement if the owner has consented to works inconsistent with the right in circumstances which make it inequitable to ‘revive the rights thereby abrogated’ (Davies v Marshall (1861) 10 CBNS 697).

Examination Consideration: Termination of easements, whether legal or equitable, can be done expressly or impliedly. Can you remember the situations in which express or implied termination may arise? And what are the distinctive elements of the test in Huckvale?

THIRD PARTIES

Given that easements and profits à prendre are proprietary in nature, it is entirely feasible for those types of rights to be transferred to third parties. Indeed, an easement cannot be transferred independently of the land that it benefits. A profit in gross, by contrast, can be transferred independently of land.

BENEFITS

Transfer of benefit of legal easements

Where the land is registered, the benefit of an express easement should be entered into the property register of the dominant title. The benefit passes with the dominant estate (Land Registration Act 2002 s.59(1) Schedule 2 paragraph 7(2)(b)). The benefit of implied and prescriptive easements can also be registered in the estate of the dominant land (Land Registration Rules 2003, r.73A).

Where the land is unregistered, it becomes affixed to the tenement in the same way that fixtures are annexed to the realty (Law of Property Act 1925, s.187(1)), and therefore upon transfer of the land the benefit of the easement is transferred also to the transferee (Law of Property Act 1925, s.62(1)-(2)).

Tenants likewise may benefit from the transfer of an easement. Where it is created between freeholders, that right can be enjoyed by any subsequent occupier of the dominant land notwithstanding that the tenant is not a freeholder of the land (Thorpe v Brumfitt (1873) LR 8 Ch App 650, CA in Chancery), and subtenants can enjoy the same benefits.

Transfer of the benefit of legal profits

For both registered and unregistered land the benefit of a profit à prendre as it applies to the given dominant land can be passed to the transferee upon transfer of the dominant land (Law of Property Act 1925, ss.62 and 187; for registration see Land Registration Act 2002 Schedule 2, paragraph 7(2)(b)). A profit in gross is separately transferable and does not pass simply because adjoining land changes hands (Lovett v Fairclough (1991) 61 P & CR 385, ChD). Only a qualifying profit à prendre in gross can have its own registered title (Land Registration Act 2002, s.3 and Schedule 2, para 6).

Transfer of benefit of equitable easements and profits

The benefit of an equitable easement or appurtenant profit à prendre passes as pertaining to the land it is intended to benefit, not the transferees as such. A conveyance of the dominant land normally carries those rights to the transferee (Law of Property Act 1925 s.62(1)-(2)) as the equitable rights are annexed to the dominant land in the same manner and just as effectively as legal rights (Leech v Schweder (1874) 9 Ch App 463).

BURDENS

Whether a purchaser of the servient estate takes subject to an existing easement or profit depends on the nature of the right and the priority rules for registered or unregistered land.

Transfer of burden of legal easements

For an express grant or reservation of an easement out of registered land on or after 13 October 2003, there normally has to be the fulfilment of the ‘registration requirement’, namely for the legal easement to have been accurately and correctly recorded in the charges register of the servient estate and, where the dominant estate is registered, in its property register. If the easement is valid, that entry protects its priority against subsequent purchasers of that servient land (Land Registration Act 2002, s.29(1) and (2)(a)(i)). If the registration requirement is not complied with, the disposition of an expressly created easement is ineffective at law and may only operate in equity (Land Registration Act 2002, s.27(1)).

If the legal easement arose either as a result of implication or of prescription then that burden will tend to ‘override’ the registered disposition of land. The implied or prescribed easement will operate as a burden on the transferee of the servient land so long as the transferee actually knew of it, it was ‘obvious on a reasonably careful inspection of the land’, or it was exercised in the year before the disposition (Land Registration Act 2002, s.29(1), (2)(a)(ii), Schedule 3, paragraph 3(1)-(2)).

In unregistered land, there is less scope for an inadequate transfer to frustrate the operation of dominant tenement rights. By virtue of its legal status alone, an easement over unregistered land will bind all persons, in particular third party purchasers of that servient land. On first registration a legal easement overrides even if no entry is made (Land Registration Act 2002, Schedule 1, para 3). Subject to the exceptions in r.35(2), the registrar enters a notice of interests disclosed by the examination of title (Land Registration Act 2002, s.14(b) and Land Registration Rules 2003, r.35(1)).

Transfer of the burden of legal profits

Where the express grant or reservation of a legal profit à prendre out of registered land requires registration, a notice is entered in the charges register of the servient estate. That entry protects its priority on subsequent registered dispositions for value (Land Registration Act 2002, s.29(1), (2)(a)(i)). An unnoted legal profit can override under the same conditions as an easement. A profit registered under Part 1 of the Commons Act 2006 also overrides (Land Registration Act 2002, Schedule 3, paragraph 3). As with legal easements in unregistered land, a legal profit binds purchasers of the servient estate.

Transfer of the burden of equitable easements and profits

As with the above examples of legal easements and profits à prendre, the burden of such a right can be transferred where that burden lies in equity.

In registered land, any equitable easement or profit à prendre will bind a purchaser of title of the servient estate where they take the property otherwise than for valuable consideration (Land Registration Act 2002, s.28(1)). On a registered disposition for valuable consideration, priority is normally protected by a ‘notice’ in the charges register of the servient title at the time of registration (Land Registration Act (LRA) 2002, s.29(1), (2)(a)(i)).

An equitable easement or profit does not override under Schedule 3, paragraph 3 merely because it is obvious or used. An interest that overrode the registered estate immediately before 13th October 2003 retains that protection (LRA 2002, Schedule 12, paragraph 9). Under the former law an openly exercised and enjoyed equitable easement could qualify (Celsteel Ltd v Alton House Holdings Ltd [1985] 1 WLR 204, ChD; on appeal [1986] 1 WLR 512, CA). Mere use of a right of way is not actual occupation of the servient land for Schedule 3, paragraph 2 (Chaudhary v Yavuz [2011] EWCA Civ 1314).

In unregistered land, if an equitable easement or profit à prendre is created on or after 1st January 1926, it can be made enforceable against subsequent disponees of the servient tenement land. Such rights are enforced by the registration of a Class D(iii) land charge against whichever person owning the estate had granted the right in question (Land Charges Act 1972, ss.2(5) and 4(6)). Without registration before completion the charge is void against a purchaser of a legal estate for money or money’s worth, even with actual notice. If the easement or profit à prendre is created prior to 1st January 1926, such a right will be enforceable against a purchaser of the servient land unless they are a bona fide purchaser of a legal estate for value without actual, constructive or imputed notice (see the chapter on ‘Third Parties’ for more information).

Examination Consideration: By way of a summary, we can see that an express grant over registered land ordinarily requires registration for an easement or profit à prendre to take effect at law. The doctrine of notice remains relevant to equitable rights over unregistered land created before 1926. We have also seen that certain rules apply where the right was created by implication or prescription. When will a purchaser of a servient estate be subject to an easement or profit à prendre if it is created prescriptively or impliedly?

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