Terms of a Contract Lecture

Last updated: 3 November 2026

This chapter of the module guide will examine how the parties’ agreements are interpreted. We will examine how the terms of the contract are identified, and assess how the courts interpret the meaning of certain terms.

Are statements made pre-contract terms or representations?

The first point to address is in relation to statements made at the pre-contractual stage, which are not in the written contract. The difficulty with these statements is that they are often made orally. Do these statements form part of the agreement or not? Generally, the courts will take an objective approach to consider the intentions of the parties. There are a number of guidelines which the courts use in order to ascertain the intentions of parties.

Pre-contractual statements can be categorised as one of the following:

  • Puffs
  • Terms
  • Representations

A puff

A mere puff is promotional language that a reasonable person would not take as a factual assurance or a contractual promise. As example of a puff would be an advertisement for a theme park which stated “you will have the time of your life at our theme park”, what if you didn’t have “the time of your life”, would you be able to sue for breach of contract? Evidently, this is a statement not meant to be taken literally, and is an advertising gimmick. The advertisement in Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co [1893] 1 QB 256 was argued to be a puff unsuccessfully.

Term or representation? Why does it matter?

A false statement can be both a contractual term and an actionable misrepresentation. Why does it matter which claim the aggrieved party brings? The significance is the form of remedy, as the remedies are different for the two. First, it is helpful to define the two.

Term: A promise as to the truth of a statement

Representation: A statement that induces the making of the contract. It need not be a promise.

The ability to claim damages

Term: On a breach of a term, there is automatically a right to claim for damages

Misrepresentation: Damages may be claimed for deceit or negligent misstatement. Under section 2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967, a contracting party who made an actionable misrepresentation is liable for the resulting loss unless they prove they had reasonable grounds for believing it and did believe it until the contract was made. For a non-fraudulent misrepresentation, the court can also award damages in place of rescission under section 2(2) if the right to rescind still exists.

The measure of damages

Term: Damages are usually based on an expectation measure - the claimant will be put into the position they would have been in had the contract been properly performed

Misrepresentation: Damages for deceit or under section 2(1) compensate the claimant for the loss caused by entering into the transaction.

Which measure gives the larger award depends on the loss. The rules on remoteness also differ.

Term: Damages will be recoverable based on the remoteness rule from Hadley v Baxendale(1854) 9 Exch 341 (see chapter on damages for more information). This test requires that the loss suffered by the claimant was of a kind within the reasonable contemplation of the parties when they contracted.

Representation: Fraudulent misrepresentation will allow for a claim for all direct loss by the claimant, irrespective of foreseeability. The same measure applies under section 2(1) (Royscot Trust Ltd v Rogerson [1991] 2 QB 297).

Where both claims succeed, the claimant cannot recover twice for the same loss. Therefore, it becomes clear that it is extremely important to the outcome of the case whether a statement is classed as a term or representation, it could be the difference between thousands of pounds in damages.

The difference between a term and a representation

This section will examine the key differences between a term and a representation, and how the courts will make a decision on the matter. Some presumptions and guiding factors which the courts will consider will be examined, these are as follows:

  1. Is the statement in writing?
  2. Is there any specialist skill or knowledge from one party?
  3. Is there reliance on the statement, or importance placed on the statement?
  4. How long was the lapse of time between the statement being made and the formation of the contract?
  5. Could the party relying on the statement have verified it?

Is the statement in writing?

Including a statement in the written contract is evidence that the parties intended it to be a term. A statement made in writing during negotiations is not automatically a term. There are a variety of different rules related to this. Each will be examined in turn.

The parol evidence rule

Even if there is a written contract, parties may claim there are other terms in the contract, perhaps ones in another document, or ones from an oral agreement.

If the parties intended a document to record their whole agreement, evidence of earlier statements cannot generally be used to add to, vary or contradict its terms. The case of Henderson v Arthur [1907] 1 KB 10 is authority for this point. This is known as the ‘parol evidence’ rule.

It should be noted that there will be circumstances in which other documents or oral agreements can form terms, but this is the initial starting point for the courts when faced with terms reduced to writing. One such rebuttal to this can be found in J. Evans & Son (Portsmouth) Ltd v Andrea Merzario [1976] 1 WLR 1078. If the contract was intended to be partly written and partly oral, the parol evidence rule will not apply. To this effect, the courts will look at the conduct of the parties from the start to the end of the contract formation.

Exam consideration: Can you think of some example of conduct which may mean that oral evidence is allowed and the parol evidence rule would be displaced?

Collateral contracts

The parol evidence rule can be circumvented by the use of a collateral contract. The courts may hold that a promise made before the written contract and intended to induce entry into it may form a collateral contract which runs alongside the written contract. This collateral contract would be enforceable, the consideration for the promise would be the making of the main written contract.

A conflict with the written contract counts against finding a collateral promise, but is not conclusive. In City and Westminster Properties (1934) Ltd v Mudd [1959] Ch 129, the landlord had specifically promised not to enforce a restriction in the lease.

Incorporation and enforceability are separate questions. The Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 prohibits some exclusions of business liability and subjects others to a reasonableness test. An unfair term in a consumer contract is not binding on the consumer under section 62 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015.

The document being signed also must be one which would be expected to contain contractual terms. In Grogan v Robin Meredith Plant Hire [1996] CLC 1127 signing a time sheet to confirm hours worked did not vary the existing hire agreement by adding new contractual terms.

Is there any specialist skill or knowledge from one party?

If the individual making the statement has some specialist skill/knowledge of the contractual subject matter, or claims to have such knowledge, the presumption is that the statement is more likely to be a term.

These two contrasting cases should help aid your understanding of this principle.

In Oscar Chess Ltd v Williams [1957] 1 WLR 370, a car seller represented his car to be a model which was worth substantially more than the actual model he was selling. This statement was held not to be a term, as the seller had no specialist knowledge, and used what the registration book told him. Furthermore, the buyers were actual car dealers, and were better placed to check the year of manufacture.

In Dick Bentley Productions Ltd v Harold Smith (Motors) Ltd [1965] 1 WLR 623 a car dealer stated a car had only done 20,000 miles since its engine and gearbox were replaced, when it had done significantly more. As the statement was made by a car dealer, with specific knowledge, the statement was held to be a term.

The distinction between these cases is the credentials of the person making the statement. The private seller did not claim to, nor would it have been presumed that he had specialist knowledge, whereas it would be presumed a car dealer would.

Is there reliance on the statement, or importance placed on the statement?

If the individual relying on the statement makes it clear that the statement was of such importance that they would unlikely have contracted without that guarantee, this points towards a term. Two questions help assess its importance.

  1. Is the statement so important that the party would not have entered into the contract but for the statement?
  2. Is the above importance clear to the statement maker at the time this statement is made, either by an express statement or it would be clear from the contractual circumstances

The case of Bannerman v White(1861) 10 CB NS 844 Party A asked whether sulphur was used in the product he was buying, explicitly stating he was not interested if they included sulphur. He was assured by Party B that there was no sulphur included. This is an example of expressly confirming the importance of a term, therefore, when there was sulphur included, the buyers could reject the hops and resist the seller’s claim for the price.

The case of Pritchard v Cook (Court of Appeal, 4 June 1998) illustrates the importance of identifying who takes responsibility for information passed on. The question to ask is if whether the statement maker is taking personal responsibility for the statement.

How long was the lapse of time between the statement being made and the formation of the contract?

If a statement made during negotiations is omitted from the eventual written contract, that may suggest the maker did not undertake contractual responsibility for it - Heilbut, Symons and Co. v Buckleton [1913] AC 30.

A delay between the statement and the agreement may also count against it being a term, as in Routledge v McKay [1954] 1 WLR 615. An entire agreement clause may exclude an earlier collateral assurance, as in Inntrepreneur Pub Co v East Crown Ltd [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 611.

These presumptions can be rebutted if the parties’ intentions are clear through another means.

Could the party relying on the statement have verified it?

There are two presumptions which fall under this heading. First, if a statement maker accepts responsibility for the truth of a statement, the statement will be a term. This was seen in Schawel v Reade [1913] 2 IR 81, where Party A were examining a horse, and Party B stated the quality of the horse was fine and they did not need to inspect it. This statement was held to be a term.

The second presumption is that where a statement is made, but that party advises or tells the other party to verify that statement, this points towards a representation rather than a contractual promise. This is because the statement maker suggests the statement may not be true and he would advise it is confirmed. Ecay v Godfrey(1947) 80 Lloyd’s Rep 286 is good authority for this point.

Incorporation of terms

Once a statement has been identified as a term of a contract, it is not the case that this will always be binding on the parties; the term must have been successfully incorporated into the contract. Only following incorporation will that term become a part of the contractual obligations. There are three main ways by which this may be done:

  1. Signature
  2. Notice
  3. Previous course of dealings

Signature

The case of L’Estrange v F. Graucob Ltd [1934] 2 KB 394 outlines the importance of a signature to the contractual document. It is held that if a party signs a document containing contractual terms, the signature ordinarily signifies agreement to its terms. The terms in the signed contractual document are generally incorporated even if unread, subject to the exceptions below and statutory controls.

This presumption is limited in that a party may be unable to rely on a term whose effect it misrepresented when obtaining the signature, as shown in Curtis v Chemical Cleaning and Dyeing Co [1951] 1 KB 805, where the receipt for a dress excluded all liability for damage. The customer only signed the receipt because the assistant misrepresented the terms as applying to damage to the beads and sequins on the dress.

Exam consideration: Aren’t the two decisions in L’Estrange v F. Graucob Ltd and Curtis v Chemical Cleaning and Dyeing Co [1951] 1 KB 805 conflicting? Surely the customer in Curtis should have been bound no matter what as per L’estrange. Consider the commercial difficulties if the Curtis exception did not operate.

Notice

In order for a term to be incorporated into the contract, the party who it confers obligations upon must be or ought to be aware of its existence. In light of this, there are two requirements.

  1. The term must be included in a document in which contractual terms would normally be found
  2. There has been reasonable notice of the existence of these terms before or at the time of contracting
Documents

The most famous case on this matter is Chapelton v Barry Urban District Council [1940] 1 KB 532. In this case, Party A hired deckchairs from Party B. The ticket he was given contained a term exempting the council for liability for any injury in relation to the hiring of those chairs. It was held that the term was not incorporated into the contract, as a ticket was a receipt, and not a contractual document.

Here are the two main factors to consider when assessing a document to decide whether it is contractual:

  1. What the document is called is not conclusive - the document does not have to be specifically identified as a contract
  2. This document must be delivered before the contract or at the time of the contract

Grogan v Robin Meredith Plant Hire [1996] CLC 1127 shows why a time sheet used to record work already performed will not ordinarily add terms to the original agreement. The same question arises with an invoice or statement of account. What matters is the function of the document in the particular transaction.

Reasonable Notice

The question is whether reasonable steps were taken to bring the terms to the other party’s notice. There is no requirement that the other party actually read them.

Parker v South Eastern Railway (1877) 2 CPD 416 distinguished actual knowledge from reasonable notice. A person who did not know a ticket contained conditions could still be bound if the issuer took reasonable steps to draw attention to them.

This objective consideration is highlighted particularly in Thompson v London, Midland and Scottish Railway [1930] 1 KB 41, where it was held to be irrelevant that the individual was illiterate if this fact is not known by the party supplying the document with the terms. If the issuer knows of a difficulty that prevents the recipient reading the document, what amounts to reasonable notice may differ.

Terms can also be incorporated by referring the party to a different document which has the terms in. Thompson v London, Midland and Scottish Railway highlights this, the ticket stated “subject to conditions set out in timetables”. Although the actual contractual document did not have these conditions in, the reference was enough to objectively incorporate them.

In order for the terms to be incorporated by reference, the document referred to must be ‘readily available’. In Sterling Hydraulics Ltd v Dichtomatik Ltd [2006] EWHC 2004 (QB), a term referred the party to their general terms of sale. However, these terms of sale were not sent with the contractual document, and had not otherwise been adequately brought to the buyer’s attention. Online, a clearly signposted link available before the customer agrees can suffice. In Parker-Grennan v Camelot UK Lotteries Ltd [2024] EWCA Civ 185 the customer could open the terms before ticking the box to accept them.

Before or at the time of contracting

The reasonable notice must be given either before or at the time of contracting. In Olley v Marlborough Court Ltd [1949] 1 KB 532, a hotel excluded liability for loss to personal possessions of the guests. This notice was on the doors of the hotel rooms. The contract was formed at the hotel desk, therefore the notice was deemed to be after the formation of the contract, and the exclusion could not be relied upon.

One unique circumstance of incorporation and notice relates to ticket machines. The case of Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking Ltd [1971] QB 163 has affirmed the fact if terms of a contract are included on a ticket which is printed after the money has been paid, the contract has been formed already, and therefore the terms are not incorporated. Following, the terms relating to contracts through automated machines must be made clear before the ticket has been purchased, perhaps by a sign or another form of notification.

Different standards for different terms

Where incorporation depends on notice, a particularly onerous or unusual term needs more prominent notice. In Interfoto Picture Library Ltd v Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd [1989] QB 433 a term in the contract stipulated there would be a late fee of £5 plus VAT per transparency per day. The court considered this term as onerous and unusual, and therefore would have had to have been brought directly to the attention of the party subject to the term. Examples of ways this might be done are:

  • Large sized print in the contract
  • Placed in a box in the document to highlight the term

It should be noted that the term does not need to be both onerous and unusual, only one of the factors need be satisfied - Ocean Chemical Transport Inc v Exnor Craggs Ltd [2000] 1 All ER (Comm) 519

Previous course of dealings

There are some occasions where notice of terms will not be required to be given. This will be on the basis that the parties have had a previous course of dealings, and therefore will be aware of all the relevant terms. Where parties regularly contract with consistency in terms and conditions, the terms may be held to be incorporated - Hardwick Game Farm v Suffolk Agricultural Poultry Producers Association [1969] 2 AC 31. It will be for the party attempting to rely on the fact the term has been incorporated to prove the past dealings have been sufficiently consistent enough to imply the terms into the contract.

The two requirements are:

  1. There must be sufficient notice of the term
  2. The previous dealings must have been sufficiently consistent
Sufficient notice

Sufficient notice refers to the terms being present at some point in the previous dealings. In Spurling v Bradshaw [1956] 1 WLR 461, the parties had dealt with each other for a number of years. After every contract, Party A sent Party B a “landing account” which excluded their liability. Due to the fact there was such a large amount of previous dealings, this term was held to be included in all of the following agreements.

The parties in Spurling v Bradshaw had dealt with each other for a number of years, but it is unclear exactly how many dealings are required to result in a decision such as in Spurling v Bradshaw. The case of Hollier v Rambler Motors (AMC) Ltd [1972] 2 QB 71 confirmed that three or four dealings over five years did not result in any terms being implied due to previous course of dealings.

Exam consideration: As there is no law which tells us exactly how many previous dealings are required to result in terms implied through a previous course of dealing, in a problem question, ensure to contrast both cases and form a reasoned judgment - there can’t be a wrong answer if you substantiate your conclusion well!

Consistency in the dealings

This requirement highlights the need for consistency in the previous dealings, if the term relied upon has varied from one dealing to the next, the party relying on it must show why that version formed part of the present contract.

McCutcheon v David MacBrayne Ltd [1964] 1 WLR 125 was a case in which the consistency in the dealings was not sufficient. In the past course of dealings, there was inconsistency in whether one party was required to sign a “risk note” which included an exclusion clause. In the particular dealing where the other party attempted to rely on this clause, the risk note was not signed. The court could not incorporate the term due to the inconsistency of the dealings, as the dealings only sometimes required the risk note to be signed.

Nature of terms - express or implied?

A term may be incorporated into the contract either expressly or impliedly. Express terms are those which have been explicitly communicated between the parties orally or in writing. If the meaning of an express term is disputed, the court asks what a reasonable person with the background knowledge available to both parties would understand it to mean. It reads the words in the context of the whole agreement and its commercial purpose (Wood v Capita Insurance Services Ltd [2017] UKSC 24).

Implied terms are those terms which fill the gaps in the contract. For example, take a contract in which an individual goes to a restaurant for a meal. The express contractual terms will be for the exchange of an amount of money for the food. However, there will be implied terms as to the quality of the food; for example, it will be implied that the food will be cooked correctly. If for each and every contract each term needed to be expressed, it would be very tedious and inefficient. Therefore, terms can be implied in the following ways:

  1. Custom
  2. Law
  3. Fact

Terms implied by custom

There is potential for terms to be implied based on established custom or usage in the relevant field. An example of this can be found in Hutton v Warren(1836) 1 M & W 466, in relation to an agricultural lease. In this case, a term was implied by custom that the tenants were entitled to an allowance for seed and labour. This was usual and custom in agricultural leases. The main three requirements are

  1. The term is certain, reasonable and sufficiently well established or ‘notorious’ in that trade context
  2. The term is not inconsistent with any of the express terms
  3. Both parties must be involved in the trade context in such a way that they would be expected to be aware of the term being custom in that context

An example which satisfied this test was in British Crane Hire Corporation Ltd v Ipswich Plant Hire Ltd [1975] QB 303, in which the ‘Contractors’ Plant Association’ terms were incorporated because both parties were plant hirers and shared an understanding that plant was hired on those conditions.

Terms implied by law

Terms in law can be implied irrespective of the intentions of the parties, they relate to legal obligations imposed either by the courts or by statute.

Terms implied by the courts

The basic requirements for a term to be implied by courts are:

  1. The term is implied in all contracts of that type, as a policy matter
  2. The term must be necessary
  3. The term must be reasonable to imply

The case of Liverpool City council v Irwin [1977] AC 239 is the leading authority here. In this case, the council let some flats to tenants. The tenants withheld rent and the council sought possession. The tenancy did not expressly say who should maintain the common parts. The House of Lords implied an obligation on the council to take reasonable care to keep them in reasonable repair and fit for use. The tenants did not establish a breach of that obligation.

Therefore, it can be seen that the implied term was a necessity in order for the tenants to be granted other rights in the contract. The question is whether the obligation is a necessary incident of the type of contract. In Spring v Guardian Assurance plc [1995] 2 AC 296 this approach was clarified. Lord Woolf explained that it was also based on what ‘normal practice’ would be in the context.

In Liverpool City Council v Irwin, access to the flats depended on the common parts, which the council retained under its control.

Terms implied by statute

Where it has been deemed necessary by the legislature, certain terms have been implied into contracts by statute. The most obvious example of this relates to the sale or supply of goods.

The Sale of Goods Act 1979 continues to govern, for example, a sale between two businesses. In contracts between traders and consumers made from 1 October 2015, the principal terms governing goods are now in the Consumer Rights Act 2015. Here are some of the terms of the 1979 Act:

  • Section 14(2) provides that in the sale of goods in the course of a business, there is an implied term that the goods will be of satisfactory quality
  • Section 14(3) requires reasonable fitness for a particular purpose made known to a seller acting in the course of business, unless the buyer does not rely, or it is unreasonable to rely, on the seller’s skill or judgment.
  • Section 13(1) implies that where goods have been sold by description, the goods will correspond with this description

For consumer goods, sections 9 to 11 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 cover satisfactory quality, fitness for a particular purpose and correspondence with description. Sections 34 to 36 make similar provision for digital content. Under sections 49 and 50, a trader must perform a service with reasonable care and skill, and what the trader says about itself or the service can be binding if the consumer takes it into account when deciding to contract or when making a later decision about the service.

Terms implied by fact

Some contracts will include terms which are implied by the facts surrounding the contract, on the basis of the parties’ intentions. This is a strange implication, as the courts have always wished to focus on giving effect to the parties’ intention, surely if they intended something to be a term of the contract, they would have expressed this wish and it would not have to be implied? The starting position, therefore, is that the courts should not interfere and imply terms - Attorney-General of Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd [2009] UKPC 10

The Supreme Court clarified the test in Marks and Spencer plc v BNP Paribas Securities Services Trust Co (Jersey) Ltd [2015] UKSC 72. The court first interprets the express terms. An implied term must be capable of clear expression and consistent with those terms. It must also satisfy one of two closely related tests:

  1. The ‘officious bystander’ test
  2. The ‘business efficacy’ test
The ‘officious bystander’ test

This test was created in Shirlaw v Southern Foundries (1926) Ltd [1939] 2 KB 206. Essentially, it would be a term implied because it would be so obvious that it would go without saying. The test, as explained by MacKinnon LJ is:

“If, while the parties were making their bargain, an officious bystander were to suggest some express provision for it in their agreement, they would testily suppress him with a common ‘Oh, of course!’”

This standard is rather strict and subsequently it becomes difficult to imply terms using it. The difficulty is that is requires a theoretical unquestionable assent by both parties to the implied term.

The ‘business efficacy’ test

The business efficacy test asks whether the contract would lack commercial or practical coherence without the proposed term. It is not enough that the term would make a better bargain.

The Moorcock (1889) 14 PD 64 is a prime example of this. In that case, there was a contract to unload a ship on the river Thames. The parties were aware the ship would settle on the riverbed at low tide. The ship was damaged on uneven ground at low tide. The wharf owners were under an implied duty to take reasonable care to ascertain the condition of the riverbed and warn the shipowners of danger.

The reasoning behind this term being implied is that this term must have been the intention of the parties, as without this term, the contract could not have been performed as intended and it was needed for the contract to work.

Generally, it was set out in SABIC UK Petrochemicals Ltd v Punj Lloyd Ltd [2013] EWHC 2916 (TCC) that the court considered both business efficacy and obviousness. The alternatives are:

  1. The term is necessary for the contract’s operation, or
  2. The term is so obvious that it goes without saying.

Exam consideration: In the restaurant example, which terms about the food and service follow from the Consumer Rights Act 2015? Would you need to imply those terms in fact?

Different types of terms

Contractual terms can be classified as one of three different types of terms:

  1. Conditions
  2. Warranties
  3. Innominate

The importance of this classification is the extent a breach of each term will have in the event they are breached.

Conditions and warranties

A condition is the most important of terms. If a condition of a contract is breached, the aggrieved party can choose to end the parties’ outstanding obligations to perform, subject to any terms that survive termination, and will have the right to sue for damages. A condition will be typically described as being of fundamental importance to the contract.

In contrast, a warranty is of less importance to the contract. The result of a breach of warranty is the innocent party can claim damages for that specific breach of contract, but will not be able to bring the contract to an end, their contractual obligations will continue despite this breach.

As you can identify, it will be of utmost importance when a party breaches a term whether that term is a condition or a warranty. There are three main ways the classification can be presumed:

  1. Statutory presumption
  2. Identified by parties
  3. The importance of the term to the contract
Statutory presumption

As we are now aware, there are some terms of contracts which are implied by statute. It may be the case that the statute in question expressly defines whether the term is a condition or a warranty. To use the example we examined when discussing terms implied at statute, the terms in the Sale of Goods Act 1979 are a mixture of conditions and warranties, as set out in sections 12 to 15. Under section 15A, unless a contrary intention appears, the seller can defeat rejection for a breach of sections 13 to 15 by showing that the breach is so slight that rejection would be unreasonable. Consumer remedies for goods under the 2015 Act are set out separately in sections 19 to 24.

Identification of the term by parties

The parties may imply a term to be a condition or a warranty. Take the following example of two terms in a contract.

  • If the windows are not cleaned on time, I will have no further obligations under the contract
  • I will be entitled to £50 if the windows are not cleaned on time

The first clause expressly allows the customer to end the contract for delay. The second fixes a sum payable for delay. Without more, specifying that sum does not tell us whether the customer can also terminate.

Interestingly, the fact that the parties have expressly labelled a term as a condition or a warranty will not always mean this is the case. In L Schuler AG v Wickman Machine Tools Sales Ltd [1974] AC 235 a term in the contract stated a term would be a condition. However, the court held the visits clause, read in the context of the whole contract, did not allow termination for a single missed visit simply because the parties had called it a condition. This brings us to the final way of categorising a term.

Importance of the term to the contract

In the absence of statutory or party intention, a holistic overview of the contract will be required in order to ascertain the importance of the term to the contract. The presumption being the more important the term is to the contract, the more likely the term will be a condition. Subsequently, if a term is less important to the contract, it may be a warranty or an innominate term.

The two contrasting cases of Poussard v Spiers and Pond (1876) 1 QBD 410 and Bettini v Gye (1876) 1 QBD 183 give an excellent illustration of this. Both contracts involved similar facts in which there was a singer who was contracted to perform in a show. The disputes concerned different obligations under those engagements.

In Poussard, the singer failed to perform on the opening night of the show. This was held to be a condition. In Bettini, the singer failed to show up to rehearsals, this was held to be a warranty. Clearly, the performance in the show was of more importance in the contract, and could therefore be classified as a condition, whereas the term to show up for rehearsal in Bettini could only be a warranty due to its lack of importance to the contract as a whole.

Innominate terms

An innominate term is neither a condition nor a warranty. It remains an innominate term after breach. Whether the innocent party can terminate depends on the consequences of the particular breach.

An example of such a term comes in Hongkong Fir Shipping Co Ltd v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd [1962] 2 QB 26 in a contract for the lease of a ship. The term is question was that the ship must “be in every way fitted for ordinary cargo service”. The ship’s engine-room staff were inadequate and inefficient, and engine trouble put the ship out of service. At the time the charterers purported to terminate, a substantial part of the two-year charter remained available once repairs were completed.

The delays entitled the charterers to damages, but did not justify termination. A more serious breach of the same seaworthiness obligation could do so. The question the courts ask is:

  • Do the consequences of the breach deprive the innocent party of substantially the whole benefit they were intended to obtain from the contract?

If yes, the innocent party may terminate and claim damages. If no, the contract continues and damages may still be claimed.

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