Breach of Duty Lecture

Edited by: Barclay Littlewood

Last updated: 3 November 2026

Once a duty of care has been found, it is then necessary to ask whether the defendant has acted in such a way as to have breached that duty of care. The key thing to ascertain here is therefore the standard expected of the defendant. Once that has been done, it is also necessary to examine the actions of the defendant to see whether they have fallen short of this standard.

Before continuing, it should be noted that reasonable foreseeability is relevant to the precautions a reasonable person would take. This means that the courts will not ask the defendant only what they foresaw. They will consider what a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have foreseen at the time, without hindsight (Roe v Minister of Health [1954] 2 QB 66). A low probability of harm is relevant but does not rule out a breach. See Fardon v Harcourt-Rivington [1932] All ER Rep 81 - the defendant's dog, which was usually docile, was left in the defendant's car. The dog broke a window, resulting in glass entering the claimant's eye. The courts ruled the outcome was a 'fantastic possibility', and therefore not foreseeable. In contrast, the defendant was only obliged to avoid 'reasonable probabilities'.

So, before dealing with any case, it is first worth asking 'are the claimant's injuries caused by a fantastic possibility, or a reasonable probability?' The type of harm need not have been more likely than not, nor need its precise sequence have been foreseeable. If the risk was merely fanciful, the courts are unlikely to rule that the duty of care was breached.

Ascertaining the Standard of Care for Different Defendants

The existence of a duty of care does not mandate perfect behaviour. Whilst there is certainly a duty of care between drivers and other road users, this duty does not mandate that every driver must drive perfectly. Instead, the law strikes a balance between providing compensation where a failure to take reasonable care has caused harm, and where a genuine accident has occurred. As such, Donoghue v Stevenson (and subsequent cases) have held defendants to the standard of the reasonable person. If a defendant has acted reasonably, then they will not have breached the duty of care, and vice versa. Although this seemingly suggests that defendants are always judged against objective standards, there does exist some scope to alter the test, depending on the characteristics of the defendant.

The general rule is that defendants are expected to act with a reasonable level of skill in the activity they are undertaking. Consider the leading case of Nettleship v Weston.

Case in Focus: Nettleship v Weston [1971] 3 WLR 370

The defendant was a learner driver, taking lessons from a friend - the claimant. Before agreeing to teach her, the claimant checked to see if the defendant's insurance covered passengers. After turning a bend, the claimant told the defendant to straighten the wheel. She panicked and failed to straighten the car in time. Despite the claimant’s intervention, the car crashed into a lamppost, fracturing his kneecap.

The defendant argued two points. Firstly, that as a learner driver, she should be judged against a lower standard of care (and therefore, that her actions did not breach the standard of care expected of a learner driver.) Secondly, that because the claimant agreed to get into the car with a learner driver, a defence of volenti non fit injuria (voluntary acceptance of risk) applied.

Both of these arguments failed. The courts held that a learner driver should be judged against the standard of a reasonably competent driver.

The second argument failed on the grounds that the claimant did not waive his rights - he demonstrated this when he checked the driver's insurance. However, he shared control of the car and his damages were reduced by 50% for contributory negligence.

Thus, a learner driver is not entitled to a lower standard of care. So, the standard of care expected of, for example, an amateur archer, is the same as the standard of care expected of a reasonably competent archer. In essence, this means that a defendant cannot rely on their own lack of skill or knowledge as a defence. The most important general principle regarding breach is therefore that the applicable standard of care is that of a reasonably competent person undertaking that activity.

Hall v Brooklands Auto-Racing Club [1933] 1 KB 205 provides further guidance as to the standard of behaviour expected of a 'reasonably competent person'. During a motor race two cars collided and one went into the spectators, killing and injuring people. The Court of Appeal considered whether the organisers had taken reasonable precautions. In identifying the 'reasonable man', some guidance was provided, describing him, at points, as 'the man in the street' or 'the man in the Clapham omnibus'. Essentially, the reasonable person should not be considered as acting perfectly, but with the care reasonably to be expected in the circumstances.

As might be expected, there are a number of exceptions to the general rule, as follows.

Defendants with Certain Medical Conditions

An unforeseen medical condition can affect whether a driver is in breach. This can be seen in Mansfield v Weetabix.

Case in Focus: Mansfield v Weetabix [1997] EWCA Civ 1352, [1998] 1 WLR 1263

The defendant company’s driver was suffering from an undiagnosed condition (malignant insulinoma, resulting in hypoglycaemia), and as a result drove his lorry into a shop owned by the claimant. The driver had also been involved in two minor accidents on the same day. The outcome is best explained by Leggatt LJ:

"In my judgment the standard of care that [the driver] was obliged to show in these circumstances was that which is to be expected of a reasonably competent driver unaware that he is or may be suffering from a condition that impairs his ability to drive. To apply an objective standard in a way that did not take account of [his] condition would be to impose strict liability..."
- Leggatt LJ, at 1268

It is important to take note of the logic at play here - if the driver was held to be negligent then this would involve blaming him for an accident he had no reasonable way of preventing. At the same time, it can be argued that the shop owner had absolutely nothing to do with the destruction of his shop, and so should be able to recover. Regardless, this case demonstrates that the courts will not simply seek to find the person who is most to blame for an incident. Rather, they will ensure that a party has passed a certain threshold for culpability before they are held responsible.

However, the distinction between impaired judgment and wholly involuntary conduct was examined by the Court of Appeal in Dunnage v Randall [2015] EWCA Civ 673. In that case, the defendant suffered from paranoid schizophrenia and set fire to himself and his nephew (the claimant) after dousing himself in petrol. The Court of Appeal held that the standard of care in negligence is objective and does not vary according to a defendant's mental condition. Rafferty LJ held that the correct approach is not to lower the standard of care on account of the defendant's condition, but rather to ask whether the defendant's act was voluntary in the first place. If a person's conduct is wholly involuntary (for example, because of an unforeseeable medical episode), there is no negligent act at all. But if the conduct is voluntary, the objective standard applies regardless of any mental or physical condition.

The position can therefore be summarised as follows: the standard of care is objective. Where a defendant was genuinely unaware of a condition and the resulting loss of control was truly involuntary, they may escape liability - not because the standard is lowered, but because there is no voluntary act to which the standard can attach. Dunnage did not overrule Mansfield. In Mansfield the driver neither knew nor ought to have known that his ability to drive was impaired. In Dunnage the illness impaired the defendant’s judgment but did not wholly deprive him of control over his actions.

Children

As might be expected, children are held to a different standard from adults when it comes to determining the applicable standard of care. The standard is instead that of an ordinary child of the defendant's age, as per Orchard v Lee [2009] EWCA Civ 295. In the case a 13-year-old was playing in a playground at his school. He ran into the claimant (who was a lunchtime supervisor) and injured her. The courts ruled that no breach had occurred - the 13-year-old was acting in the usual manner expected of a 13-year-old.

However, this should not be taken as meaning that children are able to escape all liability - thus, in Mullin v Richards [1998] 1 WLR 1304 the courts considered a similar question as in Orchard - the claimant and defendant were mock-fighting with plastic rulers. One of the rulers broke, causing an injury to the claimant's eye. At trial the judge found liability and reduced damages by 50% for contributory negligence. The Court of Appeal reversed that decision: an ordinarily prudent 15-year-old would not have foreseen a significant risk of injury from the game as played.

It is worth noting that there is no fixed minimum age for liability in negligence in England and Wales (although of course, the younger the child, the harder it will be to show a breach of the standard of care). As such, whilst young age will often help a defendant avoid liability, it does not operate as a complete defence.

Sporting Events

What reasonable care requires of a sporting participant depends on the circumstances of the sport. This is exhibited in Wooldridge v Sumner [1963] 2 QB 43. The defendant was participating in an equestrian event when his horse went out of control, left the track and injured a spectating photographer. It was held that there was no negligence on the part of the rider, rather a simple error of judgment (which might reasonably be made by a participant). The logic behind such a decision is also expounded upon, by Diplock LJ at 67: "A reasonable spectator attending voluntarily to witness any game or competition knows and presumably desires that a reasonable participant will concentrate his attention upon winning [...] If the participant does so concentrate his attention [...] the question whether any mistake he makes amounts to a breach of duty to take reasonable care must take account of those circumstances". In essence, Diplock LJ notes the inherent risks involved in sporting activities - they often involve moving faster or more violently than would ordinarily be expected of an individual. Consider the difference between someone driving on the road and someone driving on a race track - whilst the activity is similar, the expected standard of behaviour differs greatly. This is taken into account by the law.

However, it is worth keeping in mind that participants in sporting activities must still act in a manner reasonably expected of someone playing that sport. This is exhibited in Caldwell v Maguire [2001] EWCA Civ 1054 - the claimant was injured when he fell off his horse during a race. It was submitted that two other jockeys had undertaken an unsafe manoeuvre, causing the fall. In examining the claim, the courts noted that the standard was that of a reasonable competitor in the particular circumstances. An error of judgment or a breach of the rules did not by itself establish negligence, and the claim failed. Instead, sporting competitors are still expected to act in a reasonable manner - both in terms of following the rules of a sport and in terms of acting with skill and aptitude.

Those Acting as Professionals

An additional expectation exists regarding those who are acting as a professional. The relevant standard of care in such situations is not that of the reasonable person. Instead, professionals are judged against the standards of their profession. The standard is that of a reasonably competent person in the post. A junior doctor may need to seek senior assistance (FB v Princess Alexandra Hospital NHS Trust [2017] EWCA Civ 334). For clinical judgment this is reflected in the Bolam test.

Case in Focus: Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 583

The claimant underwent a course of electro-convulsive therapy (ECT) in a hospital whilst being treated for severe depression. Such treatment had the aim of causing seizures. Modern ECT is given under general anaesthesia with a muscle relaxant. The defendant failed to provide the claimant with either muscle relaxants or restraints during the procedure, and as a result the claimant suffered from a number of dislocations and fractures.

The question was what a reasonably competent practitioner would do. As in the later case of Nettleship, the standard was objective, but there were conflicting views within the medical profession on the use of relaxants or restraints during the procedure. As such, McNair J directed the jury on what became the Bolam test: that is, those acting as professionals are expected to act in accordance with a practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of professional opinion. Because a body of opinion existed which stated that it was preferable to carry out the procedure without relaxants or restraints, the practitioner had not breached the standard of care, and the claim therefore failed.

Although Bolam involved medical practitioners, it has been held to apply in general to other professionals. This has also involved widening the test to take into account non-traditional professions. Thus, it has been applied in cases involving auctioneers in Luxmoore-May v Messenger May Baverstock [1990] 1 WLR 1009, through to window designers in Adams v Rhymney Valley DC [2000] Lloyd's Rep PN 777.

There is one further clarification to the rule for professionals, as per Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority [1998] AC 232. The claimant (a 2-year-old child) was a patient in hospital who suffered respiratory failure and later died. The failure to attend was admitted to be negligent. The doctor said she would not have intubated him had she attended. The issue was whether that decision would itself have been negligent, in which case the failure to attend would have caused the injury. The House of Lords held that a course of action must be capable of withstanding logical analysis before it is protected by the Bolam test. Thus, the overall principle is that for professionals, the minimum expected standard of care is based on a body of professional opinion, but that opinion must be logically defensible. In Bolitho itself, it was ruled that there was a logically defensible argument to be made regarding not intubating, and so the claim failed.

It is also essential to note a significant limitation on the Bolam test. In Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11, the Supreme Court held that the Bolam test does not apply to the question of what risks a doctor must disclose to a patient before treatment. The claimant, a woman of small stature with diabetes, gave birth vaginally rather than by caesarean section. Her son suffered severe injuries during the birth due to a complication (shoulder dystocia) which the doctor had not warned her about. The Supreme Court departed from the previous approach in Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital [1985] AC 871 (which had applied the Bolam test to the question of disclosure) and held that a doctor has a duty to take reasonable care to ensure that a patient is aware of any material risks involved in proposed treatment, and of any reasonable alternative treatments. A risk is "material" if a reasonable person in the patient's position would be likely to attach significance to it, or if the doctor is or should reasonably be aware that the particular patient would be likely to attach significance to it. The doctor need not force information on a patient who does not want it. The narrow exceptions for necessity and for disclosure reasonably considered seriously detrimental to the patient’s health do not permit withholding information merely because a patient might refuse treatment.

Exam Consideration: Students should be clear about the current scope of the Bolam test. Following Bolitho and Montgomery, the position is: (1) for questions of diagnosis and treatment, the Bolam test applies, subject to the Bolitho requirement of logical defensibility; but (2) for questions of disclosure of risks and informed consent, the Bolam test does not apply - instead, the test is whether the risk is material to a reasonable person in the patient’s position or to this particular patient (Montgomery). Whether an alternative treatment is clinically reasonable is a matter for professional judgment supported by a responsible body of medical opinion (McCulloch v Forth Valley Health Board [2023] UKSC 26). This is a crucial distinction in medical negligence cases.

Clarifying the Reasonable Standard of Care

The courts will often see novel situations which defy quick reference to the reasonable person due to their unique facts or circumstances. The courts have therefore created a framework which deals with the factors surrounding a given incidence of negligence. The relevant standard of care therefore shifts depending both on the nature of the defendant, and the nature of the activity being undertaken.

Magnitude of Risk

There are two ways the magnitude of risk affects the relevant standard of care. The first of these is likelihood of risk, and the second is the seriousness of the risk involved.

If a risk is particularly pronounced, then there will be an expectation that the reasonable person will act to prevent that risk from occurring, as per Bolton v Stone [1951] AC 850 and Miller v Jackson [1977] QB 966. Both cases involved damage caused by errant cricket balls; however, in the former case it was shown that cricket balls rarely left the cricket ground, and so the risk of damage was small. Conversely, in the latter case, cricket balls left the ground several times every season, constituting a recurring risk. In Bolton a passer-by was struck. The possibility of injury was foreseeable, but the risk was so small that reasonable care did not require further precautions. In Miller repeated incursions damaged neighbouring property, and the majority found negligence.

The same principle can be seen operating in Haley v London Electricity Board [1965] AC 778 - the defendant was sued for failing to provide proper safety measures around a hole it was digging on a London street. As a result, the claimant, who was blind, tripped over a tool placed across the pavement to warn pedestrians, struck his head and became deaf. Because it was held to be a foreseeable risk that a blind person would be walking down the street, and would therefore be unprotected from the hazard, the claim was successful. In contrast, consider a case with similar facts, but in which the hole was dug in a remote field - because the likelihood of a blind person falling into the hole is far lower, different precautions may be reasonable.

This is an arguably logical stance - if, for example, a lab is working with a highly infectious pathogen, we'd want it to act with the utmost care because it presents a serious risk. Conversely, it would be unjust to apply this high standard to a secondary school lab working with some benign bacteria - the likelihood of it harming someone is far, far lower. As such, the law will seek to impose a standard of care which scales proportionally with the risk involved.

Regarding the seriousness of the risk involved, this refers not to whether a harmful event is likely to occur, but rather to the seriousness of the harm which will occur should that harmful event take place. Again, this is based around foreseeability. Thus, in Paris v Stepney Borough Council [1951] AC 367 the claimant, a mechanic, was working for the defendants. He was blind in one eye, and his employers knew this. One day whilst working a chip of metal flew off a vehicle he was working on, and entered his good eye, leaving the claimant completely blind. It was not an ordinary practice to supply goggles to mechanics at the time. However, the courts held that the applicable standard of care was higher because the defendants were aware of the seriousness of harm that might befall their one-eyed employee, but had failed to act. The claim was therefore successful.

In comparison, consider the same situation, but one in which the claimant was only at risk of losing sight in one eye - because the foreseeable harm is less serious, the precautions reasonably required might differ. Paris did not decide that goggles could never be required for a worker with sight in both eyes. Alternatively, consider a situation in which the defendants were not aware of the claimant's blindness in one eye (through no fault of their own). In such a situation, it would not be foreseeable that the claimant might be blinded by a single metal chip, and so the employer would assess the foreseeable risk without that special knowledge. Today regulation 4 of the Personal Protective Equipment at Work Regulations 1992, as amended, requires suitable protective equipment where the risk is not adequately controlled by other equally or more effective means.

This can be brought back to the lab situation above - we'd like a lab working with a dangerous pathogen to be held to a high standard of care because the seriousness of a mistake is high. In contrast, a mistake in the school lab would not be serious at all.

In summary, a higher standard of care will be applied to situations involving either a high likelihood of harm or situations involving a high seriousness of harm (or both).

Cost of Precaution

The courts will take into account the cost of precaution when considering the applicable standard of care. Succinctly: the lower the cost of a precaution, the more reasonable it will be held for the defendant to have taken it, and vice versa. This can be seen in Latimer v AEC Ltd [1953] AC 643. The claimant was working in a factory which became flooded after a heavy storm. The rainwater mixed with an oil-based cooling agent used in the factory, and this left an oily film on the factory floor after the water was drained away. Whilst the defendants spread sawdust over most of the floor, they did not have enough sawdust to cover the entirety of it. The claimant was injured when he slipped on this uncovered floor.

The claim, however, failed. The only way to have prevented the risk would have been to close the affected part of the factory until it had dried out, and this was held to be a disproportionately expensive measure to have taken. As such, not closing the affected section of the factory down did not breach the reasonable standard of care, and the claim failed.

Note: It might be instinctive to conclude that the factory should have had more sawdust on hand to deal with the slipperiness, and that this was the real breach which occurred. However, keep in mind that the reason the entire stock of sawdust was used up was due to the unpredictably heavy rainfall. In other words, the factory's supply of sawdust was enough to deal with reasonably foreseeable situations.

Therefore, when dealing with a risk, an inquiry should be made regarding the cost of prevention. In ascertaining whether a defendant has acted reasonably, the courts will take into account whether preventative measures could have been taken, and the cost of such measures. Even a small but real risk may require precautions if it can readily be avoided at little or no cost (The Wagon Mound (No 2) [1967] 1 AC 617). However, it should be noted that it is unlikely that a defendant will be able to use lack of money as a defence. After all, safety is usually the first concern we'd like businesses and organisations to deal with, rather than financial viability.

Exam Consideration: You're unlikely to have expertise in many of the industries which appear both in relevant cases and problem questions. As such, it's up to you to come up with a coherent argument regarding reasonable industry behaviour when it comes to the cost of prevention.

Social Value of Activity

The social value of an activity is relevant to the risks it is reasonable to take. This principle is best understood via the relevant leading case - Watt v Hertfordshire County Council [1954] 1 WLR 835. The claimant was a fireman on the way to an accident - some 300 yards away from the fire station itself. A heavy lorry jack was required at the scene of the accident, but the usual vehicle for transporting the jack was unavailable. As a result, the fire chief ordered the claimant and another fireman to lift the jack onto the back of a truck. During the journey there was no way of securing the jack, and when the truck braked, the heavy jack fell onto the claimant's leg, causing severe injuries.

The courts denied the claim - the emergency nature of the situation and the utility of saving a life made the use of the available vehicle reasonable on these facts.

However, it should be noted that even when the social value of an activity is extremely high, there still exists a need to act with relative diligence. This can be seen in comparing Watt (above) and Ward v London County Council [1938] 2 All ER 341 - the defendant was a fire engine driver who, whilst on the way to an incident, caused an accident by driving through a red light. The courts held that slowing down sufficiently at the junction would not have substantially affected the service's emergency response, and that the social value of the fire service's activities did not justify needlessly endangering other road users.

Thus, the courts can be seen to take the benefit of the defendant’s activities into account in deciding what precautions are reasonable, although this will not usually justify all behaviour undertaken by the defendant.

The common law position on social value has now been supplemented by statute. Section 1 of the Compensation Act 2006 provides that a court considering a claim in negligence or breach of statutory duty may, in determining whether the defendant should have taken particular steps to meet the standard of care, have regard to whether a requirement to take those steps might prevent a desirable activity from being undertaken at all, to a particular extent or in a particular way, or discourage persons from undertaking functions in connection with a desirable activity. This essentially codified the existing common law approach.

More recently, the Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Act 2015 (the "SARAH Act") went further by requiring courts, when deciding what steps were required to meet a standard of care in a claim in negligence or breach of statutory duty, to have regard to the following matters:

  • Whether the alleged negligence or breach of statutory duty occurred when the defendant was acting for the benefit of society or any of its members (s.2);
  • Whether the defendant demonstrated a predominantly responsible approach towards protecting the safety or other interests of others (s.3); and
  • Whether the alleged negligence or breach of statutory duty occurred when the defendant was acting heroically by intervening in an emergency to assist an individual in danger (s.4).

Whilst the practical impact of the SARAH Act has been debated (some commentators suggest it merely restates the existing common law position), it provides a clear statutory framework for the courts to consider in appropriate cases.

It is also worth noting that the social value of a given activity is dependent on the context of that activity. This principle can be seen at work in Scout Association v Barnes [2010] EWCA Civ 1476. The claimant was injured when he struck a bench against a wall whilst playing a game at a Scouting event, in the dark. The courts were left to ascertain whether the chance of injury that the game presented was in proportion to the social value of the activity. In particular, there existed a question regarding the decision to play the game in the dark (which provided additional excitement but at additional risk). The majority upheld the finding that the added excitement did not justify the added risk of playing this game in the dark. Thus, an activity which ordinarily didn't breach the standard of care became unacceptable when the context changed (in this case, the risk profile changed once the game was played in the dark). It is therefore necessary not only to question the social value of an activity in establishing the relevant standard of care, but also to question the context surrounding the activity - games played in the dark can become too dangerous, and fire engines which go too fast can become so risky that the danger outweighs the benefits of prompt dispatch.

Exam Consideration: When it comes to standard of care, examiners will not be looking for a perfect evaluation of the relevant standard of care - although if you can provide such a thing, do so! Instead, the important thing is to demonstrate that you are aware of all of the different factors that the courts consider in finding the standard of care - likelihood/seriousness of harm, cost of precaution and social value. Where relevant, reference to the Compensation Act 2006, s.1 and the SARAH Act 2015 will demonstrate awareness of the statutory framework.

Proving Breach

Once the relevant standard of care has been established, it is up to the claimant to argue that the defendant breached the standard. This will be based on the balance of probabilities - in other words, the claimant must prove that it was more likely than not that the defendant breached the standard of care.

Res Ipsa Loquitur

Translated as 'the facts speak for themselves', this refers to specific situations in which the claimant cannot directly show that the defendant factually acted in a negligent manner, but in which the claimant argues that it is obvious that their injuries were caused by the defendant's negligence. In other words, the claimant argues that it is more likely than not that the defendant acted negligently, but is unable to detail exactly how the negligence unfolded.

See Scott v London & St Katherine Docks Co (1865) 3 H&C 596 - the claimant was injured by six bags of sugar which fell from the defendants’ warehouse. The courts ruled that there was enough evidence to leave negligence to the jury, though the claimant could not show precisely how the bags had fallen. This is an application of res ipsa loquitur.

Firstly, the thing which causes damage must be under the control of the defendant (or under the control of someone for whose actions the defendant is responsible). Secondly, the cause of the accident must be unknown. And thirdly, the injurious event must be one which would not normally occur without negligence. So, applying this test to the above case, the handling of the bags was under the control of the defendants, the exact cause of the accident was unknown, but the accident was of a type which would not ordinarily occur without negligence (cranes don't usually drop their load suddenly). Such a situation also demonstrates the usefulness of the principle - it means that claimants can still make a claim, even if they cannot directly explain the negligence which has occurred. For example, in the above case, the breach might have been caused by incompetent operation or poor maintenance; regardless, both of these are negligent acts. As such, the maxim of res ipsa loquitur allows claims to be made even if a 'true' narrative of events cannot be provided by the claimant.

Each part of this test can be clarified further. The definition of 'control' depends on the case itself. In Easson v LNER [1944] KB 421 a claimant (a four-year-old child) was injured when he fell out of an open door on a train. It was held that the train company could not be described as being in control of the doors - there was no evidence that the train company had opened the door; it could just as easily have been a passenger on the train who opened it. Thus, the control element of res ipsa loquitur was not established.

The need for an unknown cause is relatively self-explanatory. If the facts of the case are available to the court, then the claimant can rely on them to prove his or her case in fact, rather than relying on res ipsa loquitur. As per Barkway v South Wales Transport [1950] AC 185, once the facts explaining the accident are established, the court decides on those facts whether there was negligence. In Barkway a bus tyre burst because of impact damage. The question was whether the company had a reasonable system for reporting impacts and inspecting tyres. Competing accounts alone do not prevent a court drawing an inference from the evidence.

Finally, it must be successfully argued that the event which caused the claimant's injuries was one which would not ordinarily have occurred if reasonable care had been taken. Scott (above) demonstrates this, as does Ward v Tesco Stores Ltd [1976] 1 WLR 810 - the claimant slipped in a puddle of yoghurt on a supermarket floor. The defendant did not show when the floor had last been inspected or swept. On the evidence the majority inferred a failure to take reasonable care.

The same principle can be seen in Cassidy v Ministry of Health [1951] 2 KB 343. The claimant went into hospital for a routine operation on his hand. Whilst he went into hospital with two stiff fingers on the hand, he left with four. Again, the hospital could be held liable without the claimant identifying which member of staff had been negligent. The result of the treatment, in the absence of a satisfactory explanation, supported the inference of negligence, and so this aspect of res ipsa loquitur was fulfilled.

The effect of res ipsa loquitur is that the facts may support an inference of negligence in the absence of an explanation. The defendant can meet it with evidence of reasonable care or of a credible cause consistent with reasonable care. The legal burden remains on the claimant throughout, and the court decides the issue on all the evidence (Ratcliffe v Plymouth and Torbay Health Authority [1998] EWCA Civ 206).

Cases Involving Criminal Proceedings

Finally, it is possible for a claimant to use a defendant's criminal conviction as evidence that the offence was committed, where that fact is relevant, as per the Civil Evidence Act 1968:

s.11 Convictions as evidence in civil proceedings

(2) In any civil proceedings in which by virtue of this section a person is proved to have been convicted of an offence by or before any court in the United Kingdom or of a service offence [...]

(a) he shall be taken to have committed that offence unless the contrary is proved.

If the conviction is proved and relevant, the defendant is taken to have committed the offence unless the contrary is proved. This is particularly relevant in traffic accidents: a conviction for careless driving can establish a failure to drive with reasonable care. The claimant must still prove that the breach caused the loss claimed.

Exam Consideration: Do not get questions of breach mixed up with questions of causation (which are discussed in the next chapter)!

Questions of breach revolve around being able/unable to show that the defendant acted negligently.

In contrast, questions of causation revolve around being able/unable to show that the defendant's conduct led to the claimant's injuries.

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