Psychiatric Illness Lecture
How does Tort Treat Psychiatric Illness?
In a similar manner to the way tort law treats economic loss, claims in tort for negligently caused psychiatric illness have their own set of rules which must be followed before a valid claim can be made. However, whilst it is relatively straightforward to see why economic losses should be controlled (namely, their potentially infinite nature), the contemporary reasoning behind the restriction on claims for psychiatric harm is a little less clear. Indeed, as will be revealed below, it is far easier for a claimant to make a claim for a small cut on his or her arm, than it is for that same claimant to receive damages for years of psychological harm. Historically, the reasoning becomes a little clearer - it is only in recent years that psychological illness has become relatively well understood and accepted as a facet of healthcare, whereas in the past it was far more likely to be seen as a character flaw (e.g. male mental illness was ascribed to weakness, women were thought of as being hysterical etc.)
However, there is some obvious basis for restricting claims for psychiatric harm stemming from a negligent act. Take, for example, a particularly gruesome car accident. Physical harm will usually be restricted to the passengers in the involved vehicles, with some associated property damage. In contrast, the psychological ramifications of such an accident can be much further reaching. Those involved might be traumatised, but then so might those who are witness to the accident. At the same time, accidents tend to attract rescuers, both in an official capacity (fire, police services) and an unofficial capacity (passers-by), all of whom might be exposed to situations which take a long-term toll on their mental health. Finally, the information age has brought about the ability for (at a leap) billions of individuals to witness a given event in both live and recorded forms, who themselves might be negatively affected by a witnessed event. It is thus clear that some restrictions need to be put in place in order to have a practically viable system for compensating psychiatric harm. These restrictions can be separated into two camps - firstly, there are restrictions on the nature of the psychiatric harms which can be claimed for. Secondly, whilst the elements of negligence (duty, breach, causation, remoteness) are the same for a claim involving psychiatric harm, there are certain principles governing the exact forms that they take.
General Rule One: Psychiatric Injuries Must Be Medically Recognised
Not all psychiatric harms are recognised by the law equally. Instead, as a means of separating legitimate and illegitimate claims the law states that psychiatric injury must manifest in a medically recognised condition. In the past, legitimate claims were based around the idea of ‘nervous shock’, although nowadays you are more likely to find references to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and various other specifically defined mental illnesses.
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
This can be seen in Leach v Chief Constable of Gloucestershire Constabulary [1999] 1 WLR 1421. The claimant was working as an unpaid volunteer when, without warning as to the nature of his crimes, she agreed to act as an appropriate adult for serial killer Fred West during the investigation of his crimes. She alleged that she suffered PTSD (and a stroke). The Court of Appeal allowed her claim over the failure to warn or support her to proceed to trial. It did not decide that the police were liable.
Pathological Grief
As per Vernon v Bosley (No. 1) [1997] 1 All ER 577, grief may form part of a medically recognised psychiatric illness. The claimant was called to a car accident in which his daughters died, and suffered from a psychiatric illness after witnessing attempts to rescue them. The defendant argued that these symptoms were simply a matter of simple grief, and thus not actionable. The court disagreed - witnessing the failed rescue materially contributed to his psychiatric illness. Grief contributing to the same illness did not defeat his claim.
Anxiety Neurosis
As seen in Chadwick v British Railways Board [1967] 1 WLR 912, Mr Chadwick lived nearby to the site of a serious train crash (with 90 fatalities). He attended as an untrained rescuer, and due to the traumatic nature of the events he had witnessed, developed an acute anxiety neurosis resulting in over 6 months of treatment as a psychiatric inpatient.
Physical Injury Following Shock
Although not strictly a psychiatric injury (rather, a physical harm occasioned by psychiatric trauma), physical injury following shock has also been alleged. One such claim was the Scottish appeal in Bourhill v Young [1943] AC 92. The claimant, who was pregnant at the time, heard the collision in which a motorcyclist was killed and later saw blood on the road. Her child was stillborn. She subsequently brought a case against the motorcyclist’s estate. It should be noted that the case failed - injury by shock to someone in the claimant’s position was not reasonably foreseeable. The House of Lords did not find that the collision caused the stillbirth.
Unrecognised Psychiatric Harms
As a general rule, sadness, grief or general distress are not covered - they are held to be expected parts of everyday life. In England and Wales, eligible relatives have a separate statutory claim for bereavement under s.1A of the Fatal Accidents Act 1976. The distinction between actionable grief and anxiety and non-actionable grief and anxiety can be seen in two cases.
Case in Focus: Hinz v Berry [1970] 2 QB 40
The defendant lost control of his vehicle at speed, crashing into a lay-by where the family had parked, killing the claimant’s husband and badly injuring her children. The courts made a distinction between the morbid depression that the claimant suffered and ordinary non-actionable grief:
"In English law no damages are awarded for grief or sorrow caused by a person's death. No damages are to be given for the worry about the children, or for the financial strain or stress, or the difficulties of adjusting to a new life. Damages are, however, recoverable for nervous shock, or, to put it in medical terms, for any recognisable psychiatric illness caused by the breach of duty by the defendant."
— Lord Denning MR, [1970] 2 QB 40, pp. 41–43, quotation at 42H–43A.
A similar rationale can be seen in Rothwell v Chemical and Insulating Co [2007] UKHL 39. The claimants sued their employer when they discovered that they had developed pleural plaques on the lining of their lungs - evidence of past exposure to asbestos. In England and Wales the asymptomatic plaques did not themselves constitute actionable damage. The courts rejected their claims for the anxiety caused by the knowledge that they might later develop a more serious disorder, because the anxiety had not manifested itself in any diagnosed condition. Notably, there was one claimant who did develop a mental illness as a result of this anxiety, and so surpassed this hurdle, but the claim failed for lack of foreseeability.
Exam Consideration: You are unlikely to have a working knowledge of all mental health conditions, and so it will usually be up to you to work out whether the injury constitutes a recognised condition. If you’re lucky, it will be obvious (e.g. the claimant will be described precisely as having PTSD or depression).
If general symptoms are offered up (e.g. sleep disorders, anxiety), ask whether there is evidence of a recognised psychiatric illness. Duration alone cannot establish PTSD or pathological grief, and a short-lived illness is not necessarily mere distress.
If outside of an exam setting, a list of generally recognised conditions can be found online, in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (usually abbreviated as DSM-5-TR).
Secondary Victims: Witnessing an Accident or Its Immediate Aftermath
A secondary victim must suffer a recognised psychiatric illness caused by directly perceiving an accident involving a loved one, or its immediate aftermath. There is no separate requirement of sudden shock. Gradual illness can also be actionable under a duty owed directly to the claimant, as where an employer failed to take reasonable steps in response to a foreseeable risk of psychiatric injury to a particular employee from stress at work (Barber v Somerset County Council [2004] UKHL 13).
Case in Focus: Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1992] 1 AC 310
The case arose as a result of the 1989 Hillsborough disaster. In short: various police failings meant that a large crowd of football supporters were allowed into a crowded, fenced-in terrace at Hillsborough football stadium. In turn, this led to a severe crowd crush incident in which 97 people ultimately lost their lives. This was witnessed by a large number of individuals - both in-person and via TV broadcasts of the disaster as it occurred. In discussing the then understanding of shock, Lord Ackner said the following:
"‘Shock’, in the context of this cause of action, involves the sudden appreciation by sight or sound of a horrifying event, which violently agitates the mind. It has yet to include psychiatric illness caused by the accumulation over a period of time of more gradual assaults on the nervous system."
— Lord Ackner, at pp. 400E–401F, quotation at 401F
In Paul the Supreme Court held that this description of shock does not impose a test for recovery. The claimant must prove that witnessing the accident or its immediate aftermath caused the illness, without having to prove a particular psychological mechanism or that the scene was sufficiently horrifying. Alcock also provides an outline of the primary and secondary victim classes (discussed below.) It also provides a key example of the potentially wide-reaching effects of a negligent act when public media is involved.
An earlier application of the ‘sudden shock’ approach can be seen in North Glamorgan NHS Trust v Walters [2002] EWCA Civ 1792 - the claimant’s 10-month-old son suffered from liver disease which the hospital failed to diagnose. He died about 36 hours after a seizure. Although the event itself was relatively protracted, this was held to be sufficiently immediate. The concept of the ‘seamless tale’ or continuous horrifying event was applied - the 36-hour period from the first seizure to death was treated as a single shocking event.
However, the Supreme Court held that Walters was wrongly decided and rejected the ‘seamless tale’ approach in the important recent decision of Paul v Royal Wolverhampton NHS Trust [2024] UKSC 1.
Case in Focus: Paul v Royal Wolverhampton NHS Trust [2024] UKSC 1
Mr Paul suffered a cardiac arrest and died while out with his daughters, some 14 months after the defendant NHS Trust had allegedly failed to diagnose his heart condition. The daughters witnessed their father’s collapse and brought proceedings for psychiatric injury as secondary victims.
The Supreme Court dismissed the claims. A doctor’s duty to diagnose and treat a patient does not extend to protecting relatives against psychiatric injury from witnessing the effects of the patient’s illness. The daughters saw a medical crisis, not an accident causing injury or a risk of injury by violent external means. The court left open whether an accident in a medical setting could qualify. In MIM v Sheffield Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust [2026] EWHC 562 (KB), the High Court applied Paul to a father’s claim arising from a delayed delivery. He had not witnessed an accident.
Duty of Care and Psychiatric Harm
Assuming the above rules have been followed, the next step is establishing a duty of care between claimant and defendant. As per Alcock (facts immediately above), the secondary victim rules concern close ties of love and affection, proximity in time and space and direct perception. It is important to note at this point the distinction the law makes between the duty a defendant has towards primary victims and the duty a defendant has towards secondary victims.
Case in Focus: Page v Smith [1996] AC 155
The defendant negligently failed to give way when moving from a side road onto a main road. This resulted in a collision with the claimant’s car. Whilst the claimant was physically unharmed by the accident, it caused him to suffer from myalgic encephalomyelitis (ME) (also known as Chronic Fatigue Syndrome) - a condition which he had previously had, but which was in remission before the accident. The key issue was whether this harm was foreseeable or not.
The court held that two classes of claimants exist with regard to psychiatric injury - primary and secondary. The former class includes those directly involved in an accident or incident (for example, those in the car in traffic accidents), and the latter includes those who suffer injury through witnessing an accident in which someone else is killed, injured or put in peril, or its immediate aftermath. It was held that for primary victims, foreseeability of physical injury to the claimant is sufficient to allow a primary victim to claim for a psychiatric injury. So, in a traffic accident such as this one, if it is held to be reasonably foreseeable that turning onto a main road unexpectedly might physically injure the claimant, then this is regarded as being sufficient to establish foreseeability of psychiatric harm.
Note: The correctness of Page v Smith has been doubted in subsequent cases. In Rothwell [2007] UKHL 39 the House of Lords declined to depart from it but distinguished illness caused by fear of a future disease. Shorter v Surrey and Sussex Healthcare NHS Trust [2015] EWHC 614 (QB) concerned a secondary victim. Paul v Royal Wolverhampton NHS Trust [2024] UKSC 1 rejected the requirement applied in Shorter that the event be objectively horrifying. Page v Smith remains authority for primary victims of accidents.
The Scope of Primary Victims
Whilst, broadly, the primary victim category is relatively straightforward to understand, there have been two specific groups of people that the law has historically placed in the primary category.
The first of these groups are rescuers - those who attend the scene of an accident. Rescue alone does not confer primary victim status: rescuers are only considered primary victims when they are either objectively exposed to danger or they hold a reasonable belief that they are in danger. The source for this principle can be found in White and Others v Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police [1999] 2 AC 455. Like Alcock, this case also revolved around the events of the Hillsborough disaster, but involved various members of the police claiming for psychiatric injury as rescuers attending the disaster. The court rejected the idea that they were primary victims of the event, stating that in order to fit into this category they must be exposed (or reasonably believe themselves to be exposed) to danger. This was not the case for the police, and so the claim failed. It was also notably pointed out that it would be unjust for police officers to recover when bereaved relatives could not under the Alcock control mechanisms.
To better understand the primary victim principle, consider the following example. A negligently caused explosion on an oil rig results in a fire. Consider three examples of people who might be primary victims of such an event. Firstly, those hurt by the explosion will be primary victims - they are physically harmed by the negligence (and this is foreseeable). They may recover for psychiatric injury caused by the accident. Under Page, those personally endangered need not have suffered physical injury.
Secondly, there are those who come to the aid of the oil rig workers after seeing the explosion. Assuming that those rescuers are placed into physical risk by the fire, they can be considered to be in the ‘danger zone’, and are therefore primary victims, who can claim for psychiatric injury, as per White.
Thirdly and finally, some of those who attend might not factually be exposed to the dangers of the fire, but might believe themselves to be - for instance, they might rush in to help others, believe themselves to be at risk, when in actual fact the fire has been contained. As long as the rescuer’s belief that they are in the danger zone is reasonable, then they will be able to claim for psychiatric injury as a primary victim, again, as per White.
The second group of people is those who believed themselves to have caused the death or injury of another. The discussion of rescuers in White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1999] 2 AC 455 did not settle every case of involuntary participation. In W v Essex County Council [2001] 2 AC 592 the House of Lords allowed an arguable claim based on the parents’ unwitting involvement to proceed to trial.
This can be seen in Dooley v Cammell Laird [1951] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 271 - the claimant was a dockside crane operator employed by the shipbuilders and lent with the crane to a subcontractor. Whilst loading a ship with heavy materials, the defective sling provided by the subcontractor broke. The load dropped suddenly into the hold of the ship, where men were working. None was struck, but the claimant could not see if he had killed anyone or not. Believing, temporarily, that he had killed somebody (or a number of people), the claimant suffered acute shock, aggravating a pre-existing psychological condition. This was held to be a valid claim - the claimant had a reasonable belief that he had killed someone.
A belief in one’s responsibility does not by itself make a claimant a participant. In Hunter v British Coal [1998] 2 All ER 97, an operator of a mining vehicle hit a water hydrant whilst driving through a poorly lit, overly narrow section of mine. He attempted to close the hydrant with the help of a colleague. He left temporarily to get a hose to drain the pooling water. The hydrant then exploded, killing his colleague. He went to turn off the water, a task that took about 10 minutes, and was then told that his colleague appeared to be dead. He believed that he was responsible for killing his colleague (because he drove into the hydrant). As a result, he developed a depressive illness. In legal terms, however, the defendants were in breach of duty in relation to the conditions in the roadway. The claimant’s case failed. He did not see the fatal incident, and the majority did not regard his later guilt-induced illness as a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the breach.
Exam Consideration: Distinguish rescuers claiming under White from someone whom the defendant’s negligence has foreseeably made an unwilling participant in an accident. Ask what the claimant actually did and perceived, and whether their belief that they had injured someone was reasonable. Nonetheless, in discussing the development of the law it is important to know how the category of primary victims has changed over the past few decades.
Secondary Victims
In order for a claimant to have a viable claim as a secondary victim, they must satisfy a number of criteria established in Alcock and confirmed by the Supreme Court in Paul v Royal Wolverhampton NHS Trust [2024] UKSC 1. Firstly, there must be a close emotional link between the claimant and the primary victim. In other words, the courts largely require that the secondary victim be closely related in some way to a primary victim. Alcock once again illustrates this point: the ten appeals failed for different reasons. Some claimants had not proved a close tie; others had not witnessed the accident or its immediate aftermath. Regardless of this ruling, it should be emphasised that the rule is that there must be a close emotional link, not that the secondary victim must be a spouse or parent of a primary victim. Rather, whilst cases involving spouses, or a parent and child, benefit from a rebuttable presumption of a sufficiently close relationship, other relationships can satisfy this criterion. The severity of the accident does not dispense with the requirement of a close tie.
The Court of Appeal considered older suggestions about bystanders in McFarlane v EE Caledonia Ltd [1994] 2 All ER 1. It rejected the claim of a bystander who had witnessed the Piper Alpha disaster without a sufficiently close relationship to the victims.
Exam Consideration: Because of the relative vagueness of the ‘close relationship’ category, it can often crop up in problem questions as a means of testing your ability to argue coherently in situations without clear-cut rules. This might take the form of either an estranged parental or spousal relationship (in other words: you need to rebut the presumption), or a different family tie which is described in the text as being extremely close, such as siblings or fiancées (in this situation, you’ll need to argue for the closeness of the relationship.)
Secondly, the secondary victim must be both close in terms of ‘spatial and temporal proximity’ (translation: same time, same place.) In other words, the claimant must be present at the accident or its immediate aftermath. As seen in McLoughlin v O’Brian [1983] 1 AC 410, the immediate aftermath can include a hospital away from the scene. The claimant’s husband and children were involved in a serious traffic accident. The claimant only found out about the accident two hours later, and she was immediately taken to the hospital to see her family. She then learned that her youngest daughter had been killed, and saw the injuries of her husband and children, who were still covered in oil and mud. The claimant sued the defendant for psychiatric injury. Her claim succeeded - the claimant came upon the immediate aftermath of the incident, and this was held to be sufficiently close in space and time.
The Supreme Court in Paul v Royal Wolverhampton NHS Trust [2024] UKSC 1 made clear that the time between the negligent act and an accident is not the test. A person who sees a building collapse may qualify even if it was negligently built years before. In Paul, the father’s collapse 14 months after the alleged missed diagnosis was a consequence of his illness, not an accident.
Thirdly, the secondary victim must see or hear the accident or its immediate aftermath with their own unaided senses. The importance of such a rule can be seen in Alcock - a huge number of people saw the events over TV (remember, the disaster took place during a football broadcast, and was then covered by live news.) It should be noted that the rule is not that seeing a primary victim die or get injured on a TV broadcast makes a claim automatically invalid. The television pictures in Alcock did not show identifiable individuals suffering injury. Whilst viewers might know a close relation was in that particular stand of the stadium, they could not directly see the harm done to them. Lord Ackner did not exclude the possibility of an exceptional live broadcast being equivalent to direct sight or hearing:
"Although the television pictures certainly gave rise to feelings of the deepest anxiety and distress, in the circumstances of this case the simultaneous television broadcasts of what occurred cannot be equated with the "sight or hearing of the event or its immediate aftermath." Accordingly shocks sustained by reason of these broadcasts cannot found a claim. […] Many other such situations could be imagined where the impact of the simultaneous television pictures would be as great, if not greater, than the actual sight of the accident.”
— Lord Ackner, [1991] 4 All ER 907, at 921; [1992] 1 AC 310, at 405.
These three criteria are cumulative. A spouse who sees their partner die in front of them, with their own eyes, in an accident caused by the defendant may have a valid claim if the accident caused a recognised psychiatric illness and such injury was reasonably foreseeable. Conversely, a distant third cousin who learns about a primary victim’s bruise days later from a television recording has not directly perceived the accident or its immediate aftermath.
Exam Consideration: A useful memory aid for the elements of secondary victims’ claims is to create your own fictional situation (such as those immediately above) as a means of bringing all of the elements together. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Paul v Royal Wolverhampton NHS Trust [2024] UKSC 1, you should also be prepared to consider what the secondary victim actually witnessed. A gap between negligent conduct and an accident does not prevent recovery. A later medical crisis resulting from an undiagnosed illness is not itself the accident required by Alcock.
Other Legal Principles
There are a few other principles which apply in cases of psychiatric injury.
Foreseeability
When dealing with secondary victims, it must be reasonably foreseeable that a psychiatric injury might occur to someone in the given circumstances. So, to reiterate, when dealing with primary victims the standard is foreseeable physical or psychiatric injury, whilst when dealing with secondary victims the standard is foreseeable psychiatric injury in a person of reasonable fortitude.
The ‘Egg-shell Skull’ Rule
Secondly, the ‘egg-shell skull’ rule (as often seen in criminal law) applies to psychiatric injury. In essence, this means that a claimant’s particular psychiatric injury does not need to be foreseeable - the mere fact that some psychiatric harm is foreseeable is enough to satisfy the criteria. This rule can be seen in Brice v Brown [1984] 1 All ER 997 - the claimant was particularly susceptible to mental illness due to a pre-existing condition. As a result of a car crash, she became neurotically obsessed with her daughter’s safety. She recovered damages. Some psychiatric injury was foreseeable, even though the severity of her illness was not. Damages were assessed for the consequences of the accident, allowing for the chance that her underlying condition would have caused illness in any event.
Primary Victim as Defendant
Secondary victims cannot recover when the defendant is also the primary victim. In other words, if an individual negligently causes themselves a horrible injury, a secondary victim cannot sue for psychiatric injury, as per Greatorex v Greatorex [2000] 4 All ER 769.
Damage to Property
A different question arises where the defendant owes a duty directly to the owner of property and the owner suffers psychiatric injury on seeing it destroyed. This can be seen in Attia v British Gas [1988] QB 304 - the claimant returned home one day to see her house fiercely aflame, as a result of negligence by the defendant. The Court of Appeal held that such a claim was not barred in principle and could go to trial. Foreseeability and causation remained to be proved.
Injurious News
Finally, there is precedent to suggest that negligently presenting shocking news to someone can meet the standard for actionable psychiatric injury. In Allin v City and Hackney Health Authority [1996] 7 Med LR 167, the claimant was told, inaccurately, that her baby was dead. The hospital owed the mother a duty as its patient, and she recovered damages for PTSD. Simply being told that a relative was injured does not meet the direct perception requirement for a secondary victim.
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