Damages Lecture
Introduction to remedies and damages
We have now covered the formation of the contract, privity of contract, the construction of the contract, vitiating factors and how obligations under the contract are discharged. This brings us onto the final element of contract law, the remedies for a breach of contract.
There are a number of different remedies under English law. The next chapter will cover claims for an agreed sum, specific performance and injunctions, but this chapter will focus solely on the most common and sought after remedy - damages. Damages in contract law can be defined as a sum of money paid to the innocent party in compensation for a breach of contract.
As you will know by now, contract law is based upon the freedom of the contracting parties. This concept is difficult to apply to the remedies and damages. When the parties make the agreement, they will hope that they both fulfil their obligations. The parties may agree the sum payable for a breach or limit their liability, subject to the rules governing those terms. In the absence of such provision, damages generally reflect the value of the interest the innocent party has in the contract. This may well be more than the value of the actual contract, as you will begin to understand as you progress through this chapter.
The case of Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] AC 827 explained the basis of the remedy of damages. Lord Diplock stated that every contracting party has a secondary obligation to pay monetary compensation to the other party in the event they breach the contract.
The different types of damages
Before we begin examining the law behind damages, you should understand the two different types of damages:
- Compensatory damages
- Non-compensatory damages
Compensatory damages are an award of a sum of money which aims to compensate the claimant for his loss under the contract. This need not be limited to loss from the contract itself, and may compensate the innocent party for losses relating to subsequent contracts, which will be covered later in the chapter.
Nominal damages recognise a breach where the claimant proves no loss. Damages are not awarded to punish a party for breach of contract alone. A reasonable fee for using a contractual right can itself be compensatory where the breach has deprived the claimant of a valuable asset (Morris-Garner v One Step (Support) Ltd [2018] UKSC 20).
Compensatory damages are the most common form of damages, and will form the content of this chapter.
Compensatory damages
In order to assess whether an innocent party may be entitled to compensatory damages, there are six things that should be considered:
- Has the claimant suffered any loss?
- Is the loss suffered actionable?
- Did the breach of contract cause the loss?
- Was the type of loss reasonably foreseeable?
- Did the claimant mitigate the loss?
- Did the claimant contribute to the loss?
We will now examine each step in turn and consider the relevant legal principles.
Has the claimant suffered a loss?
The first step is to ascertain the loss the claimant has suffered under the contract. The general rule is that the claimant may only recover for his own loss - Alfred McAlpine Construction Ltd v Panatown Ltd [2001] 1 AC 518. A narrow exception allows recovery for a third party’s loss in respect of property where the parties contemplated that the loss might fall on that third party and their arrangements gave the third party no direct remedy. The mere fact that the loss would otherwise go uncompensated is insufficient (Forthwell Ltd v Pontegadea UK Ltd [2026] UKSC 33).
The claimant does not need to be able to identify an exact amount of loss. The fact there is a loss at all is sufficient to satisfy this first requirement. The courts will attempt to quantify the loss no matter the difficulty.
Case in focus: Chaplin v Hicks [1911] 2 KB 786
In this case, the claimant was one of fifty finalists in a competition. The defendant was to select twelve of them for work as actresses. The invitation did not reach the claimant in time for her appointment, and she therefore missed out on the opportunity to win.
The court held that the defendant had breached the contract with the claimant by not giving her a fair opportunity to participate in the competition. The court awarded damages. Despite the difficulty in calculating the value of her lost opportunity, the court was happy to award damages on this basis.
Chaplin v Hicks brings us onto an important rule relating to loss. In that case, there was no tangible loss as such, it was a lost opportunity. The opportunity to compete was itself part of the bargain in Chaplin. Where a gain depends on what a third party would have done, the claimant must show a real and substantial chance of that gain. The court values the chance even if it was below 50% (Allied Maples Group Ltd v Simmons & Simmons [1995] 4 All ER 907). What the claimant would have done to obtain the gain must ordinarily be proved on the balance of probabilities (Perry v Raleys Solicitors [2019] UKSC 5).
Assessing the amount of the loss
The court will assess the loss at the date of the breach, but under circumstances where this would not be appropriate may assess the loss at a chosen date (Johnson v Agnew [1980] AC 367). Later events may show that performance would have ended earlier in any event, reducing the loss (Bunge SA v Nidera BV [2015] UKSC 43).
The aim of damages is to put the non-breaching party in the position they would have been in had the contract been performed as agreed (Robinson v Harman(1848) 1 Ex 850). In order to calculate this, we need to know the extent of the loss which results from the breach. There are two different ways in which this can be measured:
- Expectation measure
- Reliance measure
Expectation measure
Expectation measure involves a comparison between the claimant’s current position, and the position they would have been in had the contract been performed correctly. An example of this would be a contract for the sale of a car which should be worth £1,000. If the car is faulty, and is only worth £200, the expectation measure would be £800, as the car is worth £800 less than it should have been worth.
At this point it is worth noting that the expectation measure is subject to step four of our approach to assessing damages; whether or not the damage was foreseeable. This means that not absolutely everything under an expectation measure can be claimed, but this will become clearer when we move on to the forseeability later in the chapter.
The first important rule of the expectation measure is that it is calculated on the expectation that the breaching party would have performed their obligations under the contract, but no more and no less (Lavarack v Woods of Colchester Ltd [1966] EWCA Civ 4). Therefore, care should be taken when assessing the obligations under the contract - for example, take a contract of employment where a bonus may be awarded every month. A purely voluntary bonus is different from a contractual right to have a bonus considered. For the latter, the court may assess what a rational exercise of the discretion would have produced (Horkulak v Cantor Fitzgerald International [2004] EWCA Civ 1287).
Where there is discretion as to how the contract is to be performed, the court must first identify what performance the contract requires.
Case in focus: Durham Tees Valley Airport Ltd v Bmibaby Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 485
In this case, Bmibaby agreed to operate two aircraft from the airport for ten years. The contract did not expressly state a minimum number of flights. The airport generated money from each flight. Bmibaby only operated one aircraft for some time, and eventually stopped operating an aircraft at all, therefore breaching the contract. There was a question as to the amount of damages that should be awarded, as there was no minimum number of flights, there was no clear expectation measure.
The court identified this contract as being discretionary as to how the contract is to be performed. In other words, Bmibaby had to operate the aircraft from the airport but retained commercial discretion over the number of flights. Therefore, the expectation measure will be assessed by the court considering how the contract would have been performed if there was no breach, rather than considering the minimum level of performance.
Exam consideration: In light of the above case, consider a contract that does specify a minimum level/amount of performance. What would the result for the amount of damages be?
The second important rule in relation to the expectation measure is the conversion of expectation loss to an amount of money which successfully puts the claimant into the position they would have been had the contract been completed correctly. There are two viable methods, and they often result in the same award. Where they differ, the question is which method reasonably reflects the claimant’s loss.
The first method is the difference between the value of performance provided and the value of performance that should have been provided. If we think back to the earlier example of the £1,000 car actually worth £200 - the value of performance £200, when it should have been £1,000, which gives us our difference of £800 which would be the amount awarded under damages. This is usually the applicable method for sales of goods.
The second method is the cost of curing the breach. In other words, how much will it cost the innocent party to rectify the breach of the defendant, either by paying someone else or the defendant to rectify it the breach. This method is more likely to be applicable in contracts for the provision of services. For example, in the case of a contract for the building of a house, if the contract was breached due to the unsatisfactory quality of the house, and it was going to cost £5,000 to get the house in a satisfactory state, the damages would amount to this cost if the work and its cost were reasonable. This is known as the ‘cost of cure’ approach.
In deciding whether the cost of cure is reasonable, the court may consider:
- Whether the claimant intends to rectify the issues. This is relevant but is not a condition of recovery (Tito v Waddell (No 2) [1977] Ch 106)
- Whether the cost of cure is disproportionate to the benefit of the work, including any benefit to the claimant beyond market value (Ruxley Electronics & Construction Ltd v Forsyth [1995] UKHL 8)
Case in focus: Tabcorp Holdings Ltd v Bowen Investments Pty Ltd [2009] HCA 8
This case is an Australian case, and therefore is not binding on English law but only persuasive. However, it provides an excellent illustration of why the cost of reinstatement can be recoverable even when it substantially exceeds the diminution in value.
In this case, a tenant of a commercial property destroyed the foyer of the property, with the knowledge that the landlord had specifically picked this foyer for the property. The tenant replaced the foyer with a different one without the landlord’s written consent, as the lease required. The landlord claimed for breach of contract, arguing that the tenant should pay the cost of the cure to replace the foyer with the previous one.
The trial judge awarded $34,820 Australian Dollars. The High Court upheld an award of $580,000 to restore the foyer and $800,000 for rent lost during the work.
The landlord was entitled to have the foyer preserved unless it consented to alterations. Its loss was the reasonable cost of restoring what the tenant had promised to leave intact.
Exam consideration: In Tabcorp Holdings Ltd, what difference did the covenant requiring the landlord’s consent make to the measure of damages?
Reliance measure
The reliance measure compensates the claimant for expenditure wasted because of the breach. This is relevant for where one of the parties has incurred expenditure in preparing for their side of the bargain. A claimant may plead expectation and reliance in the alternative, but cannot recover the same expenditure twice, for example as both a wasted cost and part of gross earnings (Cullinane v British ‘Rema’ Manufacturing Co Ltd [1954] 1 QB 292).
The reliance measure can help where the claimant cannot establish what profit the contract would have made. It cannot shift a loss the claimant would have made even if the contract had been performed. Below is a quick example:
- Party A enters into a contract with Party B to build a house
- Party A has spent £9,000 on preparation, all of which is wasted when the contract ends
- Party B then breaches the contract so that Party A can claim for damages
- Party A has now realised that the contract would have made a loss of £5,000 overall, including the cost of preparation
- Party A is now £9,000 out of pocket, compared with £5,000 if the contract had been performed
- Party A’s wasted expenditure is £9,000 before taking account of the loss on the bargain
- If the £5,000 loss on the bargain is proved, Party A can recover £4,000
In C & P Haulage v Middleton [1983] EWCA Civ 5 the court refused damages for expenditure the claimant would have lost even if the contract had been performed.
The court generally presumes that reasonable expenditure would have been recouped. The defendant may show that some or all of it would have been lost in any event (Soteria Insurance Ltd v IBM UK Ltd [2022] EWCA Civ 440). In our example, £9,000 less £5,000 gives £4,000. The reliance measure can be used:
- Where the claimant can identify expenditure wasted through the breach
- Where the expectation measure is difficult to calculate as it is hard to show what would have happened if the contract was properly performed
Is the loss suffered actionable?
Now we have established how loss will be calculated, it must be considered whether or not the loss suffered is actionable. This section will examine a number of common categories and provide the legal principles relating to them.
Financial Loss
Financial loss refers to where the claimant is in a worsened financial position as a result of the breach, either through less money, or less assets. This is the most common category of loss and is recoverable subject to the terms of the contract and the rules on proof, causation, remoteness and mitigation.
The consumer surplus
This consumer surplus is the amount by which a particular consumer values the performance of a contract above its market value for some particular reason. In order to understand this, here are some cases where this was relevant:
- Jackson v Horizon Holidays Ltd [1975] 1 WLR 1468 - The contract was for a holiday, the consumer surplus being the value the claimant put on the enjoyment of the holiday with his family;
- Ruxley Electronics and Construction Ltd v Forsyth - The contract was for the building of a swimming pool, the consumer surplus being the value the claimant put on the swimming pool being built to the agreed depth.
These interests need not be reflected in the market price. In Ruxley the shallower pool had the same market value, but the claimant recovered £2,500 for loss of amenity.
The case of Watts v Morrow [1991] 1 WLR 1421 confirmed the general rule against damages for distress caused by breach of contract. There are exceptions:
Where an important contractual objective is to provide relaxation, pleasure or peace of mind, damages may be awarded if this is not provided.
In Jackson the contract for a holiday had the objective of providing relaxation. In Ruxley the award reflected the loss of the promised amenity.
The rules regarding claiming for consumer surplus were clarified in Farley v Skinner [2001] UKHL 49. In this case, Farley purchased a house near Gatwick airport. He asked his surveyor of the house to take note of any noise from the airport, as he wanted it to be sufficiently quiet. The surveyor reported the noise would not be a problem, but Farley found it was very noisy once he had moved in.
The court awarded Farley £10,000 worth of damages for discomfort. The judges in this case came to the same decision, but under two different grounds:
- Peace and quiet were an important object of the surveyor’s instructions. It was not required to show that this was the sole object of the contract
- Physical discomfort from aircraft noise and the distress directly related to it
Therefore, it can be seen that the English courts are willing to accept consumer surplus as an actionable loss, but it must be treated with caution and be assessed in light of the benefit the contract promised. Here are some important things to remember:
- Awards of this kind are generally modest
- The type of loss must have been within the parties’ reasonable contemplation (see the section on remoteness)
Exam consideration: When answering a question which relates to a consumer surplus it would be wise to discuss Farley v Skinner and Watts v Morrow, explaining the courts conservative approach to such cases. As long as you justify your thoughts and talk about the ‘objective’ of the contract for the claimant, you should be able to come to a logical conclusion and ensure you get a lot of marks.
Distress
Distress is different to consumer surplus in that it actually results in a negative experience, physically or mentally, for the individual. Mere disappointment that a contract has been broken is generally insufficient.
In Watts v Morrow the court also recognised damages for physical inconvenience or discomfort caused by the breach and mental suffering directly related to it.
In Farley v Skinner, Lord Scott explained why the unwelcome noise could amount to physical discomfort. The aircraft noise interfered with the claimant’s use of his home.
Where loss of amenity and distress overlap, the claimant cannot recover twice for the same loss.
Did the breach of contract cause the loss?
In order for a loss to be actionable, the claimant must show that the breach of contract caused the loss. Causation requires both legal, and factual causation.
Factual causation
Factual causation requires an application of the ‘but for’ test; but for the breach of contract, would the claimant have suffered the loss?
This is a simple concept and is the easier of the two tests to prove.
Legal causation
Legal causation requires the breach of contract to be an effective cause of the loss. A subsequent act of the claimant or a third party may break the chain of causation.
If the claimant may have broken the chain of causation, the courts will consider whether the acts of the claimant were reasonable or not. The claimant will break the chain of causation where they were so unreasonable that it must relieve the defendant of liability for the resulting loss. This threshold is very high and difficult to prove.
If it is a third party who has broken the chain of causation, there are a number of things to consider:
- Did the defendant have a duty to guard against the act occurring? (Stansbie v Troman [1948] 2 KB 48). The decorator left the house unsecured. The ensuing theft was the very risk he was bound to guard against and did not break the chain of causation.
- How likely was the intervening act to happen? (Monarch Steamship Co Ltd v Karlshamms Oljefabriker [1949] AC 196). The more likely the act to happen, the less likely it would break the chain of causation.
- How reasonable was the intervening act? The more reasonable the act, the less likely it would break the chain of causation.
Was the type of loss reasonably foreseeable?
This stage of assessing whether damages will be an appropriate remedy is the most important stage, and is where a lot of claims will fail. The purpose of this stage is to consider the remoteness of the damage. Consider the following example:
- Party A contracts with Party B for some denim
- Party A intends to use the denim to make into jeans and sell to Party C
- The denim is of a poor quality, meaning Party A cannot fulfil their contract with Party C
- As a result, Party C ceases all dealings with Party A
- Party A has been dealing with Party C for ten years, and would be dealing with them for the foreseeable future
- Can Party A claim for all future earnings they would have made with Party C from Party B, as Party B’s breach of contract caused Party C to cease dealings with them?
This is a question of what the parties could reasonably have contemplated when they made the contract. Did Party B know enough about the dealings with Party C for the loss of future business to be a serious possibility? The size of the loss alone does not answer that question. Party A would also have to prove the value of the lost business, allowing for costs and the chance that dealings would have continued.
In the case of Hadley v Baxendale, the test for foreseeability of damages was laid out. Alderson B explained that where there is a breach of contract, damages can be claimed under two different limbs:
- The damages which would fairly and reasonably be considered to arise naturally from the breach of contract itself
- Damages which reasonably would have been supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties at the time of the making of the contract as a probable result of a breach
Case in focus: Hadley v Baxendale (1854) 9 Exch 341
This case is the leading authority on the test of foreseeability of damages. In this case, the claimant ran a mill. The mill broke down as a result of a broken crank-shaft, and they did not have a replacement. The claimant therefore contracted with the defendant to carry the broken crank-shaft to the engineers as a pattern for a replacement. Delivery was delayed, and the claimant sued for the profits lost while the mill was not operating.
It was held that the damages for the loss of profits were not claimable. This was because they did not fall under either limb of the test laid out in the case. Such a delay would not ordinarily keep a mill idle. The circumstances communicated to the carrier did not establish that the mill would remain at a standstill until this shaft was delivered.
The first limb of the test is relatively easy to understand. These are damages that would be obvious under a contract. For example, in a sale of goods, if the goods are faulty, an ordinary loss is the difference between their value on delivery and the value they would have had if they had met the contract.
The second limb of the test is the more complicated one. These are those losses which would not normally be ordinarily expected for somebody to suffer as a result of the breach. Therefore, for them to be actionable, they must have been reasonably contemplated by both parties at the time of contracting. The easiest way this will arise is where the claimant directly informs the defendant of the potential loss. If we take the above case of Hadley v Baxendale, if the claimant had explained the importance of the crank-shaft, telling the carrier that the mill had no spare shaft and would remain idle until the replacement could be made, the loss would have then been in both parties’ reasonable contemplation.
There are various cases which should help outline the rules of the test of foreseeability. The first of these is Victoria Laundry Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd [1949] 2 KB 528. In this case, the contract was for a boiler which was required for the expansion of the claimant’s business, and the defendant was aware of this. The claimant attempted to claim for their loss of profits, and the loss of some lucrative contracts that they would have obtained with the boiler. The court held that the loss of profits would have been in the reasonable contemplation of the defendants, and would thus be claimable, but the loss of the lucrative contracts would not have been in the reasonable contemplation of the defendants, and were not claimable. In the denim example, whether future profits were too remote would likewise depend on what Party B knew when the contract was made.
Exam consideration: Do you think the decision in Victoria Laundry Ltd would have been different if they had specifically told the defendant that if the boiler was not delivered they would miss out on the unusually profitable dyeing contracts? Why?
The case of Parsons (Livestock) Ltd v Uttley Ingham & Co Ltd [1978] QB 791 confirmed an important part of the rule from Hadley v Baxendale. It is the type of loss which needs to be reasonably contemplated under the second limb, not the extent or the exact nature. Therefore, if we consider Hadley v Baxendale, the defendant need not know exactly how extensive the loss of profits would have been for the mill if that type of loss was contemplated, the defendant would be responsible for the extent of them. The commercial context may nevertheless show that the defendant did not assume responsibility for that kind of loss (The Achilleas [2008] UKHL 48).
Did the claimant mitigate the loss?
The claimant cannot recover loss that reasonable steps would have avoided. It is for the defendant to show that the claimant failed to take such steps. There are three general rules relating to mitigation.
First, as per British Westinghouse Electric Co Ltd v Underground Electric Railways Co of London Ltd [1912] AC 673 the claimant will be unable to claim for damages in respect of any loss that he could have reasonably avoided.
For example, if there was a contract for the sale of steel which was faulty, a reasonable way to mitigate loss might be to sell the faulty steel on. They may only make 20% of the price they paid, but this is a step in mitigating the loss.
Secondly, the claimant may recover all expenses reasonably incurred in trying to mitigate the loss, even if the attempt fails. In our above example, costs of advertising, shipping and other expenditure incurred attempting to sell the steel would be claimable.
Thirdly, if the claimant avoids further potential losses, they cannot recover for the loss they avoided. If we consider a breach of a contract of employment, if the claimant then finds another job one week later, the new earnings are credited against the salary lost over the same period. A shortfall may still be recoverable.
Did the claimant contribute to the loss?
If the claimant contributed to the loss in question, the courts may reduce the amount of damages the claimant is able to claim, proportionately in line with the fault of the claimant. This rule has statutory footing in Section 1 of the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945.
There are three types of contractual liability to distinguish when considering contributory negligence:
- Where the defendant’s liability arises from a contractual provision which does not rely on the negligence of the defendant
- Where the defendant’s liability arises from a contractual obligation to take care but there is no corresponding duty in tort
- Where the defendant’s liability in contract is the same as his liability in the tort of negligence independently of the existence of any contract.
The case of Barclays Bank plc v Fairclough Building Ltd [1994] EWCA Civ 3 confirms that contributory negligence will only be available in situation ‘3’. Therefore, there must be a concurrent liability in tort in order to claim contributory negligence as to a claim for damages.
Once the claim falls into situation ‘3’, the defendant must show the claimant was at fault, and the fault was a factual cause of the loss the claimant sustained (the ‘but for’ test). The courts will then reduce the damages ‘to such extent as the court thinks just and equitable having regard to the claimant’s share in the responsibility for the damage’ as per Section 1(1) of the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945.
Agreed damages clauses
So far, this chapter has dealt with the situation in which the courts will assess the amount of damages to be awarded. The contractual freedom of parties allows them to pre-agree an appropriate amount of damages in the event of certain things. These are common in commercial contracts, and are advantageous for a number of reasons:
- They provide certainty
- The claimant does not have to prove the amount of loss, as the amount will be pre-agreed under the contract
- The defendant cannot claim the loss was unforeseeable, as they are contracted into it
- They are efficient, and prevent the relationship between two parties being disruption through large amounts of litigation
There are two types of damages clauses; a liquidated damages clause and a penalty clause.
Liquidated damages clause
A liquidated damages clause fixes the sum payable for a specified breach. A genuine attempt to estimate the likely loss is a familiar example (Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New Garage and Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79), but is not the only basis on which a clause may be enforceable.
If a damages clause is identified as a liquidated damages clause, the sum in the clause will be payable, irrespective of whether the actual loss is greater or smaller than the sum in the clause. In Cellulose Acetate Silk Co Ltd v Widnes Foundry Ltd [1933] AC 20 the contract provided for a liquidated damages clause of £20 per week late. The delay was thirty weeks long, and actual loss for delay was £5,850, but as the £20 clause was a genuine pre-estimate of loss, the non-breaching party could only claim for £600 (£20 per week for 30 weeks). Unless the contract provides otherwise, liquidated damages for delay generally accrue up to termination, with ordinary damages available for subsequent loss (Triple Point Technology Inc v PTT Public Company Ltd [2021] UKSC 29).
Penalty Clauses
The penalty rule applies to a secondary obligation triggered by breach. It does not apply to a term which, on its proper construction, defines the primary obligations, such as the price to be paid.
Case in focus: Jobson v Johnson [1989] 1 WLR 1026
In this case, the contract was for the purchase of shares in a football club. One of the terms was that if there was a failure to pay one of the later instalments of the purchase price, the shares would need to be retransferred for £40,000. The defendant failed to pay one of the instalments after making substantial payments.
The Court of Appeal held the retransfer provision penal. The price was fixed at £40,000 regardless of the number of later instalments already paid.
A penalty is unenforceable. The innocent party may still claim ordinary damages for the underlying breach. In a straightforward damages clause the comparison in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre with the greatest loss the breach might cause remains useful.
In Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67, heard with ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis, Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption explained that the test to apply is:
“whether the impugned provision is a secondary obligation which imposes a detriment on the contract-breaker out of all proportion to any legitimate interest of the innocent party in the enforcement of the primary obligation”
Case in focus: ParkingEye Limited v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67
In this case, ParkingEye managed a car park and imposed an £85 charge on motorists who exceeded the two hours of free parking. Beavis overstayed and refused to pay the charge, arguing that it was a penalty.
The court held that this was not a penalty clause. Although the £85 did not represent the loss caused by one car overstaying, the charge helped keep spaces available for other motorists and funded the parking scheme. Its amount was not out of all proportion to those interests.
You should use the test from Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessiwhen assessing whether a clause is a penalty. The test for penalty clauses is yet another one which can be difficult to apply in practice. A sensible approach would be to consider:
- Is the obligation a secondary one triggered by breach?
- What legitimate interest does the innocent party have in performance?
- Is the detriment out of all proportion to that interest? In a consumer contract, consider fairness separately under section 62 and Schedule 2, paragraph 6 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015.
That brings us to the end of this chapter on damages. The next and final chapter will cover the principal other remedies available for a breach of contract.
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