Duress and Undue Influence Lecture
This chapter will examine the doctrines of duress and undue influence. These doctrines both provide a means for an individual to avoid an already concluded contract. These doctrines operate where the individual has been induced to contract by illegitimate pressure or by an abuse of influence. The justification for these doctrines is fairly obvious, it is that it prevents one party taking unfair advantage of another. The effect of these doctrines on a contract is that it makes the contract voidable at the request of the aggrieved party. The chapter will start with the doctrine of duress, before moving on to undue influence.
Duress
Duress is defined as some kind of threat, violent or other action which is used to coerce somebody into doing something against their will. In the context of contract law, this refers to where a party uses duress against the other party in order for them to enter into a contract which they either do not want to, or where the terms of the contract are unfavourable to them.
History and development
The doctrine of duress has always been recognised in the English common law, here are some of the main examples of the forms it may come in:
- Duress by the threat of violence - Barton v Armstrong [1976] 1 AC 104
- Pressure on a father to give security under an implied threat to prosecute his son - Williams v Bayley (1866) LR 1 HL 200 (undue influence)
- Duress by creating a threatening environment - Antonio v Antonio [2010] EWHC 1199
- Economic duress by the threat of industrial action - Dimskal Shipping Co SA v International Transport Workers’ Federation, The Evia Luck [1991] 4 All ER 871
- Duress by economic pressure - D & C Builders v Rees [1966] 2 QB 617
The two categories this chapter will explore are threats of force or violence, and economic duress.
Duress by threat of violence
Duress by threat of violence is self-explanatory. If a party is able to prove they were coerced into a contract due to a threat of violence, the contract will be voidable. There are two main requirements of duress by threat of violence:
- The nature of the threat must be sufficient to amount to duress
- The threat must have been a reason why the claimant entered the contract
The nature of the threat
An unlawful threat of physical violence is sufficient in nature. In Barton v Armstrong [1976] AC 104, the threats were to have Barton killed.
Effect of the threat
The question is whether the threat contributed to the decision to enter the contract. A claimant may have had commercial reasons for signing as well.
Once threats of violence intended to induce the agreement were established in Barton v Armstrong, it was for the person who made them to show that they played no part in the decision.
Barton was entitled to relief even though he might have signed the deed for commercial reasons in the absence of the threats.
Economic duress
Economic duress refers to a threat to an individual’s financial interests. This was not suggested as a potential ground of duress until the case of Occidental Worldwide Investment Corporation v Skibs A/S Avanti, The Siboen and the Sibotre [1976] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 293. A typical scenario of such duress would be as follows:
- Party A and Party B negotiate a contract
- Party B threatens to breach the contract unless the contract is renegotiated
- Party A opt to renegotiate the contract in favour of Party B because of the potential outcomes in B were to breach the contract
In this situation, a breach of contract by Party B could have any number of unwanted consequential results for Party A. Perhaps the contract is a subcontract, and if Party B breach the contract, Party A will be liable in damages to another party.
This doctrine requires a fine balance with the commercial needs of society. Legitimate economic pressure can be recognised as a useful negotiation tool, and the courts risk going too far with the scope of economic duress.
The Privy Council considered economic duress in Pao On v Lau Yiu Long [1980] AC 614. The early cases spoke in terms of:
- Coercion of the will that vitiates consent
- The pressure or threat must be illegitimate
The first requirement, that requires a coercion of the will that vitiates consent, was highly criticized by academics such as Atiyah. It was also criticised in Dimskal Shipping Co SA v International Transport Workers’ Federation, The Evia Luck [1991] 4 All ER 871. The judges criticised the ‘coercion of the will that vitiates consent’ requirement on the ground that a victim of duress’ consent has not been vitiated, as they are completely aware of what they are doing, they consent intentionally. This has been recognised in the criminal law, where it is recognised that the party under duress does consent, but they do so with no other potential alternative. In DSND Subsea Ltd v Petroleum Geo Services ASA [2000] BLR 530, Dyson J identified the following elements:
- Pressure
- The practical effect of the pressure is that there is compulsion, or lack of practical choice for the victim
- The pressure is illegitimate
- The pressure is a significant cause in inducing the claimant to enter the contract
Lack of practical choice
A practical example of this principle in operation can be found in B & S Contracts & Design Ltd v Victor Green Publications Ltd [1984] ICR 419. In this case, there was a contract to erect some exhibition stands. The contractor’s workers went on strike and the contractor threatened to cancel unless the exhibition organisers contributed to the payment they demanded. With the exhibition imminent, the organisers had no realistic option but to pay.
Here are some classic examples of conduct which can amount to economic duress:
- Threat to stop supply of components needed in manufacture process - Adam Opel GmbH v Mitras Automotive Ltd [2007] EWHC 3205 (QB). This was because there was no realistic choice other than to pay the higher price for the components
- Threats to withhold delivery once under contractual obligation - Carillion Construction Ltd v Felix (UK) Ltd [2001] BLR 1
- Revising a contract for carriage of goods where it would be impossible for the claimant to obtain alternative carriage quick enough for the goods if they require those goods for another contract - Atlas Express Ltd v Kafco (Importers & Distributors) Ltd [1989] 1 All ER 641.
Case in focus: Atlas Express Ltd v Kafco (Importers & Distributors) Ltd [1989] 1 All ER 641
In this case, Kafco were contracted with a third party for the supply for baskets. Kafco had an agreement with Atlas Express for delivery of the baskets. Atlas had overestimated how many cartons it would carry per load at the agreed rate per carton. Atlas told Kafco if they did not pay a higher price for delivery, they would not deliver the baskets at all. Kafco agreed to a minimum charge per load to avoid losing the supply contract. When Atlas sued for the higher charge, Kafco relied on economic duress.
It was held that Kafco had no practical alternative to signing. It could not obtain another carrier in time, and failing to deliver to Woolworths would have put its business at risk. Atlas could not enforce the variation.
Illegitimate pressure or threat
The third requirement that the pressure must be illegitimate. It is difficult to distinguish between an illegitimate and a legitimate one, as there is expected to be a certain amount of pressure in commercial bargaining. As Dyson J described it - ‘illegitimate pressure must be distinguished from the rough and tumble of the pressures of normal commercial bargaining’ (DSND Subsea Ltd v Petroleum Geo Services ASA).
An example of lawful pressure is seen in R v HM Attorney-General for England and Wales [2003] UKPC 22.
Case in Focus: R v HM Attorney-General for England and Wales [2003] UKPC 22
After books had been published about SAS operations, members of the regiment were required to sign confidentiality agreements if they wished to stay. The member in question signed, but eventually claimed he had done so under duress.
The Privy Council held that returning a soldier to his parent unit if he declined to sign was lawful. Using that power to protect operational confidentiality was legitimate, however strongly he wished to stay in the SAS.
It was established in Kolmar Group AG v Traxpo Enterprises Pvt Ltd [2010] EWHC 113 (Comm) that generally speaking, a threat to break a contract would be regarded as illegitimate, especially in cases where they were aware this threat would result in a breach of contract.
The test to apply was confirmed in R v Attorney-General for England and Wales. Two things should be examined:
- The nature of the pressure
- The nature of the demand
The threat of a lawful action would not necessarily mean that the pressure was legitimate. For example, blackmail using a lawful threat would be an illegitimate threat.
Can a lawful threat amount to duress?
A threat to do something lawful can constitute duress, although the circumstances in which it will do so in commercial dealings are exceptional. In CTN Cash and Carry Ltd v Gallaher Ltd [1994] 4 All ER 714, the claim failed.
Case in focus: CTN Cash and Carry Ltd v Gallaher Ltd [1994] 4 All ER 714
In this case, Gallaher delivered cigarettes to the wrong CTN warehouse. The cigarettes were stolen before Gallaher could collect them. Gallaher mistakenly believed that CTN bore the risk and threatened to withdraw credit unless CTN paid. CTN paid and then sought to recover the money.
The courts held there was no duress, because of these three reasons:
- The parties dealt with each other at ‘arm’s length’
- The threat was lawful
- Gallaher genuinely believed CTN owed the money
Exam consideration: Do you think this case would have been decided differently if Gallaher knew the money was not owed?
A different result was reached in Progress Bulk Carriers Ltd v Tube City IMS LLC, The Cenk Kaptanoglu [2012] EWHC 85 (Comm). The shipowners had broken their original charter and manoeuvred the charterers into a position in which they had to waive their damages claim to obtain a substitute vessel.
The consideration of whether the parties have dealt in good or bad faith
In Pakistan International Airline Corporation v Times Travel (UK) Ltd [2021] UKSC 40, the airline lawfully terminated its agency agreement and offered a new one only if the travel agent waived its claim for unpaid commission. The agent had no reasonable alternative, but the airline’s use of its bargaining power did not amount to duress.
The Supreme Court majority held that even a demand made in bad faith would not, on its own, have been sufficient. In Progress Bulk Carriers, it was the owner’s earlier conduct in deliberately creating the charterer’s vulnerability and then exploiting it that made the pressure illegitimate.
Was the pressure a significant cause in inducing the claimant to enter the contract?
The case of Huyton SA v Peter Cremer GmbH & Co [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 620 is the leading case for the degree to which the pressure must have induced the contract to the party in relation to economic duress. It must be a ‘decisive or clinching’ inducement. The correct test to apply in this context would be the ‘but for’ test; but for the duress, would the claimant have entered the contract on those terms?
Protest and affirmation
A protest is evidence that the victim did not freely agree. Failure to protest is relevant but is not a separate bar to a claim for duress.
An example of this principle in operation can be examined in North Ocean Shipping Co Ltd v Hyundai Construction Co Ltd, The Atlantic Baron [1979] QB 705. In this case, the duress was a threat to breach the contract unless extra payment was made. The buyers initially reserved their rights. Once the ship had been delivered the pressure was over, yet they waited about eight months to recover the extra payments. In those circumstances the court held that they had affirmed the variation.
The court considers whether it was realistic to protest while performance was still needed. Protest and the availability of a practical alternative are relevant factors (Kolmar Group AG v Traxpo Enterprises Pvt Ltd [2010] EWHC 113 (Comm)).
While the pressure continues, apparent acquiescence need not amount to affirmation. The relevant question is what the victim did once free to choose (Antonio v Antonio [2010] EWHC 1199 (QB)).
Bars to duress claims
It should be noted that the bars to rescission can apply in relation to claims for duress. These are covered in depth in the Misrepresentation lecture, but a quick run through of those is as follows:
- Lapse of time
- Third party rights
- Affirmation
- Restitutio in integrum (where the parties cannot be substantially restored to their former positions)
Undue influence
The doctrine of undue influence provides a remedy where contracts have been entered into as a result of improper pressure. This usually occurs due to a relationship between the parties being exploited to gain an advantage.
Undue influence is similar to duress in nature, but the doctrine of undue influence is an equitable doctrine as opposed to the common law basis of duress. Duress concerns illegitimate pressure. Undue influence may involve overt coercion or the abuse of a relationship of influence.
The types of undue influence
Lord Browne-Wilkinson identified two distinct classes of undue influence in Barclays Bank Plc v O’Brien [1994] 1 AC 180:
- Actual undue influence
-
Presumed undue influence which can be categorised as:
- Protected relationships - pre-determined presumptions as to relationships which will give rise to a presumed influence
- Other cases - relationships in which influence can be presumed, but is not automatically done so
The evidential burdens of the different types
Before exploring the exact requirements of the differing types of undue influence, the importance of the different types of evidential burdens should be outlined briefly for a full understanding of the doctrines when we go on to explore them in greater detail.
In category 2A, the claimant need not prove that the relationship gave the other party influence over them. To raise a presumption of undue influence, the transaction must also be one that calls for explanation in the context of that relationship.
In category 2B, the claimant must also establish influence on the facts, for example by showing that they placed trust and confidence in the other party in managing the relevant affairs.
In category 1, the claimant does not have to prove there is an existence of any special relationship. They must prove, on the balance of probabilities, that improper influence was actually exercised and induced the transaction.
Exam consideration: Before you explore these concepts in more detail, can you think of the justifications for the differentiations between these categories?
Actual undue influence
This class of undue influence can be seen to be an alternative manifestation of duress, being conceptually similar. Actual undue influence has been described as acts of improper pressure or coercion such as unlawful threats, which seems to draw a parallel with duress.
The distinction between actual and presumed undue influence concerns how undue influence is proved. The civil standard of proof is the same. The claimant need not show that they had no choice at all.
There is no need for an existing relationship between the parties to prove actual undue influence. Nor does the transaction have to be of manifest disadvantage to the claimant, as the House of Lords held in CIBC Mortgages plc v Pitt [1994] 1 AC 200.
Case in focus: CIBC Mortgages plc v Pitt [1994] 1 AC 200
In this case, Pitt wanted to purchase some shares. In order to fund this purchase, he put pressure on his wife to sign a remortgage of the family home. The application for the loan stated the purpose was to purchase a holiday home and pay off the existing mortgage. Following, the husband used the money to purchase the shares. When the bank sought to enforce their security under the mortgage, the wife attempted to claim undue influence against her husband.
It was held that there was no requirement to demonstrate manifest disadvantage where actual undue influence was established. The wife proved that her husband had unduly influenced her, but the lender was entitled to enforce its security. The loan appeared to be for the couple’s joint benefit and the lender had no notice of the husband’s conduct.
Presumed undue influence
In Daniel v Drew [2005] EWCA Civ 507 the Court of Appeal emphasised that the question is how the claimant’s intention to enter the transaction was produced. Royal Bank of Scotland plc v Etridge (No. 2) [2001] UKHL 44 explains that influence alone does not raise a presumption of undue influence. The transaction must also call for explanation.
The key test for presumed undue influence was set out in Turkey v Awadh [2005] EWCA Civ 382:
- Do the facts give rise to either the existence of a protected relationship, or a relationship in which evidence could prove that one party exerted influence on the other?
- If so, could the transaction be shown to be one that could not be explained by ordinary motives, therefore suggesting some kind of undue influence resulted in the transaction.
- Can the defendant rebut this presumption by establishing there was no abuse of trust?
Category 2A - Protected relationships
The law has deemed certain relationships special, meaning influence between them can automatically be presumed in the absence of any other facts. The effect of the case of Royal Bank of Scotland plc v Etridge (No 2) is that this presumption is irrebuttable. Here are some examples of such relationships:
- A parent’s influence over a child while the parental influence continues. The reverse relationship, in which an adult child influences a parent, must be established on the facts.
- Solicitor and client
- Doctor and patient
Once one of these relationships is established, the claimant must also show that the transaction calls for explanation. The court may then infer undue influence unless the other party provides a satisfactory explanation.
Category 2B - Other cases
If the relationship does not fall into category 2A, the claimant must show that the other party had influence over them in the relevant affairs. Trust and confidence, or a relationship of dependency, may establish this. A transaction calling for explanation is still required to raise the evidential presumption.
Courts have considered a number of specific relationships that do not amount to category 2A relationships, but may well amount to category 2B relationships. In the following section the most important of these relationships are explained and examined with reference to case law.
Husband and Wife
In Barclays Bank plc v O’Brien [1994] 1 AC 180 it was confirmed that the relationship of Husband and Wife may amount to a relationship which satisfies the requirements of category 2B. Whether or not this relationship gives rise to one where there is presumed influence is dependent on the facts, including whether one spouse entrusted the relevant financial affairs to the other. It has been noted that the same will apply to other cohabitees as long as the trust and confidence element can be recognised.
Due the nature of the husband and wife relationship, it is not enough to merely show that there has been influence relating to a transaction which is not to the claimant’s advantage. A spouse may willingly take on a liability to help their partner. The question is whether the transaction calls for explanation in the context of their relationship.
Other cohabitees
The same approach applies to unmarried partners regardless of sex or whether they share a home. The question whether a lender has notice is distinct from the question whether influence existed between the partners. Massey v Midland Bank plc [1995] 1 All ER 929 illustrates the position of an unmarried partner giving security for the other’s business debts.
Bank and customer
The relationship between a bank and a customer is one which is possible to fall under category 2B. The presumption was successfully proven in Lloyds Bank Ltd v Bundy [1975] QB 326, in which the decisive factors were:
- The customer had banked at the branch for a long time and relied on the bank manager for all his financial advice
- The manager recognised the fact the customer did put this confidence in him
- The transaction was not in the interests of the customer
Exam consideration: Do you think this case would have been decided differently if it was the customer’s first time banking at the branch? Would he have an alternative remedy in the event undue influence could not be proven?
Therefore, it would seem the test for whether a bank and customer relationship could fall under category 2B is based first on the previous dealings between the two, considering whether there was evident trust and confidence. Secondly, the courts will assess whether the transaction calls for explanation in the context of that relationship.
Commanding officer and solider in the army
We touched on the case of R v HM Attorney-General for England and Wales [2003] UKPC 22 in the duress chapter. To remind us, the solider was refusing a sign a confidentiality agreement, and was threatened with being removed from his special unit if he did not sign the agreement. This did not give rise to a claim for duress, but the courts did suggest there could be a degree of undue influence involved in the transaction.
The Privy Council majority rejected the claim. The soldier signed because he wanted to remain in the SAS. The agreement had an ordinary explanation in the needs of the regiment, and the relationship with his commanding officer did not by itself establish undue influence.
Evidential burdens in relationships of presumed influence
The evidential burdens were briefly mentioned earlier in this section, however, this section will discuss the evidential burdens for category 2A and 2B presumptions with reference to specific case law.
The requirement that a transaction must be a ‘manifest disadvantage’ to the claimant
In earlier cases of presumed influence it was presumed that the transaction needs to be of a manifest disadvantage to the claimant. This was first suggested in National Westminster Bank Ltd v Morgan [1985] AC 686. The House of Lords revisited that language in Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No 2). The question is whether the transaction calls for explanation in light of the relationship.
The case of Goodchild v Bradbury [2006] EWCA Civ 1868 applied the Etridge approach, as did Macklin v Dowsett [2004] EWCA Civ 904. The new focus and the current test is whether the transaction is ordinary and explainable in the context of the relationship between the parties, or whether there was some concern for the legitimacy of the contract due to its suspicious nature. It should be noted that whether the contract was of a ‘manifest disadvantage’ may be considered as evidence to show that the contract is not ordinary and explainable, but it is no longer a requirement (Thompson v Foy [2009] EWHC 1076 (Ch)).
Be careful in distinguishing a disadvantageous contract from one that is suspicious. There will often be contracts where one side of the bargain is inherently better, but this does not mean it is suspicious for the purposes of proving undue influence.
Rebutting the presumption of undue influence
Once the relationship of influence and a transaction calling for explanation have been shown, the other party can rebut the inference by producing evidence that the claimant acted freely and independently.
The most common way in which this presumption may be rebutted is where the claimant has undertaken independent advice with regards to the transaction in which undue influence has been claimed. In Howard v Howard-Lawson [2012] EWHC 3258 (Ch) the claimant sought and received independent legal advice in relation to signing some deeds. The advice formed part of the evidence on which the allegation of undue influence was rejected.
However, receiving independent advice may not always be conclusive. The facts of each case will need to be assessing to consider whether the undue influence was still the inducing factor or whether the independent advice was significant in this regard (Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No 2)).
Can undue influence be actionable against a third party?
It has been confirmed that undue influence by a third party on a claimant may give rise to a claim for undue influence, which can result in the contract between the claimant and the party they are contracting with being voidable. This may seem unfair on the contracting party, but a claim for undue influence under these circumstances may only arise where the contracting party has actual or constructive notice of the undue influence, or the third party acted as its agent in procuring the agreement. This may seem confusing, so here is a basic example:
- Party A, a bank, are contracting with Party B, to guarantee the loan for the third party, Party C.
- Party C have used undue influence in order to force Party B to guarantee their debt
- Party B may have the guarantee set aside against Party A if Party A had actual or constructive notice of the undue influence.
The case of Barclays Bank v O’Brien [1994] 1 AC 180 confirmed this rule, making reference to the ‘doctrine of notice’. The first category of notice is actual notice, where Party A in our example have actual knowledge of the undue influence. The other category is constructive notice. In order to prove this type of notice, there are two things the courts will consider:
- Whether the contracting party has been “put on inquiry”
- If “put on inquiry”, has the contracting party avoided notice of the undue influence?
Have the contracting party been “put on inquiry”?
Under Etridge, a lender is put on inquiry when someone offers to stand surety for the debts of a person with whom they have a non-commercial relationship. An apparently joint loan for joint purposes does not, by itself, put the lender on inquiry. In Waller-Edwards v One Savings Bank plc [2025] UKSC 22, the Supreme Court held that if, on the face of a non-commercial joint loan, more than a trivial part will discharge one borrower’s own debts and may therefore be of no financial advantage to the other, the lender is put on inquiry.
If on inquiry, has the contracting party avoided notice?
Under Etridge, the bank should contact the proposed surety directly, explain why legal advice and written confirmation are required and invite them to nominate a solicitor to advise them separately. The bank must obtain their response, provide the necessary financial information and alert the solicitor to any particular reason to suspect improper pressure. The solicitor should explain the nature and practical risks of the transaction to the surety in private.
Before proceeding, the bank should obtain the solicitor’s written confirmation that the necessary explanation and advice have been given. The bank may ordinarily rely on that confirmation unless it knows of circumstances that make reliance unreasonable. Failure to take the required steps does not by itself establish that undue influence occurred.
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