Severance Lecture

Last updated: 3 November 2026

Severance is the name given to the process of converting a joint tenancy into a tenancy in common. It is recommended that you read the chapter on ‘Joint Tenancies and Tenancies in Common’ because there is a significant amount of overlap between that chapter and this one.

This chapter will first discuss the background of severance insofar as it is a process that changes joint tenancies into tenancies in common. The chapter will then discuss the various means by which severance can be undertaken. They include: severance by written notice; severance by an act of a joint tenant ‘operating upon his own share’; severance by mutual agreement; severance by mutual conduct; severance in consequence of unlawful killing; severance by merger of interests; and the former tenancy by entireties. The chapter will examine how severance impacts on, and is impacted by, family breakdowns. Finally, as with all other chapters, several hands-on examples are provided.

BACKGROUND

As you will recall from your reading of the topic in ‘Joint Tenancies and Tenancies in Common’, a joint tenancy of a legal estate in land is a means of co-owning an estate in land. Holding a legal interest means to be responsible for the administrative responsibilities and duties inherent in the land. A trust of land is essential for the purpose of legal co-ownership (Williams & Glyn’s Bank Ltd v Boland [1981] A.C. 487; Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 s.1). Likewise, equitable ownership of the land (meaning the right to enjoy and benefit from the land) requires a trust in land (Law of Property Act 1925, ss.34 and 36).

Of particular importance to joint tenancies are the doctrines of survivorship and the four unities. Survivorship is the process by which the surviving joint tenant or tenants continue to hold the whole on the death of another joint tenant. The opposing process is where a tenant (a tenant in common) is able to pass on their interest to another by means of a will or under the rules of intestacy. The four unities, meanwhile, are the so-called unities of possession, interest, title, and time. Joint tenancies feature all of these unities, whilst tenancies in common are only required to have unity of possession. Note that this does not preclude tenancies in common from having the other interests; all four unities are necessary for a joint tenancy, but their presence does not rule out a tenancy in common.

Severance tends to be used for one of two purposes: excluding the future operation of survivorship, or ending the perpetuating existence of the so-called unities of interest and title. Ending the operation of survivorship appears to be of greater use between the joint tenants, whereas ending the existence of those particular unities applies to dealings between a joint tenant and a stranger.

Effect

The act of severance produces among the former joint tenants equal shares of the interest that they held jointly: a severing tenant takes 1/nth of that interest beneficially, n being the current number of the joint tenants (Nielson-Jones v Fedden [1975] Ch 222, ChD per Walton J). Unless there are only two joint tenants, the severance will affect only the severing tenant(s). For example, if X, Y, and Z are joint tenants, and Z severs, then Z will be a tenant in common with a one-third share (given there are three tenants) but X and Y will remain as joint tenants over the remaining two-thirds share (Wright v Gibbons (1949) 78 CLR 313 (HC of Australia) per Dixon J). If Y died, X takes that two-thirds share alone by survivorship.

Limits on severance

There are some limits on the operation of severance. Firstly, it cannot be effected by a will. It must be effected inter vivos, meaning during the lifetime of the person intending to sever the interest. Second, it cannot be brought about for legal estates; it can only be effected for equitable shares in an estate (Law of Property Act 1925, s.36(2)). As to the latter limitation, it means that legal co-ownership can take only the form of a joint tenancy. A tenant who acts to sever their interest will only be acting on their equitable interest, and cannot sell a separate share in the legal estate. They may release their legal interest to the other joint tenant(s), cease to hold it on retirement or replacement as trustee (see, for example, TOLATA 1996 s.19), or lose it by survivorship on death. Alternatively, it can be ended upon disposal of the estate (Law of Property Act 1925, ss. 36(2)-(3)).

Although a will cannot itself sever a joint tenancy on death, an agreement made during life to dispose of separate shares by will can effect a severance. Such a position arises where the course of dealing between the parties gives rise to the inference that both parties mutually considered their interests as tenancies in common during their lifetimes (Williams v Hensman 70 E.R. 862 per Page Wood V-C). Such a mutual intention must be unambiguous. That unambiguity can be perceived from a course of dealing in which the parties treated their interests as tenancies in common (Gore and Snell v Carpenter (1990) 60 P & CR 456, ChD) or - directly addressing the wills point - where the two parties agree and direct in their respective wills that they each dispose of their ‘share’ in the land (Re Wilford’s Estate (1879) 11 Ch D 267).

Evidence of mutual dealing is very particular: for example, separating a living-space into separate and self-contained areas does not indicate an intention to sever (Greenfield v Greenfield (1979) 38 P & CR 570, ChD), nor will incomplete negotiations suffice unless they show that the parties already treated their interests as separate (Harris v Goddard [1983] 1 WLR 1203, CA).

Case in focus: Williams v Hensman 70 E.R. 862

In this case, the testator left a fund to pay Mrs Hensman an annuity, with the capital to go to Mrs Hensman’s eight children at her death. This was deemed to be a joint tenancy. However, because the trustee then advanced to one child an estimated amount of their share, and the other children agreed to indemnify the trustee against any shortfall on that advance, the court held this effected to sever the shares. Sir William Page Wood VC established that a joint tenancy could be severed via one of three ways (note that there are more than three ways to sever a joint tenancy, as seen below in the section ‘How to Sever’). The first way is where any of the joint tenants ‘operating upon his own share’ thereby severs the equitable interest as to that share. The second way is to sever the joint tenancy by ‘mutual agreement.’ Finally, severance can occur where there is any course of dealing which is ‘sufficient to intimate that the interests of all were mutually treated as constituting a tenancy in common.’

Key Points:

  • A beneficial joint tenancy is severable, meaning it can be destroyed and replaced by a tenancy in common.
  • Sir William Page Wood V-C envisaged three means by which a joint tenancy can be severed.
  • Severance, according to Sir William V-C, is either accomplished unilaterally by a joint tenant ‘operating upon their own share’, or is done by all joint tenants, i.e. mutual agreement or mutual conduct. An agreement between some of the joint tenants cannot by itself sever the interests of non-parties. Two joint tenants can sever their own interests by exchanging them.

Examination Consideration: We have gone over the background to severance: what it applies to, what it does not, and how it is intended to counter one of the core aspects of joint tenancies. Can you recall what that core characteristic is? And why would someone want to sever a joint tenancy?

HOW TO SEVER

When intending to sever a joint tenancy, the burden of proof in establishing severance has occurred lies with the party asserting that severance has indeed occurred (Re Denny (1947) 116 L.J. Ch. 1029). Severance can be effected by one of several methods:

a) Severance by written notice (Law of Property Act 1925, s.36(2))

Under this method, a tenant gives a ‘notice in writing’ to the other tenants of their own ‘desire’ to sever the tenancy (Law of Property Act 1925, s.36(2)). There are several advantages and limitations to using severance by written notice, which may be summarised as follows:

  • No consent is required from the other joint tenants (Harris v Goddard [1983]). Further, it is not necessary for the notice to be signed. A court application served on the other joint tenant can suffice where it seeks an immediate sale and division of the proceeds (Re Draper’s Conveyance [1969] 1 Ch 486, ChD).
  • However, for the written notice to be effective, it must be served on all the other joint tenants. It must express an intention to sever with immediate effect, and not at some time in the future (Harris v Goddard [1983]). Under s.196, notice may be left at the recipient’s last-known UK home or place of business. A correctly addressed registered or recorded delivery letter which is not returned undelivered is deemed served when it would ordinarily be delivered.
  • Additionally, it might be argued that this method of notice does not apply where the names on the legal title are not identical to the beneficiaries behind the trust, meaning for example where those with legal titles are simply holding the property as joint tenants on trust for others who do not hold the legal title (as per the precise wording of the Law of Property Act 1925, s.36(2)). The other methods of severing an equitable joint tenancy remain available. On severance of a beneficial joint tenancy of registered land, a proprietor must apply for a Form A restriction if one is not already entered (Land Registration Rules 2003, r.94). The restriction records the change and is not what effects severance.
  • Note that if the joint tenants enter into an irrevocable agreement to make wills which treat their beneficial interests as separate, that agreement can also effect a severance of the joint tenancy (Re Heys (deceased) [1914] P. 192).

Case in focus: Kinch v Bullard [1998] 4 All ER 650

The case concerned a husband and wife, both of whom were beneficial joint tenants of the matrimonial home. The wife was terminally ill. She commenced divorce proceedings and instructed her solicitors to post a notice of severance to the husband at their shared address. Before it arrived however the husband suffered a heart attack and was hospitalised. The wife, being present at the shared address, decided to destroy the notice, in an effort to rely on the survivorship principle and obtain the husband’s share in the expectation that he would not survive the heart attack. The husband died before his wife. The dispute between their estates turned on whether there had been a valid severance. Neuberger J held that the notice took effect when it was delivered to the shared address, even though the husband never read it. Therefore, there had been a severance, and the husband’s estate took a one-half share of the property.

Key Points:

  • The wife sent a notice of severance to the husband at the husband’s residential address.
  • The husband did not read it: he was hospitalised before it arrived.
  • The wife sought to prevent the effect of severance by destroying the notice once it had arrived at the address.
  • However, destroying it upon receipt did not alter the effect of severance, nor did the fact that the husband never read it alter the severance either.
  • Once a notice of severance has been served, the sender cannot unilaterally withdraw it.

b) Severance by an act of a joint tenant ‘operating upon his own share’

There are three earlier methods of severance preserved by the Law of Property Act 1925, s.36(2), that reflect the categories laid down by Page Wood V-C in Williams v Hensman. The first category of the three is any ‘act’ by a joint tenant ‘operating upon his own share.’ This would typically take the form of a joint tenant totally or partially alienating their own share. This method of severance is a unilateral act, which makes it relatively easy to undertake (Harris v Goddard [1983]), and when the joint tenant acting to sever their interest does so, they can effectively conceal that alienation from the other joint tenant(s) (Mortgage Corporation Ltd v Shaire [2001] Ch 743, ChD). Given that it is unilateral and can be done without the knowledge of the other joint tenant(s), this method does have a limitation in its usage: the act must actually operate on the person’s beneficial interest. Intention alone is insufficient. There are different types of ‘acts’ which could apply:

Transfer inter vivos - a joint tenant can sever by transferring their beneficial interest, or by making a specifically enforceable contract to transfer it. A disposition of a subsisting equitable interest must be in writing signed by the person disposing of it or by an agent authorised in writing. This does not affect the creation or operation of resulting, implied or constructive trusts (Law of Property Act 1925, ss. 53(1)(c), 53(2)).

Alienation by mortgage - If one joint tenant acting alone charges their beneficial interest, or purports to mortgage the whole property without the others’ authority, that charge attaches solely to the interest of that joint tenant as if there had been an outright transfer of that tenant’s “share” (First National Securities Ltd v Hegerty [1985] QB 850, CA). The severance takes effect in equity, whilst their legal interest remains unaffected by the severance.

Involuntary alienation - There are various types of acts which have the effect of severing, even where the alienation is involuntary (i.e. unintended). For example, if a bankruptcy order is made against a joint tenant, by an operation of law that person’s interest is severed and becomes a share (Re Pavlou (A Bankrupt) [1993] 1 WLR 1046, ChD), with their beneficial interest vesting in the trustee in bankruptcy. The official receiver normally becomes trustee when the order is made (Insolvency Act 1986, ss.291A and 306(1); see also Bedson v Bedson [1965] 2 Q.B. 666). A charging order against the beneficial interest of one joint tenant to secure a money judgment will also sever that interest (Charging Orders Act 1979 ss.2(1)-(2) and 3(4), Midland Bank Plc v Pike [1988] 2 All E.R. 434).

Acts which are ‘insufficient’ for the purposes of severance

A testamentary disposition does not itself sever the joint tenancy during life, and survivorship takes effect on death before the will can operate. In this instance, a mere declaration is not enough to displace the rule of survivorship and ius accrescendi over the testamentary disposition. Furthermore, where there is a declaration of an intention to sever, that intention is ineffective if there is no written notice (Corin v Patton (1990) 169 CLR 540 (HC of Australia) per Mason CJ and McHugh J).

c) Severance by mutual agreement

In Williams v Hensman, Page Wood V-C noted that severance might not just be effected unilaterally, but could also come about by way of mutual agreement. This would require the agreement of all the existing joint tenants that the interests should thereafter be severed. The parties are effectively agreeing to ‘relinquish the beneficial interest of a joint tenant… including the right of accretion by survivorship, in return for the share of a tenant in common’ (Corin v Patton (1990) per Deane J). An oral agreement can suffice for severance, even if it does not meet the requirements for an enforceable contract to sell an interest in land (Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989, s.2(1)). If in the course of discussions the parties only reach an ‘agreement in principle’ to the idea, then without further evidence of the parties actively consenting to the severance, such agreement in principle would be taken to mean the parties have reserved their right to the joint tenancy, and therefore there is no severance (Gore and Snell v Carpenter (1990)).

Exclusion of survivorship

For severance by mutual agreement to be valid, the parties must have contemplated that they would thereafter be dealing with the property as tenants in common, no longer as joint tenants (Burgess v Rawnsley [1975] Ch 429, CA). The question is whether in their dealing they have agreed to end the rights of survivorship. So when applying this to a problem question, for example, key evidence would be whether the parties have all agreed to transfer their interests to a third party upon death rather than divest their interest to the other joint tenants. Alternatively, an agreement to divide the proceeds of sale between the tenants can establish severance. An agreement merely to sell is consistent with continuing to hold the proceeds jointly (Davis v Smith [2011] EWCA Civ 1603). The parties’ dealings may show their intention to divide the whole (Crooke v De Vandes (1805) 11 Ves 330). Severance alone gives equal shares. A proposed unequal division in a draft consent order can show that the parties treated their shares as separate without making that division binding (Hunter v Babbage [1994] 2 FLR 806, ChD).

Case in focus: Burgess v Rawnsley [1975]

Mr Honick and Mrs Rawnsley, who were not married to one another, purchased a dwelling-house as legal and beneficial joint tenants, and each provided half of the purchase price. They had therefore each provided an equal investment towards the property. Mrs Rawnsley agreed orally to sell her share in the house to Mr Honick for £750. She then asked for £1,000, which he would not pay. Mr Honick died three years later without the transfer having taken place. The Court of Appeal held that the beneficial joint tenancy had been severed prior to his death and therefore his estate was entitled to half the proceeds of sale of the property. There were some issues with the findings of fact about Rawnsley agreeing to sell her interest, and both Browne LJ and Sir John Pennycuick had only upheld the trial judge’s finding of fact on that point with reluctance.

Key points:

  • The parties purchased the property as joint tenants.
  • The parties contributed equally towards the purchase price.
  • Both parties agree to a severing of one of the party’s interests in the property.
  • Later negotiations, which remained incomplete, could not displace the act of severance which had occurred prior.
  • With this case, bear in mind that there is some concern over the evidence for the sale of the interest.

d) Severance by mutual conduct

Parties may sever not only by mutual agreement, but also by mutual conduct, which consists of ‘any course of dealing sufficient to intimate that the interests of all were mutually treated as constituting a tenancy in common’ (Williams v Hensman 70 E.R.  862 per Page Wood V-C). The key phrases in that passage are:

i) Sufficient to intimate

ii) Interests of all

iii) Mutually treated

iv) Constituting a tenancy in common.

First, ‘Sufficient to intimate’ suggests that there is some threshold to satisfy. Evidence of a mutual understanding is not as straightforward as evidence of mutual agreement, because in an agreement one can point to a specific event or document. Here, the evidence is more circumstantial. The word ‘intimate’ means that the circumstances effectively imply a tenancy in common, meaning nothing has to be said on the subject of severance between the parties. Second, the ‘interests of all’ demonstrates that all of the tenants must have their interests affected by the severance. Third, ‘mutually treated’ means all the tenants treat both their own interests and all the other interests as severed; no joint tenancy remains. Finally, all of these together point to a ‘tenancy in common.’

The conduct must be such that the pattern of dealing between all of the parties is, though not quite unambiguous and explicit enough to constitute a mutual agreement to sever, nevertheless evince a clear common intention to sever the joint tenancy. As with above, it must be clear from their dealings that the parties treated their interests as separate, excluding survivorship (the key component of joint tenancies). It is also worth emphasising that this means of severance is treated as distinct from severance by mutual agreement (Burgess v Rawnsley [1975]). Ultimately, there must be a consensus between all the joint tenants, as disclosed by a pattern of dealings with the co-owned property, which would in effect exclude the future operation of the right of survivorship (Quigley v Masterson [2011] EWHC 2529 (Ch)).

Such examples of mutual conduct include dealings over time on the shared assumption that the tenancies were in common and not joint (Gore and Snell v Carpenter), or an arrangement to make wills disposing of their respective ‘shares’ in the estate (Re Wilford’s Estate). The courts have placed great emphasis on the need to show that a mutual understanding exists between all of the joint tenants affected (Davis v Smith [2011] EWCA Civ 1603). The parties need not come to an agreement; there simply has to be evidence that they intend to deal the property in common, for example by the periodic distribution of property between themselves (Re Denny [1947]).

With all that said, mutual conduct is not evidenced by the following:

  • Physical conversion of jointly-owned premises into separate and self-contained units (Greenfield v Greenfield (1979)).
  • Negotiations between the parties to divide the interest in the property into shares that are inconclusive and do not show that they already treated their interests as separate (Harris v Goddard [1983]).
  • Where one party ‘offers to buy out the other for X and the other makes a counter-offer for Y’ (Burgess v Rawnsley [1975] per Sir John Pennycuick).
  • Finally, it is not enough that each joint tenant had independently treated the joint tenancy as severed; there has to be a mutual understanding.

Case in focus: Quigley v Masterson [2011]

Mrs Masterson had purchased a house in 1992 with Mr Pilkington as joint tenants, both at law and in equity. Mr Pilkington later sought via his solicitors to sever the joint tenancy via s.36(2) of the Law of Property Act 1925. The notice was sent to the solicitors formerly acting for Mrs Masterson. As they were no longer acting, they could not accept notice on her behalf. A second notice was not proved to have reached Mrs Masterson. Later, Mrs Quigley applied to the Court of Protection to act as her father Mr Pilkington’s deputy after he lost capacity. There was no course of dealing by which the parties had mutually treated the tenancy as severed. However, Mrs Masterson’s own application to sell the house, read with her statements that each had a half share, constituted written notice of her desire to sever. Mrs Quigley already knew of it when the court decided on 3 February 2009 that she should be her father’s deputy. At that point she had authority to receive it for him and the joint tenancy was severed.

Key Points:

  • Mr Pilkington’s notices of severance were ineffective.
  • Mrs Quigley’s statements before her appointment did not bind her father.
  • Mrs Masterson’s application constituted a separate notice of severance, effective once Mrs Quigley had authority to receive it.

Examination Consideration: We have seen the various means of accomplishing severance thus far can be put into two categories: unilateral (written notice, or operating on one’s own share) and mutual (course of dealing, and mutual agreement). It might be observed that both categories are satisfied. For example, there was a mutual understanding that went unstated but nevertheless governed the relations between the tenants. Then, they each agree to act to sever, following which one (or all) of the joint tenants serves written notice or operates upon their own share.

e) Severance in consequence of unlawful killing

This rule flows from a public policy concern that a joint tenant, who unlawfully kills another joint tenant, should not be able to benefit via survivorship from receiving the beneficial interest of the deceased (Re K, decd [1985] Ch 85, Ch D).

Except where the offender stands convicted of murder (Forfeiture Act 1982, s.5), the court has a statutory discretion, though it is limited (Forfeiture Act 1982, s.2(2)) to modify the operation of the forfeiture rule. This is done if, regarding the conduct of the offender and of the deceased and other material circumstances, ‘the justice of the case requires the effect of the rule to be so modified.’ Where the offender stands convicted of an offence of which unlawful killing is an element, proceedings for relief must be brought within three months beginning with the conviction (s.2(3)). A criminal conviction is not needed for forfeiture: the civil court determines unlawful killing on the balance of probabilities (Leeson v McPherson [2024] EWHC 2277 (Ch)).

Examination Consideration: Given the burden of proof in criminal proceedings for showing that A murdered (or otherwise unlawfully killed) B, how likely do you think it would be in civil proceedings that A is found to have murdered/unlawfully killed B and therefore would be precluded from benefiting by survivorship?

f) Severance by merger of interests

This is a rare scenario, but not impossible. It applies where the unity of interest is destroyed by a so-called “merger” of interests. This could apply where three beneficial joint tenants hold for life with the remainder to a third party in fee simple, and one joint tenant later acquires that remainder in the same capacity. It effects a change of status on the part of the person taking the remainder, rendering them a tenant in common and leaving the remaining tenants as joint tenants.

Another example is if one of the joint tenants goes on to acquire another estate in land in addition to their joint tenancy, then this might act to dissolve the unity of interest, because that joint tenant has interests greater than the other joint tenants. The reason this is the case is due to the doctrine of merger: a greater estate and a lesser estate are both held by the same person, without any intermediate estate, and therefore the lesser estate is incorporated into the greater estate. There is no automatic merger where equity would keep the estates separate. The intention of the person acquiring the estate is relevant (Law of Property Act 1925, s.185). There is little authority on when a joint tenancy is regarded as being severed by merger (Nielson-Jones v Fedden [1975]).

g) Old forms of ownership

Prior to 1 January 1926 there was a form of co-ownership in England known as tenancy by entireties. This type of co-ownership was a type of joint tenancy between husband and wife that could not be severed. Its inseverability was due to its character, reflecting the eternal unity of matrimonial partners. No such tenancies could be lawfully created after 1882 (Married Women’s Property Act 1882, ss.1 and 5), and in 1926 all such tenancies were rendered by operation of law as joint tenancies (Law of Property Act 1925, Schedule 1, Part VI).

Examination Consideration: It is unlikely that you will encounter archaic forms of ownership in a problem question. That is because these forms of ownership were rendered obsolete after 1926. However, in the event that your problem question refers to a co-owned estate before 1926, you would be correct to point out that one of these archaic forms may apply. So if the question refers to a pre-1926 estate, you know what to do!

FAMILY BREAKDOWN

As seen in the chapter ‘Joint Tenancies and Tenancies in Common’, the courts have attempted to deal with the irretrievable break-up of households and the interests of the respective parties by means of severance. That being said, this area has had problems.

At common law, unless the tenancy agreement provides otherwise, one joint tenant can bring a periodic tenancy of the family home to an end for everyone by serving a valid notice to quit (Hammersmith and Fulham LBC v Monk [1992] 1 A.C. 478). This ends the tenancy itself. In England, one joint tenant of a private assured periodic tenancy can give at least two months’ written notice expiring on the first or last day of a tenancy period, unless the landlord and all the joint tenants agree a shorter period in writing (Protection from Eviction Act 1977, s.5). In Wales, a joint contract-holder under a secure or periodic standard occupation contract can give a withdrawal notice and the contract continues for the others (Renting Homes (Wales) Act 2016, ss.52, 111, 130).

Following this case of Monk, the courts considered whether a public landlord’s recovery of possession following a joint tenant’s notice to quit could disproportionately interfere with the remaining occupier’s right to respect for their home under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (Qazi v Harrow LBC [2003] UKHL 43). This led to the Supreme Court modifying the position in Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45. An Article 8 defence to possession does not invalidate the notice to quit (Sims v Dacorum Borough Council [2014] UKSC 63). In the case of Pinnock, the court held as follows:

a) Where a public authority seeks possession,

b) Of a person’s home,

c) The occupier can seek a review of the proportionality of eviction

d) Under article 8.

e) This ground can only be argued by the occupier;

f) The matter can be dealt with summarily.

g) Normally, the public authority will not be refused possession,

h) But the court must consider a seriously arguable proportionality defence

i) And must resolve any factual issues in order to complete the review.

As has been discussed in the chapter ‘Joint Tenancies and Tenancies in Common’, a further problem is that the concept of joint tenancies is not always consistent with social norms about family breakdown and “blended” families, especially where co-habitation of a couple ends, as per Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 and Jones v Kernott [2010] EWCA Civ 578, reversed by [2011] UKSC 53. Separation does not by itself sever a joint tenancy.

For a family home bought in joint names without an express declaration of the beneficial interests, the starting point is that equity follows the law and the equitable interests mirror the joint legal interests. If that joint tenancy is severed, the starting point is equal shares.

A party claiming unequal shares must establish that the couple had a different common intention when they bought the property or that their common intention later changed. The court may infer that intention from their whole course of dealing. Where an intention to share differently is established but the proportions cannot be inferred, the court may attribute the shares it considers fair in light of that course of dealing.

Examination Consideration: Following the discussion above, we have seen that the cases of Stack v Dowden and Jones v Kernott address when a couple who buy a home in joint names can have unequal beneficial shares, although there are no separate shares while a beneficial joint tenancy subsists. The controversy of this decision is a potential subject for essay questions, so in your research, make sure to look for include those cases in your search criteria alongside “joint tenancies.” For example, look at the article ‘Co-ownership and severance after Stack’ by Mark Pawlowski and James Brown (2013) Trust Law International 27(2) 59-67.

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